May 1943 - JFK explains why the Marines and Navy dislike "Dugout Doug" MacArthur

May 14, 1943
[Somewhere in Solomon Islands]

Dear Dad & Mother,

I was very interested in what you said about MacArthur’s popularity. Here he has none – is, in fact, very, very, unpopular. His nick-name is “Dugout Doug”; which seems to date back to the first invasion of Guadalcanal. The Army was supposed to come in and relieve the Marines after the beach-head had been secured. In 93 days, no Army. Rightly or wrongly (probably wrongly) MacArthur is blamed. He is said to have refused to the send the Army in – “He sat in his Dug-out in Australia”, ( I am quoting Marine and Navy personnel) and let the Marines take it. [Note: JFK was right to believe MacArthur was wrongly blamed. MacArthur had nothing to do with Guadalcanal - it was Admiral King and Nimitz's show, and he had no troops to send. He sent as much air support as he could, but was tied up helping the Australians in New Guinea - Rcocean].

…In regard to MacArthur, there is no doubt that as men start to come back, that “Dugout Doug” will spread – and I think will kill him off. No one here has the slightest interest in Politics – they just want to get home – morning, noon, and night. They wouldn't give a damn whether they could vote or not and would probably vote for Roosevelt just because they know his name.

Feeling OK. The back has really acted amazingly well and gives me scarcely any trouble and in general feels pretty good. Good bunch out here, so all in all it isn't too bad, but when I was speaking about people who would just as soon be home I didn't mean to use “they”- I meant “WE”.  I figure should be back within a year though, but brother from then on its going to take an act of Congress to move me, but I guess that act has already been passed – if it hasn't, it will be.

                                                        My Love to everyone 

                                                       /s/ Jack.

MacArthur and FDR meet and Inspect the 7th US Army Division

FDR and MacArthur meet in Person - Pearl Harbor July 26 1944

At 14:25 FDR’s ship The USS Baltimore stopped momentarily while off the entrance to Pearl Harbor and took on board an official party consisting of Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Vice Adm. R. L. Ghormley, Lt. Gen. W. R. and Richardson.

At 15:00 The USS Baltimore moored at Pier 22-B.  A space had been cleared on the dock, and behind it stood a tremendous crowd anticipating FDR’s not-so-secret appearance.  Lesser Admirals and Generals were cheered as they went aboard to greet the President. Only MacArthur was missing, having just landed, so Roosevelt sent word for the General to join him.

At 15:45, since MacArthur had still not shown, it was decided that the President would go ashore.  However, while preparations were made to leave, a terrific automobile siren was heard, and there raced onto the Dock and screeched to a halt, a motorcycle escort and one the longest open car in Honolulu.  In the front, there was a chauffeur in Khaki; in back there was one lone figure – MacArthur.  When the applause died down from the crowd and sailors on deck, the General strode up the Gangplank, stopped halfway up to acknowledge another ovation, and was soon on the deck talking to FDR.

“Hello Doug” said Roosevelt, “What are you doing with that leather jacket on - it’s damn hot today.”  MacArthur was later ribbed mercilessly by Admiral Leahy for wearing a ‘non-regulation’ jacket.

‘Well, I just landed from Australia,” he replied “It’s pretty cold up there.”

Nimitz, Richardson, MacArthur, and FDR then went to the Presidents cabin for more discussion. At 16:15, a group picture was taken and at 16:30 FDR went ashore to his quarters in Honolulu.

MacArthur Meets FDR - Air Flight Timeline- July 1944

July 26 1944 08:15 - MacArthur leaves Brisbane on C-54 for Honolulu.

Flight 1: Brisbane to New Caledonia.  Distance: 1,000 miles  Total flight time - 4/12 hours
Flight 2: New Caledonia  to Canton Island - Distance 2,000 miles. Total flight Time  -10 hours.
Flight 3:  Canton Island to Honolulu - Distance 2,000 miles,  Total flight Time - 10 hours.

MacArthur arrives Honolulu July 26, 1944 at 14:45 Hawaiian Time.  Time of trip - 26 hours with stops for refueling.

At Canton, MacArthur receives a message from Nimitz requesting he delay his arrival till 17:00.  Reason: FDR is scheduled to arrive the same time as MacArthur. Nimitz cannot meet both at the same time.  MacArthur replies no delay is required since it is unnecessary for Nimitz to greet him personally on arrival.  Note: FDR's ship  arrived late at Pearl Harbor, allowing Nimitz to greet MacArthur when he landed.

Nimitz meets MacArthur when he arrives.  MacArthur is dropped off at Fort Shafter,  so he can bath and shave before meeting the President.

July 20 1944 Marshall tells General Richardson - MacArthur and FDR are Coming to Hawaii

To Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr.
July 20, 1944   [Washington, D.C.]
Top Secret

Dear Richardson:
I am not informed as to whether or not you have been advised of the approaching visit of the President to Hawaii.  Until you are so informed by Admiral Nimitz please do not disclose my mention of the visit to him or to any other individual.

To meet the President and Admiral Leahy, General MacArthur has been directed to arrive at Honolulu on July 26th.  He has been told that you would be notified in advance of his arrival—this is the notification—therefore that there would be no occasion for him to communicate in advance with you.   Incidentally, General MacArthur has not been told that he is to meet the President, though it is quite probable that he has guessed as much.  General MacArthur has been advised that in communicating with you of the time of arrival of his plane he, MacArthur, should be referred to as "Mr. Catch"; therefore when some such message arrives you will know whom it refers to and make arrangements accordingly.

I should like you to arrange for his appropriate reception and for him to stay with you.
I assume that you will know at the time of his arrival when will be the convenient hour for him to pay his respects to the President.  You can arrange this through Admiral Leahy.

MacArthur Ordered to Meet FDR in Hawaii - July 1944

July 6 1944: Marshall notifies MacArthur:  "Arrange your plans so as to arrive in Honolulu July 26th [1944].  It is of utmost importance that the fewest possible number of individuals know of your expected departure or of your destination.”

July 18 1944:  Marshall informed MacArthur to "proceed as directed" and that no further orders were necessary.  "Purpose: general strategical discussion," cabled Marshall.  "I will be in Washington but you will see Leahy, etc.  In communicating notice to Army theater commander of arrival time your plane refer to yourself as Mister Catch." **

Source: (Marshall to MacArthur, Radios, July 6 and 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

  ** = MacArthur not specifically told he was to meet FDR in Hawaii.

Rise of the USA's Great white Fleet - 1896-1909

US Navy Battleships			Royal Navy Battleships
Year	Commissioned	Total Available	Commissioned	Total Available
1896	2	3	3	14
1897	1	4	3	17
1898	0	4	3	20
1899	0	4	1	21
1900	3	7	3	24
1901	2	9	2	26
1902	1	10	5	31
1903	1	11	5	36
1904	1	12	6	42
1905	0	12	5	47
1906	6	18	2 (1 DN)	49
1907	4	22	1	50
1908	3	25	4 (2 DN)	54
1909	0	25	4 DN	58

Repatriation of Japanese After WW II

From General MacArthur's reports:

At the end of the war over six million Japanese were scattered throughout the islands in the Western Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland. Their repatriation became one of the major problems confronting General MacArthur. Their early return to Japan was desirable for purely humanitarian reasons as well as for the purpose of easing the economic burden of the liberated countries.

September 1, 1945:  Overseas Japanese to be returned to Japan:

Australian Areas
Bypassed Solomon Islands, Rabaul, New Guinea  - 139,000

British Areas
Southeast Asia (includes Indochina, Burma, Malaysia, Borneo) - 750,000
Dutch East Indies - 15,000

Chinese Areas
China - 1.5 Million
Formosa - 480,000

US Areas
Philippines - 132,000 (includes 12,000 POW taken before 8-15-1945)
Bypassed Central Pacific  Islands - 132,000
Bypassed Ryukyu Islands - 69,000
South Korea - 600,000

USSR Areas
North Korea - 320,000
Manchuria - 1.3 Million
Kuril Islands - 370,000
USSR POW (Siberia) - 700,000

Marshall to MacArthur - March 29 1945

#5-076

To General of the Army Douglas MacArthur1

March 29, 1945 Radio No. WAR-60363. Washington, D.C.

Top Secret

TOPSEC personal for MacArthur for his Eyes Only from Marshall.

Command in Pacific is under consideration but complete solution with respect to command and future operations has not as yet been resolved.2

For your information the following portions of the future directive seem in general to be agreed upon although JCS formal approval has not yet been given, the delaying being due to failure so far to reach agreement as to certain details referred to below.

I. The over-all objective in the war against Japan, to be brought about at the earliest practicable date, is:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments, and destroying Japanese Air and Naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

It is expected that the JCS will assign you the responsibility to:

(1) Complete the occupation of Luzon and conduct such additional operations in the Philippines as required for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan. Further to the foregoing, conduct such additional operations toward completing the liberation of the Philippines as can be mounted without prejudice to the accomplishment of the overall objective.

(2) Make plans for occupying North Borneo, including Brunei Bay, using Australian combat and service troops and make preparations at such time as resources can be made available without detriment to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Units of the British Pacific Fleet may be allocated for this operation.

(3) Provide forces and support to Nimitz to assist him in completion of the seizure and development of positions in the Ryukyus as required in his current directive under provisions of Part II below.

(4) Establish bases in the Philippines to support further advances for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan.

II. It appears that agreement will be reached by the JCS placing Army resources in Pacific under you. The point at issue which has so long delayed a final agreement is the degree and manner of control that you as Army Commander will exercise as to Army troops throughout the Pacific which are of necessity closely integrated in Naval Base and other operations and in the Naval Logistical problem.

You will be given responsibility for planning, preparation and conduct of actual invasion of Japan. Nimitz would be given responsibility for amphibious phase of the operation.3

FDR Terminates MacArthur's Position in the Philippines - Aug 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The President requests me to advise that General Douglas MacArthur be informed that his services in the Philippines shall terminate upon the conclusion of a two year tour of duty there; that the General is needed for service in the United States; that the General be acquainted with post commands ^to which he may be assigned at the time of his return to active duty in the United States; and that he be given his preference of such posts as may be available at that time. As a furthur consideration, in the event the General prefers some Corps Area or other command which may not be open, at that time, the President is willing that the War Department work out much transfer of officers as may be necessary to permit General MacArthur to take over the post he most desires.


The President has noted the contents of the confidential letter addressed by Brigadier General Conley to General Douglas MacArthur, under date of September 18, 1935. He directs that such portions of this letter or of existing War Department orders as conflict with the above request shall be nullified, i.e. "x x x limit of time of foreign service is waived in your case" etc.


STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Later Memo from Craig on this in Miss LeHands Confidential Files.

Retribution: Max Hastings hates MacArthur

Max Hastings' book on the last year of the Pacific War is a perfect example of MacArthur Derangement Syndrome (MDS). I've never read a respected military historian who hates an Allied general as much as Max hates Mac. Here are some Hastings' comments from Retribution:

• MacArthur by contrast seemed to reject accountability to any earthly power.(P19)

• MacArthur displayed a a taste for fantasy quite unsuited to a field commander. together with an ambition close to megalomania and a consistently poor judgment as a picker of subordinates.(p20)
• Army insiders held MacA personally responsible for the Philippines debacle, by failures of commission and omission, This was unjust, although his generalship was poor...(p20)
• He shamelessly manipulated communiques about his forces achievements, deprived subordinates of credit for successes, shrugged off his own responsibility for failures.
• He made no jokes, and possessed no small talk, though he would occasionally talk baseball to enlisted men in an effort to deceive them that he was human (p22)
• His belief that his critics were not merely wrong, but evil verged on derangement.
• Most distasteful of all his wartime actions was a flirtation with a 1944 run against FDR, whose liberalism affronted his own rabidly conservative convictions Only when he realized he could not defeat Dewey for the Republican nomination did he finally exclude himself. (P23).

And this is just the first 25 pages of a 560 page book! So far it seems that Hastings is the "deranged" one - not MacArthur.

MacArthur on the Yamashita Case

"In reviewing this case I have carefully considered the minority views presented by distinguished Justices of the United States Supreme Court in negation not only as to jurisdiction but as to method and meritorious action as well..

"No trial could have been fairer than this one, no accused was ever given a more complete opportunity of defense, no judicial process was ever freer from prejudice. Insofar as was humanly possible the actual facts were fully presented to the commission. There were no artifices of technicality which might have precluded the introduction of full truth in favor of half truth, or caused the slanting of half truth to produce the effect of non truth, thereby warping and confusing the tribunal into an insecure verdict."

On the contrary, the trial was conducted in the unshaded light of truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Those who would oppose such honest method, can only be a minority, who either advocate arbitrariness of process above factual realism, or who inherently shrink from the stern rigidity of capital punishment. Strange jurisprudence it would be, which for whatever reason defeated the fundamental purpose of justice --to rectify wrong, to protect right and to produce order, safety and well being. No sophistry can confine justice to a form. It is a quality. Its purity lies in its purpose, not in its detail. The rules of war and the military law resulting as an essential corollary therefrom have always proven sufficiently flexible to accomplish justice within the strict limitations of morality."

"It is not easy for me to pass penal judgment upon a defeated adversary in a major military campaign. I have reviewed the proceedings in vain search for some mitigating circumstance on Yamashita's behalf. I can find none. Rarely has so cruel and wanton a record been spread to public gaze... The transgressions resulting therefrom as revealed by the trial are a blot upon the military profession, a stain upon civilization and constitute a memory of shame and dishonor that can never be forgotten. Peculiarly callous and purposeless was the sack of the ancient city of Manila, with its Christian population and its countless historical shrines and monuments of culture and civilization, which with campaign conditions reversed had previously been spared.

"It is appropriate here to recall that Yamashita was fully forewarned as to the personal consequences of such atrocities. On October 24--four days following the landing of our forces on Leyte--it was publicly proclaimed that I would 'hold the Japanese military authorities in the Philippines immediately liable for any harm which may result from failure to accord prisoners of war, civilian internees or civilian non-combatants the proper treatment and the protection to which they of right are entitled."

"No new or retroactive principles of law, either national or international, are involved. The case is founded upon basic fundamentals and practice as immutable and ae standardized as the most matured and irrefutable of social codes. The proceedings were guided by that primary rationale of all judicial purposes--to ascertain the fill truth unshackled by any artificiality or narrow method or technical arbitrariness. The results are beyond challenge."

"I approve the findings and sentence of the Commission".

Eisenhower on MacArthur - 1932

From Eisenhower's Diary JUNE 14, 1932:

Douglas MacArthur - Chief of Staff. Essentially a romantic figure. Very appreciative of good work, positive in his convictions, a genius at giving concise and clear instructions... He apparently avoids social duties as much as possible - and does not seek the limelight except in things connected with the Army and the War Department. Placed a letter of commendation in my record - and assured me that as long as he stays in the Army, I am one of the people earmarked for his "gang".

In my opinion, he has the capacity to undertake successfully any position in the Government. He has a reserved dignity - but is most animated in conversation on subjects that interest him. I doubt he has any real political ambitions - and in these days of high powered publicity and propaganda - I do not expect to seem him prominently mentioned for office outside the War Department.

Most people that know Gen MacA like and admire him to a degree... He is impulsive - able, even brilliant - quick - tenacious of his views and extremely self-confident.

MacArthur and Marshall - Career Paths

George Marshall and Douglas MacArthur were both famous Generals in WW II and were both born in 1880. Given the small size of the US Army before WW II you'd think these 2 men would have been friends or rivals in the 38 years from MacArthur's graduation from West Point in 1903 to Pearl Harbor December 1941. Yet, the 2 men rarely served together and had little personal contact for the following reasons:

1) Marshall went to VMI, MacArthur to West Point.
2) Marshall was an infantry officer, MacArthur an Engineer.
3) In France During WW I, Marshall was a staff officer, MacArthur a combat officer.
4) Both men served overseas but almost never at the time. When Marshall was stateside, Mac was in the Philippines, and vice-versa.
5) MacArthur became a general in 1920, Marshall languished as Captain/Major until 1927 and only became a General in 1936.

As far as I can tell the 2 men were only in the same general area twice. In 1908-1910 both men were stationed in Ft. Leavenworth Kansas and in 1917-1919 both were in France during WWI. The two men' s service record looks like this:

MacArthur

• June 1903 - Graduates West Point.
• Oct 1903- June 1905 Philippines and California
• June 1905-June 1907 Aid to his father (General Arthur MacArthur) and President
• June 1907-June 1908 - Various posts in USA as Engineer
• 1908-1912 Engineer Ft Leavenworth and Ft Riley Kansas
• 1913-1917 Engineer attached to the General Staff - Washington DC
• 1917-1919 - France with 42nd Rainbow Division - Promoted Brigadier General
• 1919-1922 - Commandant West Point
• 1992-1925 Philippines
• 1925-1928 Corps Commander - Baltimore MD - Promoted Major General
• 1928-1930 Philippines
• 1930 1935 Army Chief of Staff - Washington DC
• 1935 - 1938 Commander US Army Philippines
• 1938 - 1941 Retired from US Army. Head of Filipino Army
• July 1941 - Recalled to active duty.

George Marshall

• Feb 1902-Oct 1903 Philippines
• 1903-1906 - Infantry Officer - Oklahoma
• 1906-1908 - Student at Ft Leavenworth Staff College - Kansas
• 1909-1910 - Instructor Ft Leavenworth Staff College - Kansas
• 1910-1913 - Company Commander and Instructor various posts in USA
• 1913-1916 Philippines
• 1916-1917 - Aid to General Bell - California
• 1917-1918 - Staff Officer - 1st Division - France
• 1918-1919 - Staff Officer - 1st Army - France - Promoted to Colonel (Temporary)
• 1919-1924 - Aid to General Pershing (Reverts back to Regular Army Captain in 1920)
• 1924- 1927 - China (Promoted to Lt Col)
• 1927-1932 - Head Ft Benning Infantry School
• 1933 - Service with Illinois National Guard - Promoted to Colonel
• 1934-1938 - Service with CCC - (Promoted to Brigadier General - March 1936)
• Oct 1938 -Sept 1939 - Deputy Chief of Staff - DC
• Sept 1939- Nov 1945 - Army Chief of Staff

USAFFE Strength - December 7, 1941

December 7th 1941 US Army Strength
Increase over July 31

Air Corps
July 31st -2,500
Dec 8th -5,500
increase - 3,000

Coastal Artillery and Support Troops
July 31st -5,000
Dec 8th -9,000
increase -4,000

Mobile AAA
July 31st -0
Dec 8th -1,800
increase -1,800

US Infantry
July 31st -2,000
Dec 8th -2,000
Increase -0

US Tank
July 31st -0
Dec 8th -1,200
Increase -1,200

Filipino Scouts
July 31st -12,000
Dec 8th -12,000
Increase -0

Total US Army
July 31st -22,000
Dec 8th -32,000
Increase -10,000

Artillery December 7, 1941:

Philippine Army - 52 British 2..95 inch, 96 British 75mm = 148 75mm & 16 155 mm
Note: This is the total artillery in stock all over the Luzon. Of the 148, 8 were sent to the south leaving 140 for the 8 Filipino Divisions on Luzon. Many of the artillery had wooden wheels or were not fit to towed by Truck - all were British WWI surplus. The Japanese captured almost 40 in their advance to Bataan leaving about 100 for the defense to Bataan in January 1942.

US Army
- 16 155mm
-36 75mm
- 12 2.95 inch
- 48 M3 75mm Self propelled artillery

Of the 48
75mm and 2.95inch pieces - 36 were with the Philippine Division. 24th Regiment (PS) had 24 75mm and the 23rd (PS) 12 2.95 inch The other 12 75 mm were with the 86th Regiment (PS). The 16 155mm were with the 88th Regiment (PS).

Total
- 64 2.95 inch
- 132 75mm
- 32 155mm
- 48 75mm self propelled

MacArthur and the PreWar Phillipines

October 1935 - MacArthur Appointed Military Adviser to the Commonwealth. The Philippine government is poor and reluctant to spend money. The Philippine Army budget is frozen at $8 million per year from 1937 to 1941.

September 1937 - FDR informs MacArthur he will be rotated back to the USA after the end of his 2 year tour (October 1937).

December 1937 - MacArthur Retires from US Army. His only position is head of the Philippine army. However, Eisenhower and several other US army officers remain to lend him assistance.

Oct 1935- July 1941 - MacArthur constantly requests FDR for increased military aid to build up the Philippine army but is refused. Under current US war plans the Philippines are considered "indefensible".

July19, 1941 Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of the newly created Army Air Forces, submits to Marshall, Stimson, and FDR a proposal to transfer to the Philippines of four heavy bombardment groups, consisting of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit groups of 130 planes each.

July 26, 1941 - MacArthur is recalled to active duty and made head of the USAFFE (US Armed Forces Far East). The current head of the US Army Philippine Department Major General Gunter is made redundant and returns to the US.

July 26, 1941 - The Philippine Army with 10 Divisions (120,00 men) is mobilized.

July 31, 1941 - MacArthur has the following US Army forces:

Filipino Scouts - 12, 000
31st US Army Regiment - 2,500
American Harbor Defense & Support Services - 5,000
US Air Corps - 2, 500
Total US Army - 22, 000

Tanks - 0
M1 Rifles -0
75mm Guns - 36 ( plus 48 in the Philippine Army)
105 mm artillery -0
Anti-aircraft guns -0
Radar sets -0

P-40B - 31
P-35 -52
B-17 -0
B-25 -0
Obsolete light bombers - 39
Obsolete fighter -16
Other (cargo, liaison, etc.) - 68

August 1, 1941 - War Department informs MacArthur that existing War Strategy has changed. Reinforcements will be sent pending shipping availability. General Marshall informs MacArthur that US plans to base hundreds of B-17s in the Philippines to deter Japanese aggression has been approved.

August 10, 1941 - MacArthur states the Philippine army has only 48 75mm guns is short machine guns, anti-tank guns and AAA. He requests 84,500 Garand rifles (M1), 330 .30-caliber machine guns, 326 .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, 450 37-mm. guns, 217 81-mm. mortars, 288 75-mm. guns with high-speed adapters, and over 8,000 vehicles of all types.

August 16, 1941 - War informs MacArthur that that the following units would sail from San Francisco between 27 August and 5 September: the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) consisting of 76 officers and 1,681 enlisted men; the 194th Tank Battalion (less Company B), with 54 tanks, 34 officers, and 390 enlisted men; and one company (155 men) of the 17th Ordnance Battalion.

September 5, 1941 - MacArthur turns down Marshall's offer of a US national guard division since equipment, supplies and aircraft require priority. Marshall approves MacArthur's request for funds for airfield defense and promises to send additional AAA and radar sets.

September 6, 1941 - 9 B-17s arrive in Manila

October 2, 1941 - 50 P-40 fighter planes arrive in Manila.

November 4, 1941 - 26 B-17s arrive.

Late November 1941 - 26 P-40s arrive.

December 8th 1941 - Aircraft strength of FEAF:

P-40 - 107
B-17 - 35
P-35 - 52
Obsolete light bombers - 39
Obsolete fighter -16
Other (cargo, liaison, etc.) - 68

Radar sets in operation - 2
Clark Airfield for B-17s
Six other Airfields for fighters

Airfields bombproofed - 0
Airfields with AAA protection -1 (Clark AFB)
Total AAA in Philippines - 12 75mm & 24 37mm plus .50 Cal Machine guns
Del Monte Airfield established in Late November for B-17s.

Why it was better to invade Luzon than Formosa

The short answer is that an invasion of Formosa in January 1945, not only would have been unnecessary but would have been a bloodbath. We would have incurred many casualties for no real benefit. The only real advantage of invading Formosa over Luzon was Formosa's geographic position. We could have cut Japan's sea lanes to the south more effectively from Formosa than Luzon. Otherwise the advantage would have been with Luzon. We would incurred more casualties for the following reasons:

1) We had occupied Luzon since 1900 and knew the detailed maps of the area along with Military officers who knew Luzon very well. Formosa had been occupied by Japan for almost 40 years, and we had no detailed maps or information on the island.

2) The Filipinos were on our side and provided us with valuable military intelligence. Such as the strength and location of the Japanese troops, existence of fortifications and blown and unblown bridges. The Filipinos not only used as scouts, but were valuable in containing and mopping up Japanese troops. The Formosa population would have contained large pro-Japanese elements that would have provided them with intelligence against us, and well as supporting guerrilla action against us.

3) Occupation of a mountainous, heavily forested island 240 miles long and 90 miles wide, with bad roads, would have required massive amounts of troops and negated our superiority in artillery and tanks.

4) Japan had millions of troops in China, and could have easily shipped reinforcements from China to Formosa. Formosa is only 100 miles from the China coast and 240 miles from Okinawa. On Luzon, OTOH, had only 250,000 japanese troops and no reinforcements arrived after our invasion.

5) The Japanese had 40 years to fortify Formosa against attack, and we didn't know their location and strength. By contrast the Japanese had only 3 years to fortify Luzon and we knew their exact location and strength.

6) With airfields in Leyte and Mindoro we were able to cover the landings in Luzon and suffer few losses. We invaded Luzon on Jan 9th 1945 and by Jan 15th the Japanese had launched their last Kamikaze attack and moved their remaining planes to Formosa. Furthermore, with adequate air cover form Mindoro and Leyte the Fast Carriers were able to cut loose in Mid January and continue their destruction of Japanese shipping and naval vessels in Indochina, Japan, and Okinawa.

7) By contrast, the only air coverage for the Formosa landings would have come from the CVE and the fast carriers. The Japanese would have been able to strike the landings not only from the Formosa airfields but stage them from Luzon and China. Indeed, even after we had occupied all of the Formosa, the Japanese still have continued their Kamikaze attacks from Chinese airfields.

Myth - The invasion of the Philippines was unnecessary

“Philippine campaign was totally unnecessary campaign undertaken to assuage MacArthur's ego. the capture of Peliliu secured the flank of the real drive, the navy/marine campaign in the central pacific. so that reason usually set forth as an excuse doesn't fly, and it blew the hell out of manila and the rest of the Filipino towns, killed scores of Filipino civilians not to mention closeto 70,000 U.S. casualties. So it should be forgotten. it was wasteful in the extreme and criminally unnecessary.

I am not the world's greatest expert on this, but if I remember the situation, MacArthur and Nimitz briefed President Roosevelt, with MacArthur recommending his return to the Philippines, and Nimitz recommending the island-hopping campaign which would bypass and isolate the Philippines,to be eliminated of the Japanese later.”

This post is a perfect example of why being ill-informed is worse than being uninformed. This post is completely wrong. To whit;

Nimitz never recommended bypassing the PI. Nimitz and every other field commander in the Pacific thought we needed to invade Leyte and establish airfields to cover the Japanese airfields on Luzon before invading either Luzon or Formosa. Only King wanted to bypass the Philippines and go directly to Formosa.

FDR did not decide Pacific war military strategy based on a discussion with MacArthur. Actually strategy was set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In 1944 that included Arnold, Marshall, King, and Leahy. FDR, from what I’ve read never overruled his JCS after his decision to invade North Africa in July 1942.

In September 1944 the choice was not between invading the Philippines and invading Okinawa and Iwo Jima. No one at the time thought we could move directly from Saipan to Okinawa in the Fall of 1944. There were three options being considered two viable option and one unviable:

1) Viable; To invade Leyte and then invade either Luzon or Formosa; or
2) Viable: bypass the PI and invade Formosa and the China Coast.
3)) Unviable: bypass the PI and Formosa and invade Japan directly or Okinawa.

Option three was never considered viable by either the Army or Navy. Marshall considered it, but quickly dropped the idea when Army planners thought it impossible. The only one in favor of Option 2 was Admiral King.

Bypassing the PI and invading Formosa was supported by King for three reasons:

1) it would support our invasion of the China coast, allowing us to support the Nationalists.
2) occupation of Formosa would cut Japan sea lanes to the south
3) B-29s could use it as a base to Bomb Japan.

Eventually, the JCS (except for King) and Nimitz, MacArthur, and Halsey concluded that we had to invade Leyte and establish airfields to neutralize the airfields on Luzon before either Formosa or Luzon could be invaded.

After the JCS decided to invade Leyte in October 1944 they had to decide between Luzon or Formosa. Marshall and Arnold supported an invasion of Luzon. Also supporting Luzon were the other army field commanders and Admiral Halsey. King never wavered in believing Formosa should be invaded.

However the Key player in the decision was Nimitz. Initially he favored invading Formosa but he came to the conclusion that it would be cheaper in lives and quicker to first invade Luzon and then invade Okinawa; bypassing Formosa. Nimitz’s reasons were as follows;

• Formosa could not be invaded till March 1945 vs. an invasion of Luzon in January 1945. Thereby pushing the invasion of Okinawa until June 1945.
• Formosa was no longer needed as a B-29 airbase.
• A Chinese port was no longer needed to support the Chinese.

Eisenhower vs. MacArthur

Similarities:
West Point Graduates
Both Chief of Staff
Both Heavy Chain Smokers
Both Heads of Theater Operations in WW II
Both Lt. Generals In WW II
Both Loved Football and followed the Army-navy Game Religiously
Neither man went to Church but both believed in God
Both wanted to Be President and run on the Republican ticket
Neither liked Harry Truman
Neither liked FDR
Both married Southerners.

Differences.
Ike never saw Combat or commanded troops in the field. MacArthur was wounded twice, won awards for bravery and saw combat in Mexico, France, and the Philippines (1903). He commanded the 84th brigade and the 42 division in combat in WW II.

MacArthur - despite the nickname of "dugout dug" often established his HQ near the front (see Leyte and Luzon), he made constant visits to the front, over saw landings from ship, and boarded C-47 airplanes to watch the paratroopers jump to the Drop zone.

Ike on the other hand, rarely visited the front. During the North African, Italy, and Sicily campaigns he spent most of his time in Algeria. He didn't visit Normandy until June 24th, or move his HQ to France until August 1944. After the line stabilized,he moved SHAEF to Versailles outside Paris.

MacArthur was a star and rose like a rocket. 1st in his class at the Academy, aide to TR at 26. General and war hero at 38, Head of West point at 39. Major General at 45, and Lt General and Army COS at 50.

Ike by comparison was the Tortoise. Graduated in the middle of West point class in 1915. Never got to France in WW I. From 1919 to 1932 he was variously a generals aide, a recruiting officer, a football coach, ghost writer, author of a book on American battlefield monuments in France, a war planner and an aide to the Secretary of War. From 1932 to 1939 he was an aide to MacArthur. Promoted to full Colonel in 1940 and finally to General in 1941, at the age of 51. But starting in 1942 his career took off. Commander of ETO, General in December 1944, along with MacArthur. Chief of staff 1945, and President 1952

MacArthur -The Clark field attack & his critics

Its interesting thing how MacArthur's critics have seized upon the attack on Clarke field and used it to attack him. They seem obsessed with it, blow it out of proportion, change their story, use 20-20 hindsight, and misstate the facts. See the US Army of the History (See "Fall of the Philippines" by Smith and the officia US Air Force History by Craven and Cate). Several points need to be made:

1) The Japanese attacked Clark Field at 12:15 PM. Given that its 520 miles from the IJN Formosan airfields to Manila it would have the Japanese approximately 2 hours to get there. Assuming an additional 1/2 hour for climb to altitude and forming into attack formation, that means the IJN aircraft had taken off no later than 945 AM. Now a B-17 cruises at 170 MPH and takes 15 minutes to get to 15,000 ft. That means if the B-17 had taken off any time after 6 am they would have bombed empty airfields. Since Brenton didn't go to Big Mac's office until 5am, that would have given them 1 hour to bomb and gas up the planes, briefs the pilots and crew, get them to the planes, do the preflight check off, warm up the engines, taxi and takeoff. Simply impossible.

2) The official history states they vaguely knew where the IJN airfields were, they had no been photographed. There were no bomb lines or bomb charts to guide the bombardiers. Also, per the US history, the B-17s not flown any practice missions or had a chance to practice their bombing techniques since they arrived in the Philippines.

3) Contrary to Costello in his "Pacific War" the P-40s could NOT have escorted B-17s to Formosa. The P-40s did NOT have drop tanks and the P-40 had a maximum radius (range/2) of 425 miles and real radius of about 300 miles. It was over 500 miles to Formosa.

4) Despite his critics, its hard to see how MacArthur was to blame for anything. Nor is it hard to see how Brenton was. The Japanese were simply LUCKY. They were spotted on Radar and had the warning be given, the B-17s and P-40s could have taken off in time. Had the Japanese attacked between 8am and 10am the US planes would have been in the air. A previous IJA air attack had caused them to be scrambled.

5) Contrary to his critics, the FEAF was on alert and expecting a dawn attack. When the attack didn't come, the planes came to refuel and for the pilots to rest and have lunch. This is when the Japanese attacked.

6) In any case, even had the planes not be lost on the ground, both Nichols, Clark, and Iba field had inadequate bomb protection and AAA. Of the 107 P-40s, only 75 were operational, the rest were in unprotected hangers undergoing service and repair. These 30 P-40s would have lost in the bombing raid no matter what. Further, since the Japanese were able to destroy the unprotected communications center, repair shops, hangers, and fuel trucks, the FEAF would have been incapable of mounting another B17 attack on Formosa after December 8th or of continuing to base 75 P-40s there.

7) Finally, the critics think it "unbelievable" that Big Mac did not talk in detail to Brenton about the B-17 attack or the defense of Clark Field. Newsflash, MacArthur was a Lt. General in command of the entire Philippines, including a 120,00 man filo-American Army. He was responsible for coordinating with Washington DC, the Philippine Government, the Navy, and US civilian officials. He was NOT a member of the air corps. He only went in aircraft as a passenger. He didn't plan or fly B-17 missions. He didn't plan or oversee the defense of the airfields. He left the details to Sutherland his C-O-S and his air force general.

8) The number of B-17s is insignificant. There were only 19 B-17s at Clark when the Japanese attacked and 18 were destroyed.