Halleck on Sherman Removing Civilians from Atlanta

September 25, 1864

General Sherman: Your communications of September 20th in regard to the removal of families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and also the official report of your campaign, are just received. The course which you have pursued in removing rebel families from Atlanta, and in the exchange of prisoners, is fully approved by the War Department. Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war in removing these people, but I think it was your duty to your own army to do so. Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the nature of your position, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy (and especially of non-combatants and women of the territory which we have heretofore conquered and occupied), will justify you in gathering up all the forage and provisions which your army may require, both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in your march farther into the enemy's country.

Let the disloyal families of the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, and natural protectors, in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the contrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in our rear and within our lines. The safety of our armies, and a proper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war. We certainly are not required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels better than they themselves treat each other. Even herein Virginia, within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of provisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, or to starve within our lines. We have fed this class of people long enough.

Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebel ranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their friends and natural protectors. I would destroy every mill and factory within reach which I did not want for my own use. This the rebels have done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also in Virginia and other rebel States, when compelled to fall back before our armies. In many sections of the country they have not left a mill to grind grain for their own suffering families, lest we might use them to supply our armies. We must do the same.>

I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for the last two years. You are almost the only one who has properly applied them. I do not approve of General Hunter's course in burning private homes or uselessly destroying private property. That is barbarous. But I approve of taking or destroying whatever may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff

Halleck - State of the Union Cavalry Feb 1865

Lieutenant-General GRANT, City Point
February 13, 1865.:

GENERAL : As the time is approaching for organizing the cavalry for the spring campaign, I forward the following items in regard to its conditions and wants, collected by the Cavalry Bureau, to January 1, 1805:

Cavalrymen present for duty 105,434
Cavalrymen present and absent 160, 237
Cavalry horses serviceable 77,847
Cavalry horses unserviceable 9,659
Cavalry horses purchased during the year 154, 400

The number expended has been much greater than this, as the cavalry force has been less than the previous year, and, moreover, a considerable number of team and captured horses have been issued to the cavalry, and also recuperated animals. The expenditure of cavalry horses during the year has probably been less than 180,000. The waste or loss of cavalry equipments during the year is estimated as follows : Carbines expended, 93,394; pistols expended, 71,000; sabers expended, 90,000; horse equipments, 150,000. Expense of cavalry in horses, pay, forage, rations, clothing, ordnance, equipments, and transportation, $125,000,000, is certainly a pretty large sum for keeping up our cavalry force for one year.

In regard to particular commands, there are in the Armies of the Potomac and the James about 10,000 mounted men, and in the Middle Division, under General Sheridan, about 12,000, which can be kept efficient by issue from here, except in case of extraordinary casualties.

General Sherman has with him in the field about 6,500 men, which, since he left Atlanta, he has kept mounted by captures from the enemy. In the Department of the Ohio (now Kentucky) there were issued to General Burbridge for his Saltville expedition 6,000 horses. On his return 4,000 were reported lost or unserviceable.

When Hood commenced his march against Nashville General Thomas' immediate command had only about 5,000 effective cavalry, but between the 1st of October and 31st of December all horses purchased in the West were sent to his chief of cavalry, the issue amounting to 23,000, and including those sent to General Burbridge during the same period, 29,000, in three months to General Thomas' entire command. As Generals Wilson and Burbridge have made requisitions since that period for 14,000 additional horses, it is presumed that about the same number were lost or disabled during that period of three months. As soon as General Thomas determined to make no farther advance during the winter, and General Canby was directed to assume active operations in the field, orders were given to resume issues to his (Canby's) command in preference to all others.

In General Canby's entire division there were about 30,000 effective cavalrymen, of which only about one-half were mounted. As, however, his cavalry force was so disproportionate to his infantry, his requisitions are for only 6,000 horses, which will soon be filled. Major-General Dodge has made a requisition for 1,000 horses to be sent to Fort Leavenworth to remount some regiments to be sent against the Indians on the Overland Mail Route. Orders have been given to fill this as soon as General Canby receives his 6,000 horses.

It is proper to remark that inspection reports for the end of December shows a cavalry force in the Department of Kansas of 4,581 men present for duty and 4,386 serviceable horses. Major-General Thomas has made a requisition for 3,000 cavalry horses to be sent to General Stone- man in East Tennessee. This requisition will be filled next after those of Generals Dodge and Cauby. No issue of cavalry horses have been made to the Department of Arkansas for several mouths, and about one-half of the cavalry there are entirely dismounted. n regard to the enormous surplus of cavalry in the Western and Southwestern armies, as compared with infantry, I would remark that it has resulted in a great measure from the repeated requisitions of Generals Rosecrans, Banks, and others for increase of mounted forces, and their mounting infantry as cavalry. They were repeatedly informed that so large a cavalry force could not be supported, and experience has placed this question beyond a doubt.

Halleck tries to Get Rosecrans to attack - Part II

June 16, 1863—2 p. m
Major- General Rosecrans,

Is it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A
definite answer, yes or no, is required.

H.W. HALLECK, General-in- Chief:


June 16, 1863—6.30 p. m.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in- Chief:

In reply to your inquiry, if immediate means to-night or to-morrow,
no. If it means as soon as all things are ready, say five days, yes.

W. S. ROSECRANS,


June 21, 1863.
GENERAL HALLECK:

In your favor of the 12th instant you say you do not see how the maxim
of not fighting two great battles at the same time applies to the case of this army and Grant’s. Looking at the matter practically, we and our opposing forces are so widely separated tbat for Bragg to materially aid Johnston he must abandon our front substantially, and thea we can move to our ultimate work with more rapidity and less wa toof material on natural obstacles. If Grant is defeated, both forces will come here,and tbcn we ought to be near our base.The same maxim that forbids, as you take it, a single army fighting two greatbattles at the same time (by the way, a very awkward thing to do), would forbid this nation’s eugagiu~, all its forces in the great West at the same time, so as to leave itwithout a single reserve to stem the current of possible disaster. This is, I think, sustained by high military and political considerations. We ought to fight here if we have a strong prospect of winning a decisive battle over tbe opposing force, and upon this ground I shall act. I shall be careful not to risk our last reserve without strong grounds to expect success.

W.S. ROSECRANS,
Major- General.


June 24, 1863—2.10 a. m.
Major-General HALLECK, General-in- Chief:

The army begins to move at 3 o’clock this morning.

W.S. ROSECRANS,
Major- General.

Halleck tries to Get Rosecrans to attack - June 1863

June 11, 1863—3 p. m.
Major-General ROSECRANS, Murfreeboro, Tenn.

I deem it my duty to repeat to you the great dissatisfaction that is felt here at your inactivity. There seems to be no doubt that a part of Bragg’s force has gone to Johnston.

H.W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.


,
June 11, 1863:
Maj. General H. W. HALLECK, WASHINGTON DC

Your dispatch of to-day received.* You remember I gave you, as a necessary condition of success, an adequate cavalry force. Since that time I have not lost a moment in mounting our dismounted cavalry as fast as we could get horses... My preliminary infantry movements have nearly all been completed, and I am preparing to strike a blow that will tell; but, to show you how differently things are viewed here, I called on my corps and division commanders and generals of cavalry for answers, in writing, to these questions: 1st. From your best information, do you think the enemy materially weakened in our front? 2d. Do you think this army can advance, at this time, with reasonable prospect of fighting a great and successful battle? 3d. Do you think an advance advisable at this time?

To the first, eleven answered no; six yes, to the extent of 10,000. To the second,four yes, with doubts; thirteen no. To the third, not one yes; seventeen no. Not one thinks an advance advisable until Vicksburg’s fate is determined. Admitting these officers to have a reasonable share of military sagacity, courage, and patriotism, you perceive that there are graver and stronger reasons than probably appear at Washington for the attitude of this army.

I therefore counsel caution and patience at headquarters. Better wait a little to get all we can ready to insure the best results, if by so doing we, per force of Providence, observe a great military maxim, not to risk two great and decisive battles at the same time. We might have cause to be thankful for it; at all events, you see that, to expect success, I must have such thorough grounds that when I say “forward,” my word will inspire conviction and confidence,where both are now wanting. I should like to have your suggestion.

W. S ROSECRANS


June 12, 1863.
Major-General ROSECRANS, Murfreesboro, Tenn.:

Your telegram of yesterday is just received. I do not understand your application of the military maxim “not to fight two great battles at the same time.” It will apply to a single army, but not to two armies acting independently of each other. Johnston and Bragg are acting on interior lines between you and Grant, and it is for their interest, not ours, that they should fight at different times, so as to use the same force against both of you. It is for our interest to fight them, if possible, while divided. If you are not strong enough to fight Bragg with a part of his troops absent, you will not be able to fight him after the affair at Vicksburg is over and his troops return to your front. There is another military maxim, that “councils of war never fight.”

If you say that you are not prepared to fight Bragg, I shall not order you to do so, for the responsibility of fighting or refusing to fight at a particular time or place must rest upon the general in immediate command. It cannot be shared by a council of war, nor will the authorities here make you fight~ against your will. You ask me to counsel them “caution and patience.” I have done so very often; but after five or six months of inactivity, with your force all the time diminishing, and no hope of any immediate increase, you must not be surprised that their patience is pretty well exhausted. If you do not deem it prudent to risk a general battle with Bragg, why can you not harass him, or make such demonstrations as to prevent his sending more reinforcements to Johnston? I do not write this in a spirit of fault-finding, but to assure you that the prolonged inactivity of so large an army in the field is causing much complaint and dissatisfaction, not only in Washington, but throughout the country.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H.W. Halleck General-in-Chief.

Franklin's Corps at 2nd Bull Run

Per Franklin in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War:

August 16th 2-August 24th

THE Sixth Corps left Harrison's Landing on the James River on August 16th, 1862, and arrived at Newport News on August 21st. On the 22d and 23d it embarked on transports for Aquia Creek. My impression is that Burnside's corps started first, landing at Aquia Creek; Porter's disembarked at Aquia Creek; Heintzelman's followed, landing at Alexandria; and the Sixth Corps followed Heintzelman's. As soon as I saw the infantry of the corps embarked at Newport News, leaving the chiefs of the quartermaster and subsistence departments and the chief of artillery to superintend the embarkation of the property for which they were responsible, with orders to hasten their departure to the utmost, I preceded the transports, and on Sunday, August 24th, about 2 o'clock, arrived at Aquia Creek, at which point I had orders to disembark and report to General McClellan. The wharves here were so encumbered with the artillery and stores that were already landed for the corps of Burnside and Porter, that McClellan directed me to have my corps landed at Alexandria, and to report upon my arrival to General Halleck.

August 24th PM Meets with Halleck
Still preceding the corps, I reported to General Halleck at "Washington, arriving there about 4 o'clock p. M. The city was as quiet as though profound peace reigned; no one was at General Halleck's office to whom I could report, and I found him at his house. He 'told me that he felt under no apprehension about Pope's position, and that he doubted whether it would be necessary for me to go to the front at all; that in any event I could be of no use until my artillery and horses arrived—instancing the fact that Burnside had been much crippled, and had done little good so far, on account of the absence of his artillery. He directed me to go into camp in front of Alexandria, and reorganize the corps as the artillery and transportation reached the camp.

August 25th and 26th Infantry Arrives
The infantry arrived on Monday and Tuesday, the 25th and 26th, but no artillery horses, except sixteen, had arrived on Wednesday night.

Tries to get Horese for artillery and Transport
The two division commanders and myself were constantly at work during this time, endeavoring to get horses. But we had no success, the answer to our demands always being that the teams then present were absolutely necessary to feed the troops in the forts from day to day, and that this duty was more important under the circumstances than that of providing transportation for artillery. Without transportation the artillery could not be used.

August 27th
On Wednesday, the 27th, news having arrived that the enemy was at Centreville, Taylor's brigade of Slocum's division was sent there on the cars of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to reconnoiter. It was received at the railroad bridge over Bull Run by a force of the enemy's artillery and infantry, and lost its gallant commander and many men. The brigade was withdrawn in safety in the face of a large force, four brigades of A. P. Hill's division, Jackson's corps. The order for this movement came from General Halleck.

August 28th
Thursday, the 28th, was employed in organizing such batteries as had arrived, with the horses, which now began to arrive slowly, and in attempting to collect a train for carrying provisions to General Pope's army. Little was accomplished, however.

August 29th and August 30th AM
On Friday, the corps was started to the front with orders to communicate with General Pope, and at the same time to guard his communications with Alexandria. On the arrival of the leading division, commanded by General W. F. Smith, at Annandale, ten miles to the front, its commander reported to me that fugitives were constantly coming in, and reported a large force of the enemy near Fairfax Court House, six miles distant. As he had with him only ten rounds of ammunition for each gun, he considered it prudent to await further orders. General McClellan, upon learning this state of things, directed me to stop at Annandale for the night, and proceed the next morning at 6.

During the night more ammunition and provision wagons were collected, numbering about one hundred, and as I was starting in the morning at the designated time I received orders to delay my start until 8:30 A. M., to protect the train so formed. When I arrived at Fairfax Court House I detached a brigade of General Slocum's division and one battery to take position to guard the point where the Little River Turnpike joins the Warrenton pike between Centreville and Alexandria. The detachment of this brigade had an important effect upon the after events of the campaign, as will appear. Proceeding onwards toward Centreville I received, at 1:30 P. M., an order from General McClellan, directing me to join General Pope at once.

August 30th PM- Arrives on Battlefield
The corps marched forward through Centreville toward Bull Run about three miles in front of Centreville, without stopping. Going to the front I found General Slocum's division formed across the road, in front of Cub Run, stopping what seemed to be an indiscriminate mass of men, horses, guns and wagons, all going pell-mell to the rear. As General Slocum expressed it, it was as bad as the Bull Run retreat of 1861. Officers of all grades, from brigadier-general down, were in the throng, but none of them exercised any authority. We gathered about three thousand in a yard near by. Presently a force of cavalry appeared to the left and front, about one mile off, and the fugitives, imagining that they were the enemy, ran to the rear as one man;—nothing could stop them."

Timeline - McClellan and re-inforcing Pope

All dates 1862

August 23rd - McClellan Leaves Fort Monroe

August 24th 6 am- McClellan arrives Aquia Creek. McClellan requests Halleck for news of Pope and for orders.

August 24rd - McClellan meets with Porter and Burnside at 12:15 PM. He learns that Pope has retreated from Rappahannock and that Porters Corps in near Fredericksburg. Later, McClellan telegrams Halleck & asks who commands Porter. Halleck replies that night - Porter is under the command of Pope, states he doesn't know where Pope is.

August 26th 11 am - Halleck telegrams McClellan& orders him to Alexandria and to leave Burnside in charge of Aquia Creek. Tells McClellan that Heintzlemann has joined Pope and Kearny is on his way.

August 26th, PM - Sumner Corps starts to disembarks at Aquia Creek


August 27th 6 am - McClellan arrives Alexandria and telegrams Halleck for orders. He has no idea what his command is or where Pope is.

August 27th 10 am - Halleck telegrams the McClellan will "take entire direction of sending troops out of Alexandria - Determine questions of priority of transportation and the places they should occupy."

August 27 115 PM - Halleck sends the following:

Telegrams from General Porter to General Buruside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sign], and Ricketts near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centreville.

August 29, 1862—12 PM (Received 12.8 p. in.)
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLEOK. General-in-Chief:
Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin’s
corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without
transportation.
GEG. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major- General,.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
Aleiandria Va., August 29, 1862—(Received 12.50 p. in.)
Major-General HALLECK, General-in- Chief:
Have ordered most of Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry ho report to
General Barnard for scouting duty toward liockville, Poolesville, &c.
If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river I had better
send a brigade or two of Sumner’s to near Tennallytown, where, with
two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch
both Chain Bridge and Tennallytown. Would it meet your views to
post the rest of Sumner’s corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran
where they can either sul)port Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, an~
even Tennallytown. Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready
for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

WASHINGTON, D.C., August 29, 1862—3 p. m.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
Your proposed disposition of Sumner’s corps seems to me judicious.
Of course I have no time to examine into details. The present danger
is a raid upon Washington in the night-time. Dispose of all troops as
you deem best. I want Franklin’s corps to go far enough to find out
something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at
Annandale as to prevent his going farther; otherwise he will push on
toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Mannannas,
either by telegram or through Franklin’s scouts. Our people must move
more actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.


WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
I think you had better place Sumner’s corps as it arrives near the
fortifications, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The l)rincipal thing
to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially iii the night-
time. Use Cox’s and Tyler’s brigades and the new troops for the same
object if you need them.
Porter writes to Burnside from Bristoe, 9.30 a. in. yesterday, that
Pope’s forces were then moving on Manassas and that Burnside would
soon hear of them by way of Alexandria.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
August 29, 1862—5.25 p. m~ (Received 5.38 p. in.)
Maj. Gen. II. XV. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
Before receiving the President’s message I had put Sumner’s corps
in motion toward Arlington and the Chain Bridge, not having received
no reply from you. The movement is still under your control in either
direction, though now under progress, as stated. I think that one of
two alternatives should be fully carried out.
GEG. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major- General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862—7.50 p. m.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
You will immediately send constructing trains and guards to repair
railroad to Manassas; let there be no delay in this. I have just been
told that Franklin’s corps stopped at Annandale, and that he was this
evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders; investi-
gate and report the facts of this disobedience. That corps must push
forward, as I directed, protect the railroad, and open our communica-
tions with Manassas.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
August 30, 1862�9.40 a. m.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march of yester-
day. Considering the circumstances of the case, he was very~wrong in
stopping at Annandale. Moreover, I learned last Night that the Quar-
termaster's Department could have given him plenty of transportation,
if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He
knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope's
army, and should have acted more promptly.
II. W. HALLECK
General-in- Chief

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
August 30, 1862.
Maj. Gen. II. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was
to march from Alexandria he has been using every effort to get trans-
portation for his extra ammunition, but he was uniformly told by the
quartermasters here that there was none disposable, and his command
marched without wagons.*
After the departure of his corps, at 6 a. in. yesterday, he procured 20
wagons, to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of
General Banks' supply train for that purpose.
General Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, l)y application
upon quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons
to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was
obliged to march without it.
I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed
to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin; but
they will not go far toward supplying the deficiency.

Report of General Franklin on 2nd battle of Bull Run

Report of Gem William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth
Army Corps, of operations August 30.

CENTREVILLE, August 30 8.15 p. m.

GENERAL: I have opened your dispatch of 2 p. in. to General Pope.
1 arrived at the field this afternoon at 6 o'clock. Found that the road
was filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, all leaving the field
iii a panic. It was a scene of terrible confusion, and I immediately
formed line of battle across the road an(1 attempted to stop and form
the stragglers. It was impossible to succeed in this, the number be-
coining over 7,000 in less than half an hour. The number continued to
increase until I left the position, and I have now moved my corps to
this place. The panic, from the accounts I have had of it, appears un-
accountable. The men are from several divisions. Our left was broken
and turned. I shall make this place as defensible as possible, but my
march to-day has linen 20 miles.

I was unable to find General Pope on the field, but I understand that
he changed his position several times.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major- General, Commanding.
 General H. XV. HALLECK,
Commander-in- Chief.


No. 117.

Itinerary of the First Division, Sixth Army Corps, Brig. Gen. Henry W.
Slocum commanding, August 16 31. *

August 16, broke camp at Harrison's Landing and marched to Charles
City Court-House, 7 miles.
August 17, marched to and crossed the Chickahoininy at Barrett�s
Ford, 14 miles.
August 18, marched to Simpson's house, Williamsburg, 15 miles.
August 19, marched to Yorktown, 12 miles.
August 20, marched to Young's Mill,14 miles.
August 21, marched to Newport News, 9 miles.
August 22 and 23, embarked on transports for Aquia Creek.
August 24, arrived and debarked at Alexandria, Va.
August 27, the First Brigade moved from encampment near Alex-
Alexandria by rail to Bull Run Bridge. Marched across Bull Run Bridge,
and met a large force of the enemy, under General Jackson, 2 miles
beyond, and was soon forced by vastly superior numbers to retire under
a galling fire from the enemy's artillery. Marched back the same after-
noon to FairfaxCourt-House. The loss in killed, wounded, and missing
in the engagement was very severe. Among those wounded was Gen-
eral George W. Taylor, who subsequently died of wounds then received.
August 29, the division left camp near Alexandria, and marched to
Annandale, on the Little River pike, about 7 miles.
August 30, marched, via Fairfax Court-House and Centreville, to-
ward Bull Run, and just at evening formed line of battle across the
Warrenton pike, beyond Cub Run, to stop the stragglers that were
then coming from the battle-field. Remained in position there all
night, until the army had all retired. Marched this day about 18 miles.
August 31, fell back to Centreville and took position in the fortifica-
tions.