World War II - Book Reviews

Terrible Terry Allen - Gerald Astor
Awful Biography of one the US Army's best Divisional Commanders.  Allen commanded the  "Big Red One" in North Africa and Sicily. He was relieved of command by Bradley in August 1943, and sent back to the USA.  Later, he commanded the 104th Division in Northwest Europe. The whole book reads like a first draft, and shows no evidence of original research. Superficial and without footnotes. Example of how bad the book is:  Astor quotes a guy, who knew a guy, who knew Allen who states Allen "later in life" attributed his August 1943 relief to "anti-Catholic" bias. The rest of the "Relief" story is based on secondary sources. This great American soldier deserves a better biography.  Rating *

A General's Life: Autobiography of Omar Bradley - Clay Blair
Published after Bradley had died, this is a jazzed-up "update" of  Bradley's 1951 Autobiography "A Soldier's Story".  How much of it is Bradley and how is Clay Blair is unknown. In any case, it says nothing new at great length.  Also, Bradley was personally dull, so that drags the book down.  Too bad, because Bradley was one of the most important Generals in WW II, commanding 43 Divisions at one point.  Unfortunately, no one seems interested in writing a critical analysis of him. Disappointing.  Rating **

Calculated Risk -  Mark Clark
This one surprised me. Published in 1950, this is a dense, informative, 450 page autobiography which focuses on the Italian Campaign. As you'd expect, Clark defends his controversial Generalship, and gives us HIS side of the story. He admits to the occasional mistake, but anyone looking for apologies over the Rapido River or Anzio disasters will be disappointed.  He also records his contempt for General Devers and his disagreements with Alexander.  However, in the name of post-war Allied unanimity,  his more tart opinions - recorded in his Diary - about other British Generals and 8th Army are excluded from the book.  Superior to most right-after-the-war biographies.  Rating ***

Combat Commander - Earnie Harmon
 Harmon was commander of 1st Armored Division at Anzio and Tunisia, and later served as Division and Corps Commander in the ETO, including the battle of Bulge. Because it was published in 1970, Harmon is much more honest and critical of other Generals.  He's especially down on Fredendall and Hodges. His favorite General? William Simpson. Harmon also explains why - despite his battlefield successes - it took him so long to become a Corps commander. It seems he recommended someone George Marshall didn't like for promotion, and got on Marshall's "don't promote" list.  A  good WW II autobiography Rating ***

Command Decisions - Lucian Truscott 
An excellent post-war autobiography by one the best American Generals in World War 2. Fighting in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, Truscott rose from Divisional commander to 5th Army Commander. Aggressive and dynamic.  it seems everyone: Alexander, Churchill, Patton, Bradley, Ike, and Clark, liked him. Well-written, the book is jammed packed with details and goes over every battle Truscott was involved in.  The only minus? Like most post-war books, Truscott refuses to criticize other Generals (especially Clark).  The only exception is Patton.  But than Patton had been dead for over 8 years when Truscott published the book.  Rating ***

The Black Count - A Book Review

The Black Count: Glory, Revolution, Betrayal, and the Real Count of Monte Cristo

Author:TOM REISS

Subject: Biography  of Thomas-Alexandre Dumas Davy de la Pailletrie, father of Alexander Dumas Sr. (1802-1870) author of the Count de Monte Cristo and The Three Musketeers. Born in 1762 on the French colony of Saint-Domingue, T.A. Dumas was the son of a French aristocrat and a slave, who come to France in 1776 and during the French Revolution rose from the rank of Corporal to General. Serving under Napoleon in Italy and Egypt, Dumas became a prisoner of war in 1799 and held captive in a Dungeon for two years. Ignored by Napoleon after his return, he died in obscurity in 1806.

An enjoyable read if dubious history, Reiss interlaces the story of General Dumas with his own search for Dumas' records and letters. Reiss records his travels to Hati, France, Italy, and Egypt as he follows Dumas' life. Reiss also gives us a "The French Revolution For Dummies" to further pad out the book and help his NPR-PBS readers understand the historical backdrop. While good as pop history; it suffers from four main flaws -

First, because the historical record is so thin, Reiss relies heavily on Alexandre Dumas' memoirs. Written in the novelist's hero-worshiping romantic style, 50 years after General Dumas' death, his comments on his father are dubious history to say the least. Reiss also quotes the General's letters and some other primary sources, including French Army official records and correspondence, but most of the book is simply speculation and conjecture about what the hero “must have,” “may have” or “probably” felt, heard or thought. It can't be anything else, because General Dumas died young, left no memoirs, and made little or no impression on most of his contemporaries.  And despite all his travels, Reiss'  account does not differ much from John Gallaher’s 1997 monograph, General Alexandre Dumas: Soldier of the French Revolution.  

Second,  he vastly overstates the historical importance of General Dumas, his military ability, and his impact on his contemporaries.  Dumas did not rise from private to General because he was a military genius - but because he was a strong Republican, politically reliable, and there was a need for men with military experience.  The French Revolutionary Army was full of young Generals who were extremely young or former enlisted men. Some were even political favorites with absolutely no military experience (cf: Jean Carteaux,  Commander "Army of the Alps"  a former painter)  Nor was his meteoric rise unusual.  A comparison of Dumas to the other officers/Generals in the "Army of Egypt" shows the following:

• Dumas - Royal Army Corporal.  General at 31 (1793)
• Desaix -  Divisional General at 24. (1793)
• Reynier - Divisional General at 24 (1795)
• Kleber - 1792 enlisted as a private, Division Commander -1793. 
• Dommartin -   Royal Army Captain, General at 28 (1796)
• Napoleon - Commissioned Lieutenant, General at 24 (1793)
• Murat -  Enlisted Private, General at 30 (1797)
• LeClerc - Commissioned Lieutenant, General at 26 (1798)
• Davout - Royal Army Lieutenant,  General at 23 (1793)

Sometimes minor historical figures are unjustly forgotten, but usually they deserve to be forgotten because the were, well, minor.

Thirdly, Reiss seems to think Napoleon and General Dumas were rivals, and that Napoleon  hated Dumas because:  "... he didn't like the fact that this 6-foot-plus, incredibly dashing and physically brilliant general was such a contrast to him in every way.. Also, he didn't like being confronted ... and Dumas was really someone who couldn't stop from speaking his mind." [NPR Interview]. This is absurd. Not only is there no proof of this, Napoleon wasn't jealous of anyone -he was Napoleon - and in any case, was constantly surrounded by dashing, physically brilliant generals, his entire career.

And Napoleon had some very good reasons for not giving General Dumas a command upon his return from prison in 1801.  The army was downsizing since war on the continent had ended, and didn't start again until 1804. Second, Dumas had shown himself to be insubordinate, in Egypt to Napoleon,  to General Kellerman in 1796, and to General Berthier 1797.  Throw in his quitting the Egyptian Campaign, his poor health (he spent almost 2 years of medical leave from 1794-1796), and his Republicanism, there's really no reason for Napoleon to have given him a Command over more deserving, more loyal generals.

Finally,  Reiss tries make General Dumas, some sort of noble Black man in a white man's world.  Or per the NPR interview:  "He's a black man, born into slavery, and then he rises higher than any black man rose in a white society before our own time," Reiss tells NPR's Scott Simon. "He became a four-star general and challenges Napoleon, and he did it all 200 years ago, at the height of slavery."

Actually, we have no idea how "black" Dumas was. Was his mother a mulatto or a Negro? We don't know.  We do know that Dumas came to France at 14, spoke perfect French, had European features, and lived the life of young aristocrat (including horse riding and fencing) till the age of 24.  His family, friends, colleagues,  and wife were all white and French. He was French in every way, except skin color.

Nor was he a great noble figure.  Reiss completely ignores Dumas' treatment of  General François Kellermann.   Upset at returning to the "Army of Alps" as a subordinate, Dumas began writing letters to Paris charging Kellermann (in the language of the Russian Revolution) with being a "Counter-Revolutionary". A sensitive point, since Kellermann had already been imprisoned for being a former aristocrat. When called to account and shown the facts, Dumas wrote insulting letters to Kellermann, forcing a transfer.

Book Review: 98 Days - A Geographer's Review of the Vicksburg Campaign.

This is one of the most informative books I've read on the Vicksburg Campaign. While the prose is rather mediocre, Professor Grabau explains several things about the campaign that have always puzzled me. To whit:

•  1) Why was Vicksburg so important? Answer: Vicksburg and Port Hudson kept Union gunboats out of this 240 mile stretch of Mississippi, thereby allowing the Confederates to ship supplies down the Red River and across the Mississippi to the East. 
•  2) Why was the Black River considered a military obstacle despite its low water level in summer? Answer: The River has steep banks that retard movement by wagons or artillery no matter what the water level. Which is why fords and bridges were so important. Add that the uncleared banks were full of trees, brush, and fallen timber, and you can see why roads leading to fords and bridges were the only way over the river. 
•  3) Why were military operations in Mississippi difficult in mid to late Summer? Answer: Not only did most of the creeks and small lakes dry up, but the lack of well-water meant armies had to depend on farmers rainwater cisterns for water. And these cisterns weren't big enough to supply a large army with water. Both armies at Vicksburg had to transport water from the Mississippi or Yazoo to their troops. The Confederates by hand, the Union by water-wagon. 
•  4) Why were Civil war armies brought to a halt by rain? Roads contained neither gravel or rock, rain turned them to mud and the average Civil war wagon or Artillery piece had ground pressure PSI of 64. By comparison a Sherman Tank had a ground pressure PSI of 14. Result: the wagon or artillery soon sunk to its axles in mud.

Naked Lunch

Having occasionally shared neighborhoods with junkies, I have always been amazed by how thoroughly uninteresting their lives are. This book confirms my view. It works really hard to make lives of junkies literary interesting, but fails since the material that the author works with is intrinsically dull. One cannot but help shedding a tear for all the trees that has been wasted making this all too thick book.

I  know what you're thinking. "Who's this square that doesn't like Naked Lunch? Must be some kinda conservative nutjob not to like this amazing piece of counter-culture artwork!"

Hey, I get it. You're edgy. Go you. Yes, shocking images of sex and drug use and pedophilia and cannibalism and stickin' it to the man, man. Just leave this where your parents will find it and you know you'll earn cool points with the cats back at school. Leave it on your coffee table while your friends come over and you know you'll get to share some good stories while passin' the bong around, man. I'm sure you're stoked about that.

Sorry, but I hated this book for reasons that differ from why your parents hated it:

1) "Edgy" doesn't sell with me. Maybe in 1959, when this book was first published, this stuff was cutting edge. Maybe it's still cutting edge in the sheltered suburbs of America. But anyone who's been on the internet as long as I have and has long ago found the dark corners has already seen and read far more edgy stuff than what's in this book. You want edgy? I can direct you to some websites that will make Naked Lunch look like a book for 3rd graders.  It's 2013.

2) It's not a good or enjoyable book if the "edgy" thing doesn't catch you. The stories, if you can call them that, are disjointed, often lack internal cohesion even from one page to the next within the same story and just aren't remotely interesting narratives. I get the idea that we are supposed to be taking a wild ride through the drug addled brain of the author but if you've read a quarter of the book, you've read the whole thing -- it's nothing but more and more of the same nonsensical pseudo-stories. By a quarter of the way in I was like, "Yeah, yeah, I get it. Drugs messed you up. Let's get on with it." And he never got on with it. Just story after story of cheap "shocker" material that's probably excellent and revealing if you feel like an overly sheltered artist waiting to break out of his protective shell.

For the unsheltered generations, the book is a bore, at best. Maybe it's interesting discussion material regarding the repressed generations of decades gone by, who really had their socks knocked off by what was in this book. Maybe it's interesting discussion material about how some people will like just about anything if they think it makes them look "edgy" in the eyes of their peers. Maybe it's a good book for convincing your kids to stay off drugs, especially if they want to ever become coherent writers.

Although I could appreciate the dark, twisted, imaginative imagery, there was just no real story to speak of. There were hints of satire here and there, but then the prose would just descend into an incoherent mess. I can only recommend this book as a cautionary tale about the nightmarish, horrifying, delusional state that being a heroin junkie must put you in.

"a collection of 3-page surreal vignettes readable in any order." A secondary caveat would be that a lot of the language he uses seems to have inside references -- think of your group of junior high friends and the words you made up with each other.

As far as the language goes, it seems to be a mix of now-dated street slang, Clockwork Orangesque made-up slang, dashed with a few $10 words here and there.

Strom Thurmond's America - Book review

This is a well written, interesting biography on a South Carolinian Senator who had a long distinguished career. A self-described "Health Nut" Thurmond lived to be over 100, and served 48 years in the US senate (1954-2003) and 4 years as SC Governor (1948-1953). Crespino writes from a fair but liberal perspective and gets it right mostly. The books has three major flaws (1) he spends far too much time on Thurmond's post 1972 career (1/4 of the book) which is well known to anyone over the age of 40. (2) the author didn't know Thurmond personally and there's no evidence he interviewed members of Thurmond's family or staff (3) too much of the book is based is based on newspaper clippings and secondary sources. For example, I wanted the author source for "J.Edgar Hoover was aiding Southerners in their fight against Civil rights" and "waging a covert war against MLK" and all I get is a reference to a book called "America in the King Years" and a clipping from the April 1964 New York Times.

I was also disappointed in the vague, superficial coverage of Thurmond's fight against the civil rights bills of 1957 and 1964. What was Thurmond's role in both these struggles? Why did he put so much effort into what he knew was a losing cause? What did he think of the bills in later years - did he regret opposing them? Crespino never provides many details. Further, he states that Thurmond's attacks and predictions regarding the 1964 proved incorrect, but the imposition of affirmative action and school busing seems to indicate just the opposite.

Finally, Crespino never adequately addresses the role of Southern White Democrats in the 1960s and 1970s. Of the 21 Southern Democrat Senators who voted against the 1964 Civil Rights bill only Thurmond became a Republican. Why? What made Thurmond different from George Wallace (who died a Democrat), former KKK member Byrd who became Democrat Senate Majority Leader, or even his fellow SC Senator Fritz Hollings (responsible for Flying the Confederate Flay over that SC State Capital)? Why was Thurmond able to win election as a Republican senator when SC voted for Jimmy Carter in 1976, and gave Nixon only 38% of the vote in 1968? He never provides the context; preferring to focus narrowly on Republican party. The movement of old-line Democrats like Thurmond to the Republican party during the 1960-1980 time period is never given a broader focus.

3 Civil war Book Reviews

1. Extraordinary Circumstances : The Seven days Battle - Brian Burton

Excellent, scholarly retelling of the Seven Days Battle (June 24th to July 2 1862) covering both sides. Burton is more interested in the Command relationships and purely military aspects and he rarely discusses politics, grand strategy or Lincoln or Davis' opinion of the battle. Told from a commanders point of view, with very little human interest & few personal anecdotes. He's also fair to every one - including Stonewall Jackson and McClellan. Most will find it too dry and technical, others (including me) enjoyed the absence of heroes and villains (the Sears approach). Flaws: Like most modern books the maps are poor. Rating ***

2. The Union Soldier in Battle - Earl Hess

A rambling examination of the ordeal of combat from the Union soldiers perspective. Based on original letters, diaries, and memoirs. Fairly short at 240 pages, it feels much longer, and I don't mean that in a good way. I didn't find any new insights and it wasn't particularly well-organized or well written. Those new to the subject may find it more interesting. Rating **

3. Battle Tactics of the Civil war - Paddy Griffith

Written by a senior lecturer at Sandhurst, Griffith focuses on the the battle tactics of the war. His main argument: the Civil War, far from being the 1st Modern war, was in fact, the last Napoleonic one. Although his opinions are sometimes excessive, and his knowledge somewhat shallow, he makes a convincing case. While the rifled musket did increase both casualties and power of the defense, its impact has been overrated. Casualties, after all, were high in the Napoleonic wars and frontal assaults often ineffective. Further, the rifled musket had the same rate of fire as the smoothbore musket and although more accurate and easier to fire was still - compared to a bolt action rifle - complicated to load and fire, and inaccurate. While a skilled marksman could hit a man at 500 yards, its doubtful if an average Civil war soldier could hit anyone at over 100 yards.

The lack of decisive battles (overwhelming victories) in the Civil war was due to many reasons including (1) the rough and heavily forested terrain (2) the relatively small numbers of Calvary on both sides (3) the poor roads (4) the bad staff work on both sides (5) the almost complete equivalence of both two sides in tactics, lower-level generalship, men, doctrine, and arms (6) the Anglo-Saxon quality of both sides (7) the low offensive value of artillery and (8) the vastness of the Confederacy and lack of one decisive geographical point.

Griffith's book is fairly short, 200 pages, and is directed at those interested in military history. Its full of statistics and charts. I found it interesting but doubt I will re-read. Rating **1/2

The Fountainhead (1943) - Ayn Rand

Plot: On the surface, it is a story of one man, Howard Roark, and his struggles as an architect in the face of a successful rival, Peter Keating, and a newspaper columnist, Ellsworth Toohey. But the book addresses a number of universal themes: the strength of the individual, the tug between good and evil, the threat of collectivism.

Main Characters: Howard Roark, Peter Keating, Ellsworth Toohey, Dominique Francon, Gail Wynand

Pros: Interesting, bigger-than-life characters, sparse, clear prose, Kinky sex, some memorable and/or witty lines, satirical humor, attack on socialism (including Communism).

Cons: Peter Keating character given too much ink, Some Characters unbelievable and/or act illogically (cf: Dominique,the heroine), lack of Character development, too many repetitive scenes, novel too long for such a simple plot.

Not much I can add about the "Fountainhead". Judging by the Amazon reviews people love the novel or hate it. I was somewhat in-between. I found her philosophy interesting but shallow and didn't really mind the speeches. Nor given that it was a "romance" did the unrealistic nature of the characters bother me that much. The problem wasn't the lack of realism but the lack of consistency and the logic of many of their actions. The heroine Dominique for example, starts out as 'smart and level-headed' then becomes 'stupid & crazy' then 'smart but crazy' and finally ends up back at 'smart and level-headed. She's the main female character yet seems the most implausible. Roark meanwhile does things (like helping Keating) which make no real sense. And his change from a one-syllable Bartleby at the start to silver-tonged philosophizer is somewhat unbelievable.

The book really needed an editor. The first part, describing the rise of Keating and the Roark's initial failure is way too long. The book doesn't became interesting until the villain Toohey and Gail Wynand become the focus.

Some odd things about the novel:

• There are no children
• There are no loving parents in the novel. Most characters either have one live parent (that they dislike) or no parents at all.
• Dominique is described as having a "vicious" and/or "cold" mouth about 25 times.
• Roark has "orange" hair.
• Wynand likes Roark so much he goes off with him on his yacht alone for 3 months - and leaves beautiful Dominique at home.
• Characters don't merely draw or write but "violently slash lines on the drawing" or "savagely write". I didn't realize journalism and architecture was so violent until I read Rand.
• Rand's contempt for the average person and religion is quite noticeable.
• The smart characters are constantly being disappointed that another smart character needs it spelled out for them. "I thought you were smarter than that".
• Conversely, Rand is constantly writing that "words were unnecessary between them, they both understood...."

Conclusion: Very enjoyable in spots and not as bad as expected. Rating **1/2

Americans and the past - Robert E. Lee: Reading the Man

I was going to write a book review of "Reading the Man: A Portrait of Lee" by Elizabeth Pryor - but found that 'William Vallante' at Amazon.com had said everything I wanted to say:

"There is indeed a certain childish willfulness in the American mind that insists on chastising the people of the past for not being like them, or else pretending that they were. Which is a certain way NOT to learn anything from history." ---Dr. Clyde Wilson

"Put it this way - if you are the type of person Dr. Wilson is describing, you're going to love this book! If not, you'll be wishing you had paid for it in Confederate bills instead of U.S. dollars.

The book itself contains roughly 175 pages of footnotes, bibliography and index. There are 50 pages of actual letters, some of which have already been published and others of which are not even by Lee, but by other people. If you're planning on seeing 500 pages of newly discovered letters, forget it. The fewer than 50 pages of new letters by Lee himself will leave you grossly disappointed. Finally, we have 425 pages of Ms. Pryor's perseverative and monotonous interpretations of those letters, which I suppose is the "meat" of the book.

According to Ms. Pryor, Lee did not release the Custis slaves immediately. The terms of the will specified "within 5 years" of the elder Custis' death (in 1857). Lee fulfilled that mandate by manumitting them in 1862. This apparently wasn't satisfactory enough for Ms. Pryor as she repeatedly drones on about Lee's failure to understand how the slaves felt.

Ms. Pryor is also critical of Lee for expecting the slaves to actually work!? Oh horror! Oh horror!

Of course, there is the matter of several slaves being whipped by Lee, something which has never been conclusively proven. Like a second rate shyster, Ms. Brown does her best to drum up the case against him.

According to Ms. Pryor, Lee had no appreciation of other cultures and saw nothing worthwhile in the Mexican culture when he was there during the Mexican war. I'm wondering what Pryor expected Lee, an educated, well-to-do man from one of Virginia's first families, to say when he was in Mexico? "Gee! What lovely mud huts!?" I'm pretty sure that Mexico didn't have Grand Melia and Paradisus or any other resorts at that time, so I can't figure out what Ms. Pryor expected him to see in the place? I suppose to understand her reasoning, or her expectations, one would have to refer back to Dr. Wilson's quote above.

Also, according to Ms. Pryor, Lee had "poor cross cultural communications skills", a term apparently taken from today's lexicon of multicultural drivel. In this case she was referring to his "communication", or lack of it, with the Comanches. I ran this past a native American friend of mine and he almost fell over laughing. I'm not sure there were too many folks at the time who had good cross cultural communication skills with the Comanches of that era, as this particular group wasn't usually given to such things themselves. Would that it were possible to transport Ms. Pryor back in time to the 1850s and observe how her "skills" with the Comanches would fare? I would be taking bets on how long she kept her pretty blond hair.

In sum, this book, touted though it is by most "contemporary" historians, is one more example of the sham that has become what we used to call, "the field of history".

Retribution: Max Hastings hates MacArthur

Max Hastings' book on the last year of the Pacific War is a perfect example of MacArthur Derangement Syndrome (MDS). I've never read a respected military historian who hates an Allied general as much as Max hates Mac. Here are some Hastings' comments from Retribution:

• MacArthur by contrast seemed to reject accountability to any earthly power.(P19)

• MacArthur displayed a a taste for fantasy quite unsuited to a field commander. together with an ambition close to megalomania and a consistently poor judgment as a picker of subordinates.(p20)
• Army insiders held MacA personally responsible for the Philippines debacle, by failures of commission and omission, This was unjust, although his generalship was poor...(p20)
• He shamelessly manipulated communiques about his forces achievements, deprived subordinates of credit for successes, shrugged off his own responsibility for failures.
• He made no jokes, and possessed no small talk, though he would occasionally talk baseball to enlisted men in an effort to deceive them that he was human (p22)
• His belief that his critics were not merely wrong, but evil verged on derangement.
• Most distasteful of all his wartime actions was a flirtation with a 1944 run against FDR, whose liberalism affronted his own rabidly conservative convictions Only when he realized he could not defeat Dewey for the Republican nomination did he finally exclude himself. (P23).

And this is just the first 25 pages of a 560 page book! So far it seems that Hastings is the "deranged" one - not MacArthur.

Three Great Books about the old West

1) Col. Dodge - 33 Years Among our Wild Indians
2) J.P. Dunn - Massacres of the Mountains ( A History of the Indian Wars of the Far West)
3) Rodger McGrath - Gunfighters, Highwaymen, and Vigilantes.

Return to Bull Run - John Hennessy

This is probably the best book on the Battle of Second bull Run.

The battle which occurred in late August 1862 is mostly forgotten, sandwiched in between the Seven Days battle and Antietam which occurred 2 weeks later. G.F.R Henderson's has written the definitive account from the Confederate side, but no one has told the entire story in one book. Hennessy corrects the deficiency and focuses on the Union side and John Pope.

The first part of the book ( 125 pages) begins on August 10, 1862 and ends August 27, 1862. Hennessy describes the retreat of Pope to the Rappahannock line, the maneuvering of the armies, and Jackson's march to, and capture of, Manassas Junction. The remaining 330 pages cover the battle itself, Pope's retreat to Washington,. and relief on September 4th. The Bull Run campaign is analyzed in a 17 page epilogue.

I think his analysis is sound, except for the excessive criticism of every one's favorite Civil War punching bag - George McClellan. Echoing the Radical Republicans who wished his destruction Hennessy states McClellan must share with Halleck and Pope primary responsibility for the defeat. Hennessy accuses McClellan of:

• A plodding retreat from Harrison Landing thereby allowing Lee extra days to operate against Pope;
• Using every pretext and excuse not to give Pope aid while at Alexandria;
• Writing Vile things (about Pope) that put him a poor light;
• using invective that not only doomed Porter but led politicians to mistrust the AOP; and
• creating in the AOP a culture of conservatism, risk avoidance, and plodding reliability that hobbled the AOP for years.

Finally, to top it off, he calls McClellan's performance "one of the sorriest chapter in the history of war" and quotes Lincoln's quote to Chase on Sept 2, 1862, that "McClellan has behaved badly in this affair but we must use the tools we have".

The problem is that neither the ORR nor the book narrative supports this. In fact, McClellan played only a tiny role in the 2nd Battle of Bull Run. Until August 23rd he was on the Peninsula arranging the AOP's evacuation. From August 24-26 he at Aquia Creek doing nothing per orders. From August 27th -August 30th he was under Halleck's command at Alexandria both arranging the defenses and sending out troops. Finally, from 1 PM August 30, 1862 to September 4th he was merely in command of the Washington defenses.

The primary responsibility for the defeat lies first with Pope and secondarily with Halleck. Pope and Halleck made the same basic error - they tried to fight a battle with part of the army in transit and without adequate calvary or supplies. Both men underestimated Lee and were determined to show they were bold fighters - unlike McClellan. Sadly, the only thing worse then a overly cautious general is an bold reckless one.

Japanese Prisoners of War in India 1942-1945 By T.R. Sareen

An excellent book on a unknown topic, the Japanese POW's in India. During the Burma war the British took over 2,500 Japanese prisoners in the fighting from July 42 to August 1945. Sareen estimates the Japanese lost about 120,000 men KIA during the same time. It should be noted that 2/3 of the infantry in Burma were Indian and West African. The British made up only 1/3 of the actual fighting forces & in 3 years of fighting lost about 1/3 of KIA. Indian KIA - 10,000 vs. British 5,000. Sareen makes the following points:

1) Tojo codified the Japanese disdain for surrender in 1941. In summary, it forbade surrender, and anyone who surrendered and was returned to Japanese control would be "severely punished" with hard labor/execution. Former POW's would not be allowed to return to Japan . Further, their families would be dishonored and denied a pension. To avoid capture, wounded/sick Japanese were to commit suicide. If unable to do so, medical personnel were expected to kill them.

2) Almost half of all Japanese POW's were too sick/wounded to resist capture. These men did not truly surrender but were TAKEN captive against their will. Some were unconscious from sickness or concussion. The other half were voluntary surrenders. But even the voluntary surrenders were often sick, wounded, and suffering from exhaustion.

3) Few officers and no organized units surrendered. Almost all POW's were individuals or small disorganized groups.

4) Japanese soldiers would often fake surrender/request for medical aid and then blow up the allied soldier with a grenade. Other would use themselves as "bait". They would rise with their hands up and when allied soldiers stood up to receive their surrender, other Japanese troops would open fire. The result is British troops would often shoot wounded /sick Japanese troops rather then take them prisoner.

5) Japanese soldiers believed they would be tortured and executed when taken prisoner. Further, they often try to commit suicide - and even take a allied soldier with them. Accordingly, many died before they reached the POW camp.

6) Japanese soldiers would often give fake names when captured. Feeling disgraced, none of them tried to contact their families. Most felt they were Men without a country. As a result, they would cooperate and provide detailed information on Japanese positions, weapons, and organization.

Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945

Frederick Taylor in his book states the firebombing of Dresden was not a war crime with the following points:

1. BOMBING DRESDEN WAS MILITARILY JUSTIFIED BECAUSE DRESDEN WAS:

• AN ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION CENTER
• A MAJOR RAIL HUB FOR THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS And SUPPLIES
• AN ARMED CAMP .

First, it is true that Dresden had factories producing Zeiss-Ikon optical products, radios, fuses, and electrical components. However Taylor’s assertion that this production was critical to Germany's war effort is incorrect. If Dresden’s armament production was critical for Germany war effort why did the Allies wait until February 1945 to attack? The question answers itself. The British had been bombing targets deep in German territory ever since January 1944. Yet, Dresden was never targeted. Further, optical products, radios and electrical components were produced elsewhere and are not VITAL to the production of tanks or artillery. They enhance the effectiveness but are not VITAL. In any case, these production are add-ons to the final weapon. The Germans had months of production in the pipeline, and it would been months for lack of optical products, radios and fuses, to effect the war effort. Finally, the factories were in the suburbs, miles from the RAF aiming point.

Secondly, Taylor states Dresden's marshaling yards were a legitimate target and were critically important. The problem is that the RAF firestorm on Feb 13th that killed all the civilians at Dresden was NOT aimed the marshaling yards. The RAF’s aim was to create a firestorm in the old wooden densely packed city center, and kill as many civilians as possible. The RAF bombers carried incendiary and blockbuster bombs for that purpose. The later US attacks were aimed at the marshaling yard and bombing carried HE bombs. Notice, there was no followup to the attack Finally, the Germans were back running trains through Dresden a week after the attack. Since the German’s were not rushing to troops to the Eastern Front through Dresden, during this time period the bombing had no real effect. It's apparent that much of the "communications hub" argument was added later on as a justification - after the attack took place

Thirdly, while Dresden had soldiers and airmen in Dresden, so did every other German city. The people killed in the air attack were almost exclusively women, old people, and children. The Military hospitals were in the outskirts and not the target of the bombing. It should be noted that hundreds of our allies, foreign workers and slave laborers were killed in the attack.

Finally, Taylor simply omits that the War was almost over. It would end in 3 months. In February 13, 1945. The Soviets were on the Oder river only 90 miles from Berlin. The Western allies had complete air supremacy over Germany and were bombing at will. Montgomery and Bradley had launched an offensive to clear the Rhineland and within 2 weeks would be in control of the Rhine’s western bank. By March 6, 1945 we would have a bridgehead over the Rhine at Remagan. Within 5 weeks, Montgomery would launch his massive offensive the Rhine and by April 17, 1945 US troops would reach the Elbe. The attack on Dresden was the last major firebombing of a major German city since all the others had been destoyed.


2. DRESDEN WAS A PRO-NAZI CITY and DRESDEN WAS A CITY THAT TREATED JEWS POORLY. IOW, THEY DESERVED IT.

Its astounding that people make this caveman argument. Supposedly, we were the good guys and morally superior to the Nazi’s and Japanese. The problem with the RAF attack on morale (aka terror bombing) is that didn’t work. It killed women, children, and old men, but had no effect on the war effort. Given the unconditional surrender, Hitler and the Nazi’s had no intention of surrendering. The urban population, ever had they wanted to end the war, had no power to do so. Large numbers of German civilians were killed (500,00), 50,000 British airman were killed for no real reason.

Finally, the RAF attacks on German cities wasted British resources that could have been used in better areas. The lack of 4 engine bombers delayed the winning of the battle of the Atlantic. Instead of building thousands of 4 engine bombers the British could have built 4 times as many fighter-bombers, thereby supporting their ground effort and saving thousands of allied soldiers lives.

D'este - Eisenhower a soldiers life

This biography of Ike, covers his life from beginning to the end of WW II, with the main focus on Ike's military career. The book ends in May 1945, and Ike's life during WW II covers 420 of the 700 pages. D'este covers in detail Ike's relationships with Marshall, Churchill, Montgomery, Patton, and Bradley. The best part of the book covers his command decisions as Supreme Allied Commander from June 6, 1944.

One thing particularly liked is that D'este provides a clear chronological account of Ike's military career prior to his going to the Pentagon in December 1941. I found it amazing what a politician and desk jockey IKe was. The man rarely commanded troops or was in combat. This was his career assignments from 1917 to December 1941.

1. 1917-1919 Training men for the Tank Corps. Fort Meade MD and Gettysburg PA
2. 1919-1921 Tank Corps. Ike's main focus during this time was coaching the Football team. Fort Meade, MD
3. Jan 1921- Sept 1924 Aide to General Conner, Panama
4. Sept 1924 - Dec 1924 Football Coach, Ft Meade Md
5. Jan 1925- Sept 1925 Recruiting officer, Denver
6. Sept 1925 -June 1926 Staff College, Ft Leavenworth - Kansas
7. Sept 1926-December 1926 Football Coach, Ft Benning GA
8. Jan 1927-September 1927 American Battlefield Monument Commission, DC - Unofficial aide and ghostwriter for Pershing -DC
9. Sept 1927-June 1928 War College - DC
10. June 1928-Sept 1929 Writes book on American Battlefields in France - Paris France
11. Sept 1929-Sept 1932, Planner at the War Department and aide to the Asst Secretary of War.
12. September 1932-September 1935 Aide to General MacArthur COS, DC
13. Oct 1935- September 1939 Aide to General MacArthur COS, Philippines
14. September 1939 - Nov 1940 XO and Commander 15th battalion Ft Lewis
15. Nov 1940 -June 1941 COS 3rd division and X corps. Ft Lewis WA
16. June 1941-Dec 1941 COS 3rd Army - San Antonio Texas
17. December 1941-June 1942 War Plans - George Marshall, Pentagon