McClellan Vs. Grant

Any Grant Vs. Mac comparison has to begin with the understanding that Grant had it much, much easier in April ’64 than McClellan in April ’62. Others have listed the advantages. Of course Grant was also much more willing to go along with Lincolns military “suggestions” then McClellan. (And if Grant got ticked off at Lincoln, he certainly never made the mistake of venting his anger in letters to his wife). Of course, they were too different kinds of men and were in different circumstances. The Civil War was Grants big chance to make it big and he doesn’t seem have been very political before the war. McClellan OTOH was a RR President and going back into the Army was a financial sacrifice for him. He was also opposed to the Radical Republican agenda. So when Stanton and Halleck started bad mouthing and treating with contempt after Seven Days he wasn’t the least bit inclined to pander to them; instead it was more of “I’ll tell you what I think and if you don’t like it – fire me”. Something Grant never would do.

How many men does Johnson Have? April 1862

Grant before and after the battle at Shiloh estimates the Confederate army at anywhere from 70,000 to 100,000:


April 5, 1862
Major Gen Halleck, St Louis Mo

The main force of the enemy is at Corinth with troops at different points East. Small Garrisons are at Bethel, Jackson, and Humboldt. The numbers of the enemy at Corinth and within supporting distance of it cannot be far from 80,000 men... Information from deserters place their force west at 200,000.

US Grant

To Commanding officer
Advance forces near Pittsburg landing
April 6th 1862

The attack on my forces has been very spirited form early this morning... The rebel force is estimated at over 100,000 men...

US. Grant Major General.

April 9th, 1862
Major Gen Halleck, St Louis Mo

The attack on Sunday was made, according to the best evidence I have by 162 regiments. Of these many were lost by killed, wounded, and desertion.

They are at present very crippled and cannot recover under two or three weeks. Of this matter, you may better to able to judge then I am...

US Grant, Major General
Pittsburg Tennessee.

To George Ihrie, San Francisco CA
April 25th, 1862

... It does not take into account that with a force of less than 35,000 men we kept at bay all day Sunday over 80,000.

US. Grant Major General.


To Congressman Washburne, Washington D.C.
May 14th, 1862

Dear Sir;

...Those people who expect a field of battle to be maintained , for a whole day, with about 30,000 men most of them entirely raw, against 70,000 as was the case at Pittsburg landing, whist awaiting for reinforcements without loss of like life, know little of war.

US. Grant Major General.

How many men does Bragg have? August 1862

To Maj General Don Carlos Buell
August 12, 1862

From the best information I can get there is but about 20,000 men including levies or conscripts in front on my left at Corinth - the main body having gone to Chattanooga - the rail book at Mobile shows that 56,000 have passed by Rail from Tupelo and vicinity to Chattanooga. The person who gave me this information and whom I believe reliable... says the whole rebel force at Chattanooga belonging to that command is estimated at 108,000.

I will telegraph you again during the day and inform you what I have done for your support in case of need.

U.S. Grant
Corinth, Mississippi.

Grant - Attack N.C. not Richmond - Jan 1864

Major Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
January 18, 1864

GENERAL: I would respectfully suggest whether an abandonment of all previously attempted lines to Richmond is not advisable, and in lieu of these one be taken farther south. I would suggest Raleigh, N. C., as the objective point and Suffolk as the starting point. Raleigh once secured, I would make New Berne the base of supplies until Wilmington is secured.

A moving force of 60,000 men would probably be required to start on such an expedition. This force would not have to be increased unless Lee should withdraw from his present position. In that case the necessity for so large a force on the Potomac would not exist. A force moving from Suffolk would destroy first all the roads about Weldon, or even as far north as Hicksford. From Weldon to Raleigh they would scarcely meet with serious opposition. Once there, the most interior line of railway still left to the enemy, in fact the only one they would then have, would be so threatened as to force him t0 use a large portion of his army in guarding it.

This would virtually force an evacuation of Virginia and indirectly of East Tennessee. It would throw our armies into new fields, where they could partially live upon the country and would reduce the stores of the enemy.

It would cause thousands of the North Carolina troops to desert and return to their homes. It would give us possession of many Negroes who are now indirectly aiding the rebellion. It would draw the enemy from campaigns of their own choosing, and for which they are prepared, to new lines of operations never expected to become necessary. It would effectually blockade Wilmington, the port now of more value to the enemy than all the balance of their sea-coast. It would enable operations to commence at once by removing the war to a more southern climate, instead of months of inactivity in winter quarters.

Other advantages might be cited which would be likely to grow out of this plan, but these are enough. From your better opportunities of studying the country and the armies that would be involved in this plan, you will be better able to judge of the practicability of it than I possibly can.

I have written this in accordance with what I understand to be an invitation from you to express my views about military operations, and not to insist that any plan of mine should be carried out. Whatever course is agreed upon, I shall always believe is at least intended for the best, and until fully tested will hope to have it prove so. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General

Halleck - State of the Union Cavalry Feb 1865

Lieutenant-General GRANT, City Point
February 13, 1865.:

GENERAL : As the time is approaching for organizing the cavalry for the spring campaign, I forward the following items in regard to its conditions and wants, collected by the Cavalry Bureau, to January 1, 1805:

Cavalrymen present for duty 105,434
Cavalrymen present and absent 160, 237
Cavalry horses serviceable 77,847
Cavalry horses unserviceable 9,659
Cavalry horses purchased during the year 154, 400

The number expended has been much greater than this, as the cavalry force has been less than the previous year, and, moreover, a considerable number of team and captured horses have been issued to the cavalry, and also recuperated animals. The expenditure of cavalry horses during the year has probably been less than 180,000. The waste or loss of cavalry equipments during the year is estimated as follows : Carbines expended, 93,394; pistols expended, 71,000; sabers expended, 90,000; horse equipments, 150,000. Expense of cavalry in horses, pay, forage, rations, clothing, ordnance, equipments, and transportation, $125,000,000, is certainly a pretty large sum for keeping up our cavalry force for one year.

In regard to particular commands, there are in the Armies of the Potomac and the James about 10,000 mounted men, and in the Middle Division, under General Sheridan, about 12,000, which can be kept efficient by issue from here, except in case of extraordinary casualties.

General Sherman has with him in the field about 6,500 men, which, since he left Atlanta, he has kept mounted by captures from the enemy. In the Department of the Ohio (now Kentucky) there were issued to General Burbridge for his Saltville expedition 6,000 horses. On his return 4,000 were reported lost or unserviceable.

When Hood commenced his march against Nashville General Thomas' immediate command had only about 5,000 effective cavalry, but between the 1st of October and 31st of December all horses purchased in the West were sent to his chief of cavalry, the issue amounting to 23,000, and including those sent to General Burbridge during the same period, 29,000, in three months to General Thomas' entire command. As Generals Wilson and Burbridge have made requisitions since that period for 14,000 additional horses, it is presumed that about the same number were lost or disabled during that period of three months. As soon as General Thomas determined to make no farther advance during the winter, and General Canby was directed to assume active operations in the field, orders were given to resume issues to his (Canby's) command in preference to all others.

In General Canby's entire division there were about 30,000 effective cavalrymen, of which only about one-half were mounted. As, however, his cavalry force was so disproportionate to his infantry, his requisitions are for only 6,000 horses, which will soon be filled. Major-General Dodge has made a requisition for 1,000 horses to be sent to Fort Leavenworth to remount some regiments to be sent against the Indians on the Overland Mail Route. Orders have been given to fill this as soon as General Canby receives his 6,000 horses.

It is proper to remark that inspection reports for the end of December shows a cavalry force in the Department of Kansas of 4,581 men present for duty and 4,386 serviceable horses. Major-General Thomas has made a requisition for 3,000 cavalry horses to be sent to General Stone- man in East Tennessee. This requisition will be filled next after those of Generals Dodge and Cauby. No issue of cavalry horses have been made to the Department of Arkansas for several mouths, and about one-half of the cavalry there are entirely dismounted. n regard to the enormous surplus of cavalry in the Western and Southwestern armies, as compared with infantry, I would remark that it has resulted in a great measure from the repeated requisitions of Generals Rosecrans, Banks, and others for increase of mounted forces, and their mounting infantry as cavalry. They were repeatedly informed that so large a cavalry force could not be supported, and experience has placed this question beyond a doubt.

Grant on Slavery - 1863

From a letter to Mr Washburne dated August 30th 1863:

The people of the North need never quarrelled over Slavery. What V-P Stephens acknowledges as the corner stone of the Confederacy is already knocked out. Slavery is already dead and cannot be resurrected. It would take a standing Army to maintain slavery in the South if we were to make peace today,

I never was an Abolitionist, not even what would be called anti-slavery, but I try to judge fairly & honestly and it became patent to my mind early in the rebellion that North and South could never live at peace with each other except as one nation; and that without Slavery. As anxious as I am to see peace re-established I would not therefore be wiling to see any settlement until this question is settled forever.

Meade on Grant

From His Life and Letters:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY or THE POTOMAC, December 20, 1863.

You ask me about Grant. It is difficult for me to reply. I knew him as a young man in the Mexican war, at which time he was considered a clever young officer, but nothing extraordinary. He was compelled to resign some years before the present war, owing to his irregular habits. I think his great characteristic is indomitable energy and great tenacity of purpose. He certainly has been very successful, and that is nowadays the measure of reputation. The enemy, however, have never had in any of their Western armies either the generals or the troops they have had in Virginia, nor has the country been so favorable for them there as here. Grant has undoubtedly shown very superior abilities, and is I think justly if entitled to all the honors they propose to bestow upon him.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 9 p. M., June 5, 1864

Since our last battle on the 3d inst. we have been comparatively quiet. I feel a satisfaction in knowing that my record is clear, and that the results of this campaign are the clearest indications I could wish of my sound judgment, both at Williamsport and Mine Run. In every instance that we have attacked the enemy in an entrenched position we have failed, except in the case of Hancock's attack at Spotsylvania, which was a surprise discreditable to the enemy. So, likewise, whenever the enemy has attacked us in position, he has been repulsed. I think Grant has had his eyes opened, and is willing to admit now that Virginia and Lee's army is not Tennessee and Bragg's army. Whether the people will ever realize this fact remains to be seen.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, November 24, 1864.

I am sorry to hear what you say of Grant, but it is in accordance with my theory and experience. Public expectation in his case, as in Sherman's, having been wrought up to a false and unreasonable pitch, expecting impossibilities and miracles, visits on them the failure to do what only public imagination renders practicable. Both these when at one time were down. Sherman was pronounced crazy, and grant was at one time deprived of command; and now, should success by any accident attend the efforts of either, their stars will be more in the ascendant than ever.

Grant is not a mighty genius, but he is a good soldier, of great force of character, honest and upright, of pure purposes, I think, without political aspirations, certainly not influenced by them. His prominent quality is unflinching tenacity of purpose, which blinds him to opposition and obstacles — certainly a great quality in a commander, when controlled by judgment, but a dangerous one otherwise. Grant is not without his faults and weaknesses. Among these is a want of sensibility, an almost too confident and sanguine disposition, and particularly a simple and guileless disposition, which is apt to put him, unknown to himself, under the influence of those who should not influence him, and desire to do so only for their own purposes. Take him all in all, he is, in my judgment, the best man the war has yet produced. When I say this, I refer more particularly to those I have come in contact with, and do not include Sherman, about whom I know nothing but what I see in the papers.