Ike almost fires Patton - May 1944

From The Marshall Papers - Volume four:

"Eisenhower informed General Marshall on April 30 that he had sent for Lieutenant General Patton to report and explain his actions, but based "on all of the evidence now available I will relieve him from command.” Eisenhower indicated his faith in the ability of Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges to replace Patton as Third Army commander, but recognized that "the big difference is that Patton has proved his ability to conduct a ruthless drive whereas Hodges has not.” He also expressed his regret that Major General Lucian K. Truscott was unavailable to OVERLORD as a result of his position in the Mediterranean theater. Eisenhower asked Marshall whether Patton should be returned to the United States in his permanent rank or sent home in some higher grade to serve in a training command. "His relief from an active theater will certainly be interpreted by everyone as definite and severe disciplinary action," wrote Eisenhower, "but you would have the immediate problem of absorbing him as a lieutenant general.” Eisenhower added, "After a year and a half of working with him it appears hopeless to expect that he will ever completely overcome his lifelong habit of posing and of self-dramatization which causes him to break out in these extraordinary ways." (Papers of DDE, 3: 1840-41.) "

Marshall Responded to Ike on May 1, 1944:

My view, and it is merely that, is that you should not weaken your hand for OVERLORD. If you think that Patton's removal does weaken your prospect, you should continue him in command. In any event, I do not want you at this time to be burdened with the responsibility of reducing him in rank. Send him home if you see fit, and in grade, or hold him there as surplus if you so desire, or as I have indicated above, continue him in command if that promises best for OVERLORD. I fear my quotation from one editorial may have resulted in over emphasis in your mind of the necessity for drastic action to meet difficult resulting situation here at home. Incidentally, the numerous editorials, while caustic regarding his indiscretion, lack of poise or dignity, suitable to his position have not demanded his release from command. Do not consider War Department position in the matter. Consider only OVERLORD and your own heavy burden of responsibility for its success. Everything else is of minor importance."

Ike reconsidered and after reprimanding Patton, informed Marshall he had decided to keep him in command of 3rd Army.

Eisenhower Rates his Generals - June 1943

From his Diary dated June 11, 1943.

I (Eisenhower) am recording here my impressions and opinions of certain senior officers for reference if I may need them at a later date:

LT General Omar Bradley: This officer is about the best rounded, well balanced senior officer we have in the service... He is respected by British and Americans alike. I have not a word of criticism of his actions to date, and do not expect to have any in the future. I feel there is no position in the army he could not fill with success.

LT. General George Patton: A shrew soldier who believes in showmanship to such an extent that he is almost flamboyant. He talks too much and too quickly and sometimes leaves a bad impression. Moreover, I fear he is a bad example to his subordinates who may be guided only by his surface actions without understanding the deep sense of duty, courage, and service that make up his real personality. He has done well with a combat corps command, and I expect him to do so in all future operations.

LT General Mark Clark - He is the best organizer, planner, and trainer of troops I have yet met in the American Army.... he is certainly one of the best we have. His only drawback now is a lack of combat experience in a high command position. This I tried to give him in the early day of organizing an American task force in the central Tunisian front. He rather resented taking any title other than Army commander, and since I could not establish an American Army in Tunisia, I gave the command to someone else. This was a bad mistake on Clark' s part, but I think he could successfully command an army in operations.

Patton in *his* diary states in July 1943 he thought Eisenhower was looking for an excuse to relieve him during the Sicily Campaign - which shows how perceptive he was. Given Ike's private opinion of him vs. Clark or Bradley- he was right. The implication from this entry is (1) Clark was Ike's first choice as I Corps Commander NOT Patton and (2) Ike considered Bradley and Clark better fit to command an Army.

Bradley and Patton

Bradley and Patton were never friends or knew each other before WW II but they got along fine during the war because both hid their real feelings.

As shown by his diaries, Patton thought he was better man and general than Bradley. To his face, however, Patton was the loyal subordinate. The same is true of Bradley. He never criticised Patton during WWII for conduct of the Sicily campaign.

Its only after Patton's death and his publication of his papers/diaries that Bradley went public with his feelings.

As for true feelings. Bradley thought Patton while willing to take risks, great at pursuit, and a "thruster" was a sloppy administrator and adverse to detailed planning. Further, he thought Patton was too interested in public publicity. Patton, OTOH, thought Bradley had no vision or imagination, feel for the enemy, and was unwilling to take risks.

IMO, the men worked best when Patton was boss. Bradley could temper Patton recklessness, and was able to perform the detailed planning necessary to implement his ideas.

Further, Bradley was an example of the peter principle. His natural ceiling in my opinion was Army Commander. He had no ability to put himself in the enemies place or understand what the Germans could do or couldn't do. (Despite ULTRA!) For example:

1) Prior to D-day he thought that the landings would be easy, the tough part would be stopping the enemy counterattack ala Salerno or Anzio. Completely wrong.

2) He completely missed the significance of the Hedgerows on military operations.

3) After the breakout he constantly reined Patton in, and forced him to provide flank guards, completely misreading the ability of the Germans to counterattack. The failure to close the gap at Falsaise is his fault.

4) Having overestimated the Germans during the Normandy breakout, he went the other extreme and considered the war won in late August and early September. Advancing on a broad front, he threw away any chance of reaching the Rhine.

5) He continued to underestimate the Germans throughout Sept-Dec 1994. Launching penny packet attacks all along the front, he incurred thousands of causalities while accomplishing nothing. He was taken surprise during the Battle of the Bulge because he thought the German could never counterattack.

6) After the Bulge, he went back to Overestimating the Germans. Demanding that the ENTIRE West bank of the Rhine be occupied before any further advance. Holding up Patton. Demanding the Ruhr pocket be eliminated before any further advance into Germany, etc.

7) Finally, it should be noted that Bradley was against Patton's short-hook landings in Sicily, even though this was correct strategy and hastened the Germans withdrawal. The only thing wrong with them, if fact, was that weren't done sooner and in bigger strength. But Bradley didn't like to take risks.