Repudiator, Speculator, Dictator; Who enjoyed the distinction of being the first And last President of the Southern Confederacy.
A Christian and Chivalrous Gentleman, He starved Union Captives in his Prisons, And sanctioned the Massacre of Fort Pillow. But his manners were courtly and elegant,
And his State papers models of excellence. He was remarkable for his executive wisdom:To provide material for his forces, He ordered corn to be planted instead of cotton,
Which enabled Sherman to march through Georgia.
He perpetuated a Slave Empire, Whose bondsmen were guides to the Union Armies.
Consistent in his inconsistencies,
He connived at the assassination of the only man
Who could have saved him from the gallows.
The incarnation of dignity and heroism,
He was taken disguised in his wife's petticoats,
Claiming exemption from capture
On the grounds of his femininity.R
As such, friends, respect his weakness,
And that of the few who still admire him.
Showing posts with label jefferson Davis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label jefferson Davis. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 04, 2012
Sunday, April 17, 2011
Jefferson Davis - Decides to Flee to Mexico & not die in the last ditch
Letter to Varina Davis April 23, 1865:
For myself it may be that our Enemy will prefer to banish me, it may be that a devoted band of Cavalry will cling to me and that I can force my way across the Missi. and if nothing can be done there which it will be proper to do, then I can go to Mexico and have the world from which to choose a location. Dear Wife this is not the fate to which I invited when the future was rose-colored to us both; but I know you will bear it even better than myself and that /of us two/ I alone will ever look back reproachfully on my past career.
I think my judgement is undisturbed by any pride of opinion or of place, I have prayed to our heavenly Father to give me wisdom and fortitude equal to the demands of the position in which Providence has placed me. I have sacrificed so much for the cause of the Confederacy that I can measure my ability to make any further sacrifice required, and am assured there is but one to which I am not equal, my Wife and my Children. How are they to be saved from degradation or want is now my care. During the suspension of hostilities you may have the best opportunity to go to Missi. and thence either to sail from Mobile for a foreign port or to cross the river and proceed to Texas, as the one or the other may be more practicable. The little sterling you have will be a very scanty store and under other circumstances would not be counted, but if our land can be sold that will secure you from absolute want.
For myself it may be that our Enemy will prefer to banish me, it may be that a devoted band of Cavalry will cling to me and that I can force my way across the Missi. and if nothing can be done there which it will be proper to do, then I can go to Mexico and have the world from which to choose a location. Dear Wife this is not the fate to which I invited when the future was rose-colored to us both; but I know you will bear it even better than myself and that /of us two/ I alone will ever look back reproachfully on my past career.
Jefferson Davis - Delusional - Beauregard's View - April 1865
General Beauregard, in his conference with the President, also told him that, from Macon, General Cobb reported that the enemy's cavalry had penetrated North Alabama, from the Tennessee River, threatening Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery; while another force of cavalry, supported by infantry and artillery, was advancing, through North Georgia, on Atlanta, Columbus, and Macon, where he, General Cobb, had but few troops, principally local and State reserves, to oppose to them.
General Beauregard also said to Mr. Davis that the picture he presented to him was most gloomy, but that he thought it his duty to attempt no concealment of the truth, so that the President might have a clear knowledge of the situation, and be prepared for the inevitable. President Davis lent an attentive ear to the account thus given of the hopeless condition of the Confederacy, but appeared, nevertheless, undismayed. He said that the struggle could still be carried on to a successful issue, by bringing out all our latent resources; that if the worst came to the worst, we might, by crossing the Mississippi River, with such troops as we could retreat with, unite with Kirby Smith's army, which he estimated at some sixty thousand men, and prolong the war indefinitely. General Beauregard did not expect, and was amazed at, this evidence of visionary hope on the part of the President. He admired his confidence, but inwardly condemned what to him seemed to be a total want of judgment and a misconception of the military resources of the country.
The President on that day (11th April), after his interview with General Beauregard, sent telegrams to General Johnston, by way of Raleigh... and one to Governor Vance, also at Raleigh. They fully indicate the state of Mr. Davis's mind at the time, and need no commentary:
"Greensboro", N. C, April Uth, 1865. "Governor Z. B. Vance, Raleigh, N. C.:"I have no official report, but scouts, said to be reliable, and whose statements were circumstantial and corroborative, represent the disaster as extreme."I have not heard from General Lee since the 6th instant, and have little or no hope from his army as an organized body. I expected to visit you at Raleigh, but am accidentally prevented from executing that design, and would be very glad to see you here, if you can come at once, or to meet you elsewhere in North Carolina at a future time. We must redouble our efforts to meet present disaster. An army holding its position with determination to fight on, and manifest ability to maintain the struggle, will attract all the scattered soldiers and daily rapidly gather strength."Moral influence is wanting, and I am sure you can do much now to revive the spirit and hope of the people. Jeffn. Davis."
*From the Military Operations of P.T. Beauregard Volume II
General Beauregard also said to Mr. Davis that the picture he presented to him was most gloomy, but that he thought it his duty to attempt no concealment of the truth, so that the President might have a clear knowledge of the situation, and be prepared for the inevitable. President Davis lent an attentive ear to the account thus given of the hopeless condition of the Confederacy, but appeared, nevertheless, undismayed. He said that the struggle could still be carried on to a successful issue, by bringing out all our latent resources; that if the worst came to the worst, we might, by crossing the Mississippi River, with such troops as we could retreat with, unite with Kirby Smith's army, which he estimated at some sixty thousand men, and prolong the war indefinitely. General Beauregard did not expect, and was amazed at, this evidence of visionary hope on the part of the President. He admired his confidence, but inwardly condemned what to him seemed to be a total want of judgment and a misconception of the military resources of the country.
The President on that day (11th April), after his interview with General Beauregard, sent telegrams to General Johnston, by way of Raleigh... and one to Governor Vance, also at Raleigh. They fully indicate the state of Mr. Davis's mind at the time, and need no commentary:
"Greensboro", N. C, April Uth, 1865. "Governor Z. B. Vance, Raleigh, N. C.:"I have no official report, but scouts, said to be reliable, and whose statements were circumstantial and corroborative, represent the disaster as extreme."I have not heard from General Lee since the 6th instant, and have little or no hope from his army as an organized body. I expected to visit you at Raleigh, but am accidentally prevented from executing that design, and would be very glad to see you here, if you can come at once, or to meet you elsewhere in North Carolina at a future time. We must redouble our efforts to meet present disaster. An army holding its position with determination to fight on, and manifest ability to maintain the struggle, will attract all the scattered soldiers and daily rapidly gather strength."Moral influence is wanting, and I am sure you can do much now to revive the spirit and hope of the people. Jeffn. Davis."
*From the Military Operations of P.T. Beauregard Volume II
Jefferson Davis - Delusional - Joe Johnston's View - April 1865
From General Joseph Johnston's "My Negotiations" (N.A. Review August 1886)
On April 10th, the Federal army commenced its march toward Raleigh. The Confederate troops moved in the same direction. Having the advantage of a day's march, they reached Raleigh the next afternoon, when I received, by telegraph, orders to report to the President at Greensboro' without delay.
I reached the station there early in the morning of the 12th, and was General Beauregard's guest in the box-car in which he lodged... We found Davis with three members of his Cabinet—Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Beagan... We had supposed that the President wished to obtain information from us of the military condition of that department, but it soon appeared that we were to receive, not to give information. For those present were told, with very little preface, that, in two or three weeks, the President would have in the field a larger army than the Confederacy ever had in its ranks at one time, by calling out the many thousands who had abandoned the service, and all those enrolled by the conscript bureau, who could not be brought into it by the military force used for the purpose by that bureau. It was suggested that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who under similar circumstances could not be forced into it, would scarcely return to it, or enter it, in its present hopeless condition, upon a mere invitation. The fact that we had not arms enough for the soldiers who stood by their colors made this scheme inexpressibly wild. But no opinions were asked and we were dismissed.
Before leaving the room, General Breckenridge came as expected, .and reported that General Lee had capitulated on the 9th. After this intelligence, General Beauregard and I carefully considered the state of our affairs. We found ourselves compelled to admit that the military resources of the South were exhausted, and that the Confederacy was overthrown.
On April 10th, the Federal army commenced its march toward Raleigh. The Confederate troops moved in the same direction. Having the advantage of a day's march, they reached Raleigh the next afternoon, when I received, by telegraph, orders to report to the President at Greensboro' without delay.
[Johnston meets with Davis on April 12th, and Davis makes wild statements that the army will soon number in the hundreds of thousands]
I reached the station there early in the morning of the 12th, and was General Beauregard's guest in the box-car in which he lodged... We found Davis with three members of his Cabinet—Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Beagan... We had supposed that the President wished to obtain information from us of the military condition of that department, but it soon appeared that we were to receive, not to give information. For those present were told, with very little preface, that, in two or three weeks, the President would have in the field a larger army than the Confederacy ever had in its ranks at one time, by calling out the many thousands who had abandoned the service, and all those enrolled by the conscript bureau, who could not be brought into it by the military force used for the purpose by that bureau. It was suggested that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who under similar circumstances could not be forced into it, would scarcely return to it, or enter it, in its present hopeless condition, upon a mere invitation. The fact that we had not arms enough for the soldiers who stood by their colors made this scheme inexpressibly wild. But no opinions were asked and we were dismissed.
Before leaving the room, General Breckenridge came as expected, .and reported that General Lee had capitulated on the 9th. After this intelligence, General Beauregard and I carefully considered the state of our affairs. We found ourselves compelled to admit that the military resources of the South were exhausted, and that the Confederacy was overthrown.
General Beauregard and I were summoned to the President's quarters next morning (the 13th); I supposed at General Breckenridge's suggestion. We were desired to compare the military condition of the Confederacy with that of the United States. As spokesman, I said that we had an army of 20,000 * infantry and artillery, and 5,000f mounted troops; against which the United States could bring three: that in Virginia of 180,000, as we were informed ; that in North Carolina of 110,000, and that in Alabama of 60,000, making odds against us of at least fifteen to one. Then we had neither money nor credit, and no arms except those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition excepting that in their cartridge-boxes, nor shops to repair arms or fix ammunition; and that therefore the only effect of our keeping the field would be the devastation of our country and the ruin of the people, and this, too, without inflicting harm on the enemy. I asserted further that it would be the highest of human crimes to continue the war. General Beauregard assented decidedly to this view.
The members of the Cabinet were then desired by the President to express their opinions as to the possibility of our continuing the war. GeneralBreckenridge and Messrs. Mallory and Reagan concurred with the military officers—that we had been overcome in arms, and that it was necessary to make peace. But Mr. Benjamin entertained the opposite opinion, which he asserted in a speech enthusiastically warlike.
[Johnston then met with Sherman and signed a convention for peace that was repudiated by President Johnson. ]
In the afternoon of the 24th I received from the President, who was then in Charlotte, notice by telegraph that he had ratified the terms of pacification agreed upon by General Sherman and me on the 18th. Within an hour thereafter a courier brought me from General Hampton two communications from General Sherman—one giving notice of the rejection of the terms above mentioned by the President of the United States, and the other announcing the termination of the armistice forty-eight hours after noon of that day. These facts were communicated to the administration without delay; and I proposed that, to prevent further devastation of our country by the marching of armies, our army should be disbanded.
A reply dated 11 P.m., April 24th, was received early next morning. It suggested that the infantry might be disbanded then, to re-assemble at a place named. I was directed to bring with me all the cavalry, a few light field-pieces, and all other men who could be mounted on serviceable beasts. I declined to obey this order; giving as my reason, that it provided for the performance of but one of the three important duties I had to perform—securing the safety of the President and Cabinet, but not that of the people and of the army, and I suggested the immediate escape of the high civil officers under a proper escort.
The confident belief that it would be a high crime to continue the war governed me in this instance, as it had prompted me to urge the civil authorities of the South to end the war. The arrangement ordered would have put the great bodies of Union troops in motion, everywhere spreading suffering and ruin among our people, without serving the object of the President's escape as well as an escort of a few picked men would have done.
The members of the Cabinet were then desired by the President to express their opinions as to the possibility of our continuing the war. GeneralBreckenridge and Messrs. Mallory and Reagan concurred with the military officers—that we had been overcome in arms, and that it was necessary to make peace. But Mr. Benjamin entertained the opposite opinion, which he asserted in a speech enthusiastically warlike.
[Johnston then met with Sherman and signed a convention for peace that was repudiated by President Johnson. ]
In the afternoon of the 24th I received from the President, who was then in Charlotte, notice by telegraph that he had ratified the terms of pacification agreed upon by General Sherman and me on the 18th. Within an hour thereafter a courier brought me from General Hampton two communications from General Sherman—one giving notice of the rejection of the terms above mentioned by the President of the United States, and the other announcing the termination of the armistice forty-eight hours after noon of that day. These facts were communicated to the administration without delay; and I proposed that, to prevent further devastation of our country by the marching of armies, our army should be disbanded.
[Davis orders Johnston to disband the infantry and keep on fighting]
A reply dated 11 P.m., April 24th, was received early next morning. It suggested that the infantry might be disbanded then, to re-assemble at a place named. I was directed to bring with me all the cavalry, a few light field-pieces, and all other men who could be mounted on serviceable beasts. I declined to obey this order; giving as my reason, that it provided for the performance of but one of the three important duties I had to perform—securing the safety of the President and Cabinet, but not that of the people and of the army, and I suggested the immediate escape of the high civil officers under a proper escort.
The confident belief that it would be a high crime to continue the war governed me in this instance, as it had prompted me to urge the civil authorities of the South to end the war. The arrangement ordered would have put the great bodies of Union troops in motion, everywhere spreading suffering and ruin among our people, without serving the object of the President's escape as well as an escort of a few picked men would have done.
[Having rejected Davis' crazy plan, Johnston met with Sherman and made peace in N.C., S.C, Ga. and Florida]
I determined, therefore, to make another effort to bring about a pacification—within the extent of my command, at least—in the confidence that it would spread fast to the West and South. In that hope I proposed another armistice to General Sherman, and another arrangement, on the basis of the military clause in the agreement of the 18th. General Sherman sent a favorable reply very promptly; so that I was able to set out early on the 26th to meet him at Bennett's, as before, after reporting to the Administration that I was about to do so. We met at Mr. Bennett's about noon ; and, as General Sherman was anxious to restore tranquillity to the country, we soon agreed upon terms, and established peace within the limits of our commands, which were the same.
I determined, therefore, to make another effort to bring about a pacification—within the extent of my command, at least—in the confidence that it would spread fast to the West and South. In that hope I proposed another armistice to General Sherman, and another arrangement, on the basis of the military clause in the agreement of the 18th. General Sherman sent a favorable reply very promptly; so that I was able to set out early on the 26th to meet him at Bennett's, as before, after reporting to the Administration that I was about to do so. We met at Mr. Bennett's about noon ; and, as General Sherman was anxious to restore tranquillity to the country, we soon agreed upon terms, and established peace within the limits of our commands, which were the same.
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Jefferson Davis - Visits to the Army of Tennessee
Unlike Abe Lincoln, Davis made several long trips to visit the Western Theater. He got out of Richmond and made the following trips to the Army of Tennessee:
- December 9th - January 4th 1863 - Davis leaves Richmond via Lynchburg-Chattanooga and visits Bragg and the AoT at Murfreesboro Tennessee. Later, he goes to Mississippi and confers with Generals Johnston and Van Dorn. Spends December 23-25 in Vicksburg inspecting the defenses. On the way back he visits Mobile, Atlanta, and Charleston.
- October 6- November 7th 1863. Visits Bragg and AoT at Missionary Ridge, later meets with Polk, Forrest in Meridian Mississippi and Joe Johnston and Hardee in Atlanta. Visits troops and makes speeches in Mobile, Selma, Savannah, Charleston, and N.C.
- September 20, 1864 - October 6, 1864. Confers with Hood in Palmetto Georgia and reviews the AoT on September 25-27. Visits Montgomery Alabama & Beauregard in Augusta Ga. Makes speeches in NC and SC.
Saturday, May 09, 2009
Jefferson Davis - Hothead
From a letter in 1856 Davis recounts a December 1847 "dispute" with Henry Foote. Davis at that time a Congressman - while Foote was the US Senator from Mississippi. Per Davis:
" In this City (Washington DC) I had a dispute with Foote over squatter sovereignty and for offensive language I crossed the room to where he was, and whipped him until I was pulled off. He started to leave the room, and stated he struck first. I went after him, called him a liar, and shaking my fist in his face, told him if he dared to say that again I would beat him to death. He was silent, and though a Cripple (with a war wound) I felt so superior to him, I turned around to leave him. At that time he struck me, whereupon I knocked him down, jumped on him, and commenced beating him when the Gentlemen pulled me off.
I then proposed to him to go to my room and lock the door. He asked me if I had coffee and pistols for two. I told him I had no coffee, but pistols. He said it was an unfair proposal. I thought he implied I would not give him a fair chance, and was about to jump him again, when he denied any such supposition. The friends present urged the matter to be dropped as a Christmas Frolic, and the matter was I supposed at an end.
Tuesday, May 05, 2009
Jeff Davis on Breechloading Rifles
In 1858 Davis said the following supporting breech-loading Carbines for the Calvary - but not the infantry:
"... the only value of a Breech-loading arm belongs to its use by the Calvary; that is in other words, the value of the breech-loading, so far as it applies to military purposes, is confined to those cases where the man does not have the freedom of action to load the piece at the muzzle. I think is better served by with a muzzle-loader than a breech-loading piece. When breech loading had its value in rapidity in fire, or in putting the ball in so as to be tight in passing out. All that has been superseded by the introduction of the expanding ball, which is put in loose at the muzzle, rammed home without delay, and passes out tight. There is, therefore, no advantage to the footman in loading the piece at the breech. There are many disadvantages. It complicates the machinery of the piece. It is liable to get out of order. It usually requires special ammunition, and when the special ammunition is exhausted troops must be supplied from cassions with that special ammunition. If however, the ammunition is of one kind, you can go to the first cassion you reach. All special ammunition are subject to objection. The parts cannot be interchanged with other arms, and if get out of order must be thrown away."
Per The Papers of Jefferson Davis Volume 6, Davis as Secretary Of War, showed little enthusiasm for breech loading rifles, and once back in the Senate, thwarted plans to convert muskets to breach-loaders or to buy new breech loading rifles.
"... the only value of a Breech-loading arm belongs to its use by the Calvary; that is in other words, the value of the breech-loading, so far as it applies to military purposes, is confined to those cases where the man does not have the freedom of action to load the piece at the muzzle. I think is better served by with a muzzle-loader than a breech-loading piece. When breech loading had its value in rapidity in fire, or in putting the ball in so as to be tight in passing out. All that has been superseded by the introduction of the expanding ball, which is put in loose at the muzzle, rammed home without delay, and passes out tight. There is, therefore, no advantage to the footman in loading the piece at the breech. There are many disadvantages. It complicates the machinery of the piece. It is liable to get out of order. It usually requires special ammunition, and when the special ammunition is exhausted troops must be supplied from cassions with that special ammunition. If however, the ammunition is of one kind, you can go to the first cassion you reach. All special ammunition are subject to objection. The parts cannot be interchanged with other arms, and if get out of order must be thrown away."
Per The Papers of Jefferson Davis Volume 6, Davis as Secretary Of War, showed little enthusiasm for breech loading rifles, and once back in the Senate, thwarted plans to convert muskets to breach-loaders or to buy new breech loading rifles.
Saturday, April 25, 2009
Jefferson Davis - Neo-Conservative
Just finished reading an excellent Biography of the Confederate President. I'm certain that if Jeff Davis came back to life he would be McCain Republican.
Jefferson Davis believed the following:
1) Open Borders. He was against any limit on immigration
2) Free Trade - He was against any tariff for protection of industry
3) Favored War to obtain additional territory & as a way to settle international disputes
4) Wanted to Annex Cuba, Northern Mexico and Nicaragua
5) Believed in low taxes, was against the income tax. Also, against Taxes for Internal Improvements
6) His policy on the Slave Trade was very similar to McCain's on illegal immigration. Davis wasn't FOR the Slave Trade - he was just against helping the Royal Navy stop it or really punishing anyone engaged in it. He also thought it was silly to regard it as immoral since "Africans are better off here as slaves; then in Africa". In 1858 he stated:
7) Like McCain he thought there were jobs "Americans (white) wouldn't do". One reason why Slavery was necessary. Just as McCain thinks Americans won't pick lettuce $50/hour, Davis thought White men wouldn't pick Cotton - no matter the price.
8) Davis believed in Judicial Supremacy. What the SCOTUS said was the law of the land and had to be obeyed. Only instead of Roe v Wade it was Dred Scott. He claimed the constitution gave him the right to take his slaves anywhere in the USA and be "protected" in his property.
9) Davis in a strong executive.
Jefferson Davis believed the following:
1) Open Borders. He was against any limit on immigration
2) Free Trade - He was against any tariff for protection of industry
3) Favored War to obtain additional territory & as a way to settle international disputes
4) Wanted to Annex Cuba, Northern Mexico and Nicaragua
5) Believed in low taxes, was against the income tax. Also, against Taxes for Internal Improvements
6) His policy on the Slave Trade was very similar to McCain's on illegal immigration. Davis wasn't FOR the Slave Trade - he was just against helping the Royal Navy stop it or really punishing anyone engaged in it. He also thought it was silly to regard it as immoral since "Africans are better off here as slaves; then in Africa". In 1858 he stated:
". I deny any coincidence of opinion with those who prate of the inhumanity and sinfulness of the trade. The interest of Mississippi, not of the African, dictates my conclusion. Her arm is no doubt strengthened by the presence of a due proportion of the servile caste, but it might be paralyzed by such an influx as would probably follow, if the gates of the African slave market were thrown open. This conclusion in relation to Mississippi is based upon my view of her present condition, not upon any general theory. It is not supposed to be applicable to Texas, to New Mexico, or to any future acquisitions to be made south of the Rio Grande."
7) Like McCain he thought there were jobs "Americans (white) wouldn't do". One reason why Slavery was necessary. Just as McCain thinks Americans won't pick lettuce $50/hour, Davis thought White men wouldn't pick Cotton - no matter the price.
8) Davis believed in Judicial Supremacy. What the SCOTUS said was the law of the land and had to be obeyed. Only instead of Roe v Wade it was Dred Scott. He claimed the constitution gave him the right to take his slaves anywhere in the USA and be "protected" in his property.
9) Davis in a strong executive.
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