Book Review: 98 Days - A Geographer's Review of the Vicksburg Campaign.

This is one of the most informative books I've read on the Vicksburg Campaign. While the prose is rather mediocre, Professor Grabau explains several things about the campaign that have always puzzled me. To whit:

•  1) Why was Vicksburg so important? Answer: Vicksburg and Port Hudson kept Union gunboats out of this 240 mile stretch of Mississippi, thereby allowing the Confederates to ship supplies down the Red River and across the Mississippi to the East. 
•  2) Why was the Black River considered a military obstacle despite its low water level in summer? Answer: The River has steep banks that retard movement by wagons or artillery no matter what the water level. Which is why fords and bridges were so important. Add that the uncleared banks were full of trees, brush, and fallen timber, and you can see why roads leading to fords and bridges were the only way over the river. 
•  3) Why were military operations in Mississippi difficult in mid to late Summer? Answer: Not only did most of the creeks and small lakes dry up, but the lack of well-water meant armies had to depend on farmers rainwater cisterns for water. And these cisterns weren't big enough to supply a large army with water. Both armies at Vicksburg had to transport water from the Mississippi or Yazoo to their troops. The Confederates by hand, the Union by water-wagon. 
•  4) Why were Civil war armies brought to a halt by rain? Roads contained neither gravel or rock, rain turned them to mud and the average Civil war wagon or Artillery piece had ground pressure PSI of 64. By comparison a Sherman Tank had a ground pressure PSI of 14. Result: the wagon or artillery soon sunk to its axles in mud.

General Bowen's Reply to Pemberton's inquiry - Can we break out of Vicksburg?

HEADQUARTERS BOWEN'S DIVISION,
Vicksburg, MISS., July 2, 1863.

GENERAL: In reply to your inquiry of this morning in regard to the condition of my command to force their way through the enemy's lines in case that the necessity should arise to evacuate this position, I have the honor to state that my men are in as good, if not better spirits, than any others in the line, and able to stand as much fatigue, yet I do not consider them capable (physically) of enduring the hardships incident to such an undertaking. Forty-five days' incessant duty day and night, with short rations, the wear of both mind and body incident to our situation, has had a marked effect upon them, and I am satisfied they cannot give battle and march over 10 or 12 miles in the same day.

In view of the fact that General Johnston has never held out the slightest hope to us that the siege could be raised; that his demonstration in our favor to relieve this exhausted garrison would of necessity be sufficient to raise it, I see no alternative but to endeavor to rescue the command by making terms with the enemy. Under the most favorable circumstances, were we to cut our way out, we could not, in my opinion, save two-THIRDS of our present effective strength. No provision could be made for our wounded who fell in the attempt, or those we leave behind in the hospitals, and our army would reach General Johnston (if we should get through) a mere handful of broken-down stragglers.

I would, therefore, recommend that an immediate proposition be made to capitulate. If accepted, we get every thing we have any right to hope for; if rejected, we can still hold out stubbornly for some days, and our enemy may make the proposal to us. When our rations are exhausted, or nearly so, we may accept a surrender with the condition of a general parole instead of imprisonment for the command. If the offer is made at once, we have a better chance of making terms than when we have only one day's resistance in store in case of a refusal. The proposition coming from us, if rejected, will make our men determined to fight to the last; theirs, on the contrary, will feel that after Vicksburg has been offered, their blood is shed to gratify a mere vindictive feeling against its garrison, whose only fault has been the noble defense they have made, and I believe that numbers of the enemy have still enough manhood to admire our courage and determination and urge liberal terms of capitulation.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. S. BOWEN,
Major-General.

General Smith's Reply to Pemberton's inquiry - Can we break out of Vicksburg?

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, July 2, 1863.

GENERAL: Your note of yesterday desires of me a reply on two points, viz: The condition of my troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigue necessary to a successful evacuation of this place. The length of the marches and the amount of fatigue necessary to a successful evacuation not being indicated, I confine myself to giving the following information and opinions: There are about 3,000 men in my DIVISION, including State troops, in a condition to undertake a march of 8 or 10 miles a day in this weather, if there is an opportunity of resting at intervals. Out of these 3,000, only about 2,000 are considered reliable in case we are strongly opposed and much harassed. A secret evacuation I consider almost impossible, on account of the temper of many in my command, who would, of necessity, be left be hind, not to mention their natural timidity when left alone, which would induce them to at once get into communication with the enemy for their own fancied safety. I would really expect the enemy to become aware of the movement before my command had cleared the right of our line. It is proper to mention that the 2,000 alluded to have suffered severely in the loss of field officers during the siege; and while their individual bravery remains the same, they will be more readily thrown into confusion from want of officers to handle them, if forced to halt and go through any formation to oppose an enemy. In other words, while under the impression that the troops will to-day resist an assault as obstinately, or perhaps more so, as when they first manned the trenches, I do not think they would do as well out of them and in the field.

I believe that General Johnston either has or will fight Grant, and my hope has been that he would be successful and in time to relieve us. At present, however, I see no chance of timely relief from him, and him dispatches have never indicated a hope of being able to raise the siege. Under these circumstances, I deem it best to propose terms of capitulation before forced to do so from want of provisions.

The following, although not called for by your note, is respectfully stated on account of a personal conversation had some days since. In regard to evacuating with or without entering into terms of agreement with the enemy, I should much prefer the former. There is to my mind no practical difference between giving up a place openly or secretly.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
M. S. SMITH,
Major-General.

Forney's Reply to General Pemberton's inquiry - Can we break out of Vicksburg?

Near Vicksburg, July 2, 1863.

GENERAL: In reply to your confidential note of yesterday, requesting to be informed as to the condition of my troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation, as heartrending as the reply may be, I have to state that I concur in the unanimous opinion of the brigade and regimental commanders, that the physical condition and health of our men are not sufficiently good to enable them to accomplish successfully the evacuation. The spirit of the men is still, however, unshaken, and I am satisfied they will cheerfully continue to bear the fatigues and privations of the siege. I inclose herewith for your further information the brigade reports.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. H. FORNEY,
Major-General.

Stevenson's Reply to General Pemberton's inquiry - Can we break out of Vicksburg?

HEADQUARTERS STEVENSON'S DIVISION,
Vicksburg, July 2, 1863.

TO GENERAL PEMBERTON:

Your note (confidential) of yesterday, requesting me to inform you as to the condition of my troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigue necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation of this city, was duly received, and I have the honor to reply thereto as follows: My men are very cheerful, but from long confinement (more than forty-five days) in the trenches on short rations, are necessarily much enfeebled, and a considerable number would be unable to make the marches and undergo the fatigues which would probably be necessary to a successful evacuation of this city. If pressed by the enemy, and it should be necessary to place the Big Black in our rear in one march, the chances are that a large number of them now in the trenches could not succeed. I believe, however, that most of them, rather than be captured, would exert themselves to the utmost to accomplish it. I respectfully transmit herewith the opinions of my brigade commanders on these points.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
GENERAL C. L. STEVENSON,

Vicksburg - After the Surrender - July 4th 1863

Departing from Rock House, Grant overtook Logan's vanguard before it reached the courthouse. At Noon, Col Maltby called the 45th Illinois to attention. As Grant and Logan looked on, the confederate flag was lowered, and the colors of the 45th Illinois or 4th Minnesota were raised.  The Soldiers unable to restrain themselves cheered wildly, the band struck up "Hail Columbia", "Yankee Doodle" and closed with "Home sweet Home".  While the Band played, the troops paraded around the courthouse, which was unscathed, except where the cupola had been struck by a dud 30 Pound shell.

At this point, some of the Union's wilder spirits took advantage of the courthouse (surrender) ceremonies to prowl the town before a provost guard could be organized. Several drunk staff officers climbed the iron stairway leading to the courthouse copula singing the star spangled banner and banishing a captured signal flag.

Later, Sgt Wilcox of the 33rd Illinois saw" Rebel officers and union officers riding together through the streets, and in some instances, both parties were so drunk they could barely sit on their horses".
Confederate Captain Guion saw Confederates and Union soldiers loot the Washington street stores. Hogsheads of sugar were rolled into the street, broken open, and soldiers both Blue and Grey walked off with the contents.  The safe in C.C. Kress' store was broken into and $20,000 stolen, along with most of his dry goods. Confederate Corporal Anderson - 1st Missouri - reported occupied residences were generally left undisturbed, while unoccupied ones had their mirrors stolen.

Liquor was discovered and Vicksburg resident Mrs William Lord, complained that soldiers (both North and South) "All...day they were streaming through town and in and out of my yard, and so drunk".

As soon as a provost guard was organized, the marauding was brought under control by Union authorities.

Richard Howard - 124th Illinois, noted he did not see "a ragged looking person in the city" and respected the rebels and admired their spirit.  They "stoutly maintained that we had done them  very little if any damage" but were ready to call it quits.

Relations between Blue and Grey were generally good. However, before the paroled Confederates left the area, relations between Northern and Southern soldiers deteriorated. Hot words were exchanged, and tempers flared. Street brawls between blue and grey erupted. A number of men were badly beaten, and one or two killed.  In one of these fights, a Confederate killed a Union soldier who had insulted him.  Taken to Grant's HQ,  the man was released from custody, when the Federal officers learned of the circumstances.