Meade - They can take this job and shove it

To Mrs. Meade,

Headquarters army of the Potomac, Berlin, Md., July 16, 1863.

I wrote to you of the censure put on me by the President, through General Halleck, because I did not bag General Lee, and of the course I took on it. I don't know whether I informed you of Halleck's reply, that his telegram was not intended as a censure, but merely ‘to spur me on to an active pursuit,’ which I consider more offensive than the original message; for no man who does his duty, and all that he can do, as I maintain I have done, needs spurring. It is only the laggards and those who fail to do all they can do who require spurring. They have refused to relieve me, but insist on my continuing to try to do what I know in advance it is impossible to do.

My army (men and animals) is exhausted; it wants rest and reorganization; it has been greatly reduced and weakened by recent operations, and no reinforcements of any practical value have been sent. Yet, in the face of all these facts, well known to them, I am urged, pushed and spurred to attempting to pursue and destroy an army nearly equal to my own, falling back upon its resources and reinforcements, and increasing its morale daily. This has been the history of all my predecessors, and I clearly saw that in time their fate would be mine. This was the reason I was disinclined to take the command, and it is for this reason I would gladly give it up.

Lincoln on Lee's Escape - July 21st 1863

Executive mansion, Washington, 21st July, 1863

My dear General Howard:

Your letter of the 10th is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed such destruction was perfectly easy—believed that General Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed—making my belief a hobby possibly—that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. General Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer and a true man.

Yours very truly,
 A. Lincoln.

Gettysburg July 14th - Lee Escapes

To General HUMPHREYS: July 14, 1863-6. 35 a. m
My brigade commander in Hagerstown reports the works in his front evacuated.

O. O. HOWARD.  Major-General.

To Major-General PLEASONTON:
I have advanced about a mile. See nothing. My information that the enemy commenced crossing last evening, and has succeeded, [was from] a citizen who has been detained in their camp. They have all crossed, excepting about a division.

J. BUFORD.

To CORPS COMMANDERS July 14, 1863-8. 30 a. m.
Information having been received that the enemy has fallen back from our right, the major-general commanding directs that, upon receiving similar intelligence from the reconnoitering force, each corps commander will move forward with his corps to support the reconnaissance, which will be pushed until the enemy is met; that the Third Corps will follow the Second Corps; that corps commanders will keep up their communication with the corps on their right and left, and be prepared to deploy in line of battle upon overtaking the enemy.

To General HUMPHREYS:
The rear of the enemy crossed the river two and a half hours ago, our artillery shelling them. This report is from my scouting officers.

O. O. HOWARD, Major-General.

Meade To Halleck, July 14, 1863—11 A. M.
On advancing my army this morning, with a view of ascertaining the exact position of the enemy, and attacking him if the result of the examination should justify me, I found on reaching his lines that they were evacuated. I immediately put my army in pursuit; the cavalry in advance at this period. My forces occupy Williamsport, but I have not yet heard from the advance on Falling Waters, where it is reported he crossed his infantry on a bridge. Your instructions, as to further movements in case the enemy is entirely across the river, are desired.

Halleck To Meade, Washington, D. C., July 14, 1863.
The enemy should be pursued and cut up wherever he may have gone.. I cannot advise details, as I do not know where Lee's army is, nor where are your pontoon bridges.

I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army, without another battle, has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore.

Meade To Halleck, July 14, 1863—2.30 P. M.
Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President (conveyed in your dispatch of 1 P. M. this day) is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army.

Meade To Halleck, July 14, 1863—3 P. M.
My cavalry now occupy Falling Waters, having overtaken and captured a brigade of infantry, fifteen hundred (1500) strong, two (2) guns, two caissons, two battle-flags, and a large number of small arms. The enemy are all across the Potomac.

Halleck To Meade, Washington, D. C., July 14, 1863.
My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved.

Meade To Halleck, July 14, 1863—8.30 P. M.
My cavalry have captured five hundred prisoners, in addition to those previously reported. General Pettigrew, of the Confederate army, was killed this morning in the attack on the enemy's rear-guard. His body is in our hands.

To War Department, Washington, D. C.:
The Maryland campaign is ended. Have sent to me at Harper's Ferry, as soon as practicable, all the maps you can spare of the Shenandoah Valley and the routes east of the mountains to Gordonsville.

G. K. WARREN, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.

Gettysburg- July 13th - Will attack Lee Tomorrow - Maybe

To General MEADE:  July 13, 1863-11. 30 a. m.

From a church steeple in Hagerstown I have made the following observations: The enemy's left seems to rest on a detached work one-fourth of a mile north of the National pike, on the farm of Wingert, or Zeller (see county map); thence running through Hilliard's, Heyser's, and Morler's estates, which is as far as I could see. Between the detached work above referred to and the pike there seems to be a battery of heavy guns; farther to their right another battery, and on Morler's farm two batteries. They appear to be very busy intrenching. Their position is on a ridge, and very strong.

O. O. HOWARD, Major-General. HDQRS. 11TH ARMY CORPS,

Meade To Halleck, July 13, 1863—5 P. M.
In my despatch of yesterday I stated that it was my intention to attack the enemy to-day unless something intervened to prevent it. Upon calling my corps commanders together and submitting the question to them, five out of six were unqualifiedly opposed to it under these circumstances, in view of the momentous consequences attendant upon a failure to succeed. I did not feel myself authorized to attack until after I had made more careful examination of the enemy's position, strength, and defensive works. These examinations are now being made.

So far as completed they show the enemy to be strongly prospected on a ridge running from the rear of Hagerstown, past Downsville, to the Potomac. I shall continue these reconnaissances with the expectation of finding some weak point, upon which, if I succeed, I shall hazard an attack. General Smith, with the advanced division of General Couch's forces, has arrived here to-day; but from the organization and condition of these troops and the short time they have to serve, I cannot place much reliance upon them.

Halleck To Meade, Washington, D. C., July 13, 1863.

Yours of 5 P. M. is received. You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment. Make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Reinforcements are pushed on as rapidly as possible. Don't let the enemy escape.

TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL July 13, 1863-4. 30 p. m.
It is reported by deserters this afternoon that the enemy have completed a pontoon bridge at Williamsport, and are now crossing their wagons and a portion of their cavalry. Firing heard in that direction for some hours during early part of day. Rained nearly all last night and most of this morning.

B. F. KELLEY, Brigadier-General.

TO ALL CORPS COMMANDERS, July 13, 1863-9 p. m.
The major-general commanding directs that the commanders of the Twelfth, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps each make a reconnaissance in force in front of their respective positions to-morrow, the 14th instant, the movement to commence punctually at 7 a. m. The reconnoitering force from each corps will be commanded by a general officer, and will be not less than a division, with such artillery as may be deemed necessary. The enemy's pickets, supports, and guards will be driven in until a distinct view of his position, defensive works, force, and its arrangements can be had. If it should be necessary to obtain this information, and should be practicable, the enemy should even be made to display his line of battle... The position of the enemy, the arrangement of his troops, the number, strength, and position of his batteries, rifle-pits, and other defensive works, will be carefully noted, and a full report will be made of all the facts of importance ascertained. 

By command of Major-General Meade

Gettysburg - july 12th - Meade will attack tommorrow

Couch To Meade, Chambersburg, July 12, 1863—12.30 P. M.
It is reported that the rebels crossed a good many horses yesterday at Williamsport, swimming the river, and that fourteen flats were nearly completed yesterday. I can't find out that any large force of the enemy are at Fairview.

My second division will move down so soon as my provisions are up.


Meade To Couch, July 12, 1863.
My troops occupied Hagerstown this morning, the enemy retiring towards Williamsport before them. The enemy are intrenched on a line one mile and a half from Hagerstown, in the direction of dam number four on the river. The road is open to you to Hagerstown.


Meade To Halleck, July 12, 1863—4.30 P. M.
Upon advancing my right flank across the Antietam this morning the enemy abandoned Funkstown and Hagerstown, and my line now extends from the later place to Fairplay. The advance of the cavalry on the right showed the enemy tobe strongly posted on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, about a mile and a half from Hagerstown. On the left the cavalry advance showed them to be in position back of St. James College and at Downsville. Their position runs along the high ground from Downsville to near Hagerstown. This position they are prospecting. Batteries are established on it. It is my intention to attack them to-morrow unless something intervenes to prevent it, for the reason that delay will strengthen the enemy and will not increase my force.

Gettysburg - July 11th - Meade advancing cautiously

To Honorable J. K. DUBOIS,Springfield, Ill.:
It is certain that after three day's fighting at Gettysburg, Lee withdrew and made for the Potomac; that he found the river so swollen as to prevent his crossing; that he is still this side, near Hagerstown and Williamsport, preparing to defend himself; and that Meade is close upon him, and preparing to attack him, heavy skirmishing having occurred nearly all day yesterday.

I am more than satisfied with what has happened north of the Potomac so far, and am anxious and hopeful for what is to come.

A. LINCOLN.

Meade To Halleck, Antietam Creek, July 11, 1863—4 P. M.
The line of this army was advanced cautiously this morning in the direction stated in yesterday's despatch, and at this time its right rests on the road from Smoketown to Funkstown, about two miles from the latter—the line crossing the Antietam, passing through Jones's crossroads, the left being near Wash run. Strong reconnaissance of infantry are being pushed out toward Funkstown, on the left bank of the Antietam, towards the same point on the right bank, and on the road from Sharpsburg to Funkstown ; at the same time cavalry force is pushing out on the left on the Boonsboro' and Williamsport road, and on the right towards Hagerstown from Chewsville and Leitersburg. The cavalry on the Chewsville road advanced without opposition to within a short distance (about a mile and a half) of Hagerstown... Everything indicates that the enemy is massing between Hagerstown and Williamsport, and from various sources it is stated that they are entrenching.

From the representations of General Spinola, that the nine-months' men of his command could not be relied upon, as their time had nearly expired, and my own experience of troops under such circumstances, I have directed the regiments of his brigade to be posted in the rear.

Halleck To Meade, Washington, D. C., July 11, 1863.
The nine months men told me that they were willing to serve through this crisis under any one but General Spinola, but would not serve under him, as they regarded him as worthless. You are authorized to relieve him and send him away.

Gettysburg - July 8th - We must attack Lee

Halleck To Meade, Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.
There is reliable information that the enemy is crossing at Williamsport; the opportunity to attack his divided forces should not be lost. The President is urgent and anxious that your army should move against him, by forced marches.

Meade To Halleck, July 8, 1863
General Couch from scouts learns that the enemy train at Williamsport is crossing very slowly. So long as the river is unfordable they will not cross...From all I can gather, the enemy front extends from Hagerstown to Williamsport, covering the march of their train.

Their cavalry and infantry pickets are advanced to the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg pike, on general line of the Antietam. We hold Boonsboro', and our pickets, four miles in front towards Hagerstown, are in contact with the enemy's pickets. My army is assembling slowly; the rains of yesterday and last night have made all roads but pikes almost impassable; artillery and wagons are stalled. It will take time to collect them together. A large portion of the men are barefooted; shoes will arrive at Frederick to-day, and will be issued as soon as possible.

The spirit of the army is high; the men are ready and willing to make every exertion to push forward; the very first moment I can get the different commands, the artillery and cavalry, properly supplied and in hand, I will move forward. Be assured I most earnestly desire to try the fortunes of war with the enemy on this side of the river, hoping through Providence and the bravery of my men to settle the question; but I should do wrong not to frankly tell you of the difficulties encountered.


I expect to find the enemy in a strong position, well covered with artillery, and I do not desire to imitate his example at Gettysburg, and assault a position where the chances were so greatly against success; I wish, in advance, to moderate the expectations of those who, in ignorance of the difficulties to be encountered, may expect too much. All that I can do under the circumstances I pledge this army to do

Meade To Halleck, July 8, 1863—3 P. M
My information as to the crossing of the enemy does not agree with that just received in your dispatch. His whole force is in position between Funkstown and Williamsport. I have just received information that he has driven my cavalry force in front of Boonsboro...

Halleck To Meade, Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.
Do not understand me as expressing any dissatisfaction. On the contrary, your army has done most nobly. I only wish to give you opinions formed from information received here. It is telegraphed from near Harper's Ferry that the enemy have been crossing for the last two days. It is also reported that they have a bridge across. If Lee's army is so divided by the river, the importance of attacking the part on this side is incalculable. Such an opportunity may never occur again. If, on the contrary, he has massed his whole force on the Antietam, time must be taken also to concentrate your forces. Your opportunities for information are better than mine

Gettysburg July 7th - Lee heading for Williamsport

Pierce to Couch, Loudon, July 7, 1863
Scout sent out by me this morning, according to your orders, went to Clear Spring to-day, 6 miles from Williamsport. Reliable Union citizens, acquaintances of mine, informed him that Imboden was at Williamsport, with 5, 000 wagons, guarded by 7, 000 men, with sixteen pieces of artillery. After exhausting every available means of transportation, he had succeeded, up to noon to-day, in passing but very few citizens, only 3 wagons, and about 20 men. Report that General French failed in his attempt to reach Imboden, after considerable cannonading and cavalry skirmishing, on yesterday, near Williamsport. The Potomac is still rising, the rains being heavy in all the region clear to Hancock.

L. B. PIERCE,
Colonel, Commanding.

NEILL to  WARREN AoP Acting Chief of Staff:
SIR: I marched my command from Fairfield to Waynesborough to-day, and just missed capturing the rear guard of Lee's army, which left at 10 a. m. this morning. The whole of the rebel army is by this time at least as far as Hagerstown to-morrow. The whole of the rebel army have taken the pike toward Hagerstown, and I believe they are making rapidly, but in tolerably good order, toward Williamsport. Captain [George C.] Cram, now prisoner of war at Monterey, states that the discipline of the enemy seems to be very much relaxed. In the last two days I have taken a great many prisoners, or, rather, deserters, from the rebels.

Very respectfully,
THOS. H. NEILL,

Halleck To Meade, Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.
I have received from the President the following note, which I respectfully communicate.

"We have certain information that Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July. Now, if General Meade can complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over."

Meade To Halleck, Frederick, Md., July 7, 1863
General Buford reports that he attacked Williamsport yesterday, but found it guarded by a large force of infantry and artillery. Heavy forces were coming into Williamsport all night. French having destroyed their bridges, the river being unfordable, they are crossing in country flatboats—a slow operation. My army will be assembling tomorrow at Middletown; I will immediately move on Williamsport. Should the enemy succeed in crossing the river before I can reach him, I should like to have your views of subsequent operations—whether to follow up the army in the valley or cross below or near Washington.

Gettysburg - July 6th - Meade in Pursuit

Halleck To Meade And French, Washington, D. C., July 6, 1863.
It is just reported here that the bridge at Harper's Ferry was left intact when General French's command abandoned that place. If so, it gives Lee a good crossing, unless it be occupied by us in strong force. No time should be lost in throwing troops into Maryland heights.

Halleck To Couch, Washington, D. C., July 6, 1863.
Major-General Meade has authority to command and direct the movements of all troops of your department. His orders will be obeyed.

Meade To Couch, via Hanover, July 6, 1863.
I cannot get very reliable intelligence of the enemy's movements. My belief is they are in retreat to the Potomac. A captured despatch to a rebel cavalry officer, dated July 5th, says Longstreet is moving through Tock mountain, and orders him to picket roads to Emmittsburg, and to report to Longstreet at Tock mountain, and Ewell at Fairfield. Sedgwick, with his corps, is pushing them at Fairfield; other corps are in support. I have delayed my flank movement until I am positively satisfied they are retreating to the Potomac. I hope to-day some time to determine this.

Meade To Halleck, Gettysburg, July 6, 1863—2 P. M.
Yesterday I sent General Sedgwick with the 6th corps in pursuit of the enemy towards Fairfield and a brigade of cavalry towards Cashtown. General Sedgwick's report indicating a large force of the enemy in the mountains, I deemed it prudent to suspend the movement to Middletown until I could be certain the enemy were evacuating Cumberland valley.

I find great difficulty in getting reliable information, but from all I can learn, the enemy is retreating, very much crippled and hampered with his trains. General Sedgwick reports that the gap at Fairfield was very formidable and would enable a small force to hold my column in check for a long time. I have accordingly resumed the movement to Middletown, and I expect by to-morrow night to assemble the army in that vicinity. Supplies will be then provided, and as soon as possible I will cross South Mountain and proceed in search of the enemy...

... If I can get the army of the Potomac in hand in the valley, and the enemy have not crossed the river, I shall give him battle, trusting, should misfortune overtake me, that sufficient number of my force, in connection with what you have in Washington, would reach that place so as to render it secure.

General Trimble, of the confederate army, was found to-day wounded just outside Gettysburg. General Kemper was found mortally wounded in the road to Fairfield, and a large number of wounded, estimated at several thousand. Generals Heth, Wade Hampton, Jenkins and Pinder, are reported wounded. The losses of the enemy were no doubt very great and he must be proportionately crippled. My head-quarters will be here to-night, and to-morrow I expect to be at Frederick.

My cavalry have been attacking the enemy on both flanks, inflicting as much injury as possible.

Gettysburg - July 5th - Lee has retreated

Meade To Halleck July 5, 1863—8.30 A. M.
The enemy retired, under cover of the night and heavy rain, in the direction of Fairfield and Cashtown. All my available cavalry are in pursuit on the enemy's left and rear. My movement will be made at once on his flank via Middletown and South Mountain pass. I cannot give you the details of our captures in prisoners, colors, and arms. Upwards of twenty battle-flags will be turned in from one corps. I cannot delay to pick up the debris of the battle-field, and request that all these arrangements may be made by the departments. My wounded, with those of the enemy in our hands, will be left at Gettysburg. After burying our own dead, I am compelled to employ citizens to bury the enemy's.

My head-quarters will be to-night at Creagerstown. Communication received from General Smith, in command of three thousand men, on the march from Carlisle towards Cashtown.

Field return last evening gives me about fifty-five thousand effective men in the ranks, exclusive of cavalry, baggage guards, ambulance attendants, etc. Every available reinforcement is required, and should be sent to Frederick without delay.

Halleck To Meade Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.
Your movements are perfectly satisfactory. Your call for reinforcements to Frederick has been anticipated. Call to you all of Couch's force.

Halleck To Schenck, Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.
Send everything forward to Frederick, except the usual garrison of Baltimore. The enemy is in retreat. Baltimore is in no possible danger. Give General Meade all the aid in your power.

Halleck To Kelly, Washington, D. C., July 5, 1863.
Do everything in your power to capture or destroy Lee's trains, which will endeavor to cross at Williamsport or Falling Waters. His army is in full retreat.

Meade To Halleck, July 5, 1863.
Among the several officers killed is General Farnsworth, of our cavalry, not before mentioned. Rebel General Kemper killed, Pender and Johnson wounded.

Meade To Halleck, July 5, 1863—6. P M.
I send copies of all my despatches since yesterday A. M. My army is all in motion. I shall be at Frederick to-morrow night.  I desire the forces mentioned in your despatch to Major-General French to be thrown to Harper's Ferry by rail as soon as possible. I shall so instruct Major-General French. It is of importance to get possession of South Mountain passes and Maryland heights.

Gettysburg - July 4th - what is Lee up to?

Meade To Halleck  July 4, 1863—7 A. M.

This morning the enemy has withdrawn his pickets from the positions of yesterday. My own pickets are moving out to ascertain the nature and extent of the enemy's movement. My information is not sufficient to decide its character yet, whether a retreat or manoeuvre for other purpose.

Meade To Halleck, July 4, 1863—Noon.

The position of affairs is not materially changed since my last despatch, 7 A. M. The enemy apparently has thrown back his left, and placed guns and troops in position in rear of Gettysburg, which we now hold. The enemy has abandoned a large number of his killed and wounded on the field. I shall require some time to get up supplies, ammunition, etc., rest the army, worn out by long marches and three days' hard fighting. I shall possibly be able to give you a return of our captures and losses before night, and return of the enemy's killed and wounded in our hands.

Meade To Halleck  July 4, 1863—10 P. M.

No change of affairs since despatch of 12 noon. I make a reconnoissance to-morrow, to ascertain what is the intention of the enemy. My cavalry are now moving towards the South Mountain pass, and should the enemy retreat, I shall pursue him on his flank. A proposition, made by General Lee under flag of truce,to exchange prisoners, was declined by me.

General hooker on Meade

From his December 1863 letter to Secretary Chase:

"It appears to me that our people have it in their hands to make it of longer or shorter duration. I am glad to see that an effort is being made to merge the volunteers and regulars. This should have been done at the beginning of the war. In fact, there is no difference now; it only exists in theory. I know that I accepted my commission of brigadier-general in the army reluctantly, and only for the reason that it was tendered me in compliment for services. I have since had occasion to regret it many times, for it has only been an instrument of self-degradation to me ever since. Officers who had no commissions in the regular service have jumped me, while in the assignment of commands it has never been considered. If my services in this rebellion do not merit reward, they certainly have been such as should shield me from punishment. Many of my juniors are in £he exercise of independent commands, while I am here with more rank piled on top of me than a well man can stand up under, with a corporal's guard, comparatively, for a command. You cannot wonder, then, at the sincerity of my desire for the war to be brought to an end irrespective of the country and the cause. I see that they are pitching into Meade on all sides. I lost my confidence in him when he allowed Lee to escape. I thought well of him as a corps commander, and never doubted but that he would do as well with the responsibilities of an army upon him. He is a small craft, and carries no ballast. "

How many men does Lee Have?

Meade estimates Lee had 100,000 at Gettysburg:

Question: I will askat Gettysburg you, in this connexion, about the comparative strength of the two armies at the battle of Gettysburg. What was your opinion about that?

Meade: My opinion about that was that General Lee was, as far as I could tell, about 10,000 or 15,000 my superior.

Question: What was your strength upon that battle-field?

Meade: Including all arms of the service, my strength was a little under 100,000 men—about 95,000. I think General Lee had about 90,000 infantry, from 4,000 to 5,000 artillery, and about 10,000 cavalry.

(from senate testimony March 1864)

Meade on Grant

From His Life and Letters:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY or THE POTOMAC, December 20, 1863.

You ask me about Grant. It is difficult for me to reply. I knew him as a young man in the Mexican war, at which time he was considered a clever young officer, but nothing extraordinary. He was compelled to resign some years before the present war, owing to his irregular habits. I think his great characteristic is indomitable energy and great tenacity of purpose. He certainly has been very successful, and that is nowadays the measure of reputation. The enemy, however, have never had in any of their Western armies either the generals or the troops they have had in Virginia, nor has the country been so favorable for them there as here. Grant has undoubtedly shown very superior abilities, and is I think justly if entitled to all the honors they propose to bestow upon him.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 9 p. M., June 5, 1864

Since our last battle on the 3d inst. we have been comparatively quiet. I feel a satisfaction in knowing that my record is clear, and that the results of this campaign are the clearest indications I could wish of my sound judgment, both at Williamsport and Mine Run. In every instance that we have attacked the enemy in an entrenched position we have failed, except in the case of Hancock's attack at Spotsylvania, which was a surprise discreditable to the enemy. So, likewise, whenever the enemy has attacked us in position, he has been repulsed. I think Grant has had his eyes opened, and is willing to admit now that Virginia and Lee's army is not Tennessee and Bragg's army. Whether the people will ever realize this fact remains to be seen.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, November 24, 1864.

I am sorry to hear what you say of Grant, but it is in accordance with my theory and experience. Public expectation in his case, as in Sherman's, having been wrought up to a false and unreasonable pitch, expecting impossibilities and miracles, visits on them the failure to do what only public imagination renders practicable. Both these when at one time were down. Sherman was pronounced crazy, and grant was at one time deprived of command; and now, should success by any accident attend the efforts of either, their stars will be more in the ascendant than ever.

Grant is not a mighty genius, but he is a good soldier, of great force of character, honest and upright, of pure purposes, I think, without political aspirations, certainly not influenced by them. His prominent quality is unflinching tenacity of purpose, which blinds him to opposition and obstacles — certainly a great quality in a commander, when controlled by judgment, but a dangerous one otherwise. Grant is not without his faults and weaknesses. Among these is a want of sensibility, an almost too confident and sanguine disposition, and particularly a simple and guileless disposition, which is apt to put him, unknown to himself, under the influence of those who should not influence him, and desire to do so only for their own purposes. Take him all in all, he is, in my judgment, the best man the war has yet produced. When I say this, I refer more particularly to those I have come in contact with, and do not include Sherman, about whom I know nothing but what I see in the papers.