Showing posts with label lincoln. Show all posts
Showing posts with label lincoln. Show all posts

Sunday, July 15, 2012

Meade - They can take this job and shove it

To Mrs. Meade,
Headquarters army of the Potomac, Berlin, Md., July 16, 1863.
I wrote to you of the censure put on me by the President, through General Halleck, because I did not bag General Lee, and of the course I took on it. I don't know whether I informed you of Halleck's reply, that his telegram was not intended as a censure, but merely ‘to spur me on to an active pursuit,’ which I consider more offensive than the original message; for no man who does his duty, and all that he can do, as I maintain I have done, needs spurring. It is only the laggards and those who fail to do all they can do who require spurring. They have refused to relieve me, but insist on my continuing to try to do what I know in advance it is impossible to do.
My army (men and animals) is exhausted; it wants rest and reorganization; it has been greatly reduced and weakened by recent operations, and no reinforcements of any practical value have been sent. Yet, in the face of all these facts, well known to them, I am urged, pushed and spurred to attempting to pursue and destroy an army nearly equal to my own, falling back upon its resources and reinforcements, and increasing its morale daily. This has been the history of all my predecessors, and I clearly saw that in time their fate would be mine. This was the reason I was disinclined to take the command, and it is for this reason I would gladly give it up.

Lincoln on Lee's Escape - July 21st 1863

Executive mansion, Washington, 21st July, 1863

My dear General Howard:

Your letter of the 10th is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed such destruction was perfectly easy—believed that General Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed—making my belief a hobby possibly—that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. General Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer and a true man.

Yours very truly,
 A. Lincoln.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

General Hooker on General Lee

From John Hay's Journals:

September 1863

— I dined to-night at Willard's. ... Speaking of Lee [Hooker] expressed himself slightingly of Lee's abilities. He says he was never muchrespected in the army. In Mexico he was surpassed by all his lieutenants. In the cavalry he was held in no esteem. He was regarded very highly by General Scott. He was a courtier, and readily recommended himself by his insinuating manner to the General [Scott], whose petulant and arrogant temper had driven of late years all officers of spirit and self-respect away from him.

"The strength of the Rebel army rests on the broad shoulders of Longstreet. He is the brain of Lee, as Stonewall Jackson was his right arm. Before every battle he had been advised with. After every battle Lee may be found in his tent. He is a weak man and little of a soldier. He naturally rests on Longstreet, who is a soldier born."

When we recall that only four months earlier Hooker, having been beaten at Chancellorsville, boasted of successfully withdrawing his army across the river from Lee's army, which was not pursuing, we shall find more humor in his depreciation of Lee than he intended. From the frankness with which Hooker and the others talked to Hay we may be justified in suspecting that they thought they might through him reach the President. Lincoln, who never failed to give a man credit for his good qualities, remarked to Hay, "Whenever trouble arises I can always rely on Hooker's magnanimity."

Friday, April 22, 2011

The Folly of Fort Sumter

From Temple's "The Civil War In East Tennessee":

With this avowed purpose on the part of Mr. Lincoln, which he carefully pursued, it may afford a curious theme for speculation as to what would have been the fate of the Southern Confederacy if Sumter had not been assaulted, or if some similar act of open war had not been resorted to. Would it have gone on exercising the powers of government over the states which had seceded until its authority had become securely cemented and established? Would Virginia, Tennesseeand North Carolina have joined the seceded states? Sooner or later this is most probable. Would the people of the North have acquiesced in this dismemberment of the government? Yes, at that time, in preference to civil war. In this very contingency such men as Greeley, Seward, Thurlow Weed and Crittenden, and thousands of others, if they did not all say, as Mr. Greeley did, let the cotton states "go in peace," they did all insist in spirit that there should be no coercion to restrain them from going. Previous to this time, Expresident Pierce had written to Jefferson Davis, assuring him that if there was to be fighting "it will not be along Mason's and Dixon's line merely. It will be within our own borders, in our own streets, between the two classes of citizens to whom I have referred." "The Albany Argus," a Democratic paper said: "The first gun fired in the way of forcing a seceding state back into the Union would probably prove the knell of its final dismemberment."

So high was the tide of public opinion running, at the time of the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, against the party that had elevated him to power, especially against the Abolition part of it, that it is almost certain that any attempt at coercion against the people of the seceding states, would have been followed in the North by mobs, riots and civil war. Mr. Lincoln saw and knew the hazardous condition of affairs around him. He knew that a blow prematurely struck at secession was more likely to produce a revolution in the North than to end the existing one. In addition to his earnest desire to avoid the shedding of blood, there was necessary on his part the most cautious statesmanship. A single false step would prove fatal to the Union. He must so act as to put the South clearly in the wrong before the world in the event of a conflict of arms. There must be no divided North. He delayed, apparently hesitated, and seemingly negotiated with the enemy. He refused to reenforce Sumter, and only attempted to send provisions to the starving garrison. No troops were mustered for the national defense, not one; no force was used; no threats were made. Never did Mr. Lincoln exhibit a more masterly wisdom, or pro founder sagacity than in this crisis. By his discretion, secession came to a standstill. The North was petrified with fear. A majority had turned with rage against the triumphant party. In the South there was danger, as Mr. Gilchrist said, that some of the states would return to the old Union.

And now came the stupendous folly of firing on Sumter. That single act, in "one hour by Shrewsbury's clock" united the divided North. Without that, or some equally foolish deed, the North could never have been brought to the point of resisting the South, and secession would have triumphed. But when the nation's honor was assailed, and the national flag brought low, sympathy was in a moment turned to wrath, and men everywhere rushed to arms. That first shot, as it went sounding round the world, announcing the commencement of the conflict, was also sounding the death knell of the Southern Confederacy, But for that shot, it might be in existence to-day as a government. But it accomplished its purpose in the direction intended. By it, Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina were induced, most unwisely but most naturally, to rush to the help, not of the aggrieved party, but of the aggressor. But it did more than this—something not anticipated. It lost to the South, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, East Tennessee, Kentucky and Missouri. And still more; by this needless act, the North was brought together in one hour as one man in the determination to avenge the nation's insult, and to lift up and restore the fallen and dishonored flag. Thus Mr. Davis by that shot did what no other power on earth could have done—united the divided North.

The Southern people were sadly mistaken. They expected a divided North. Such would have been the case if the leaders had waited in patience for the fruit to ripen. There can scarcely exist a doubt that a large majority of the Northern people would have voted, in the spring of 1861, to let the seceding states go in preference to the alternative of Civil War. So shocking, so dreadful was the idea of such a war that men were ready to give up everything rather than have such an affliction. But when the nation's honor was insulted, the feeling of brotherhood was turned into rage, that of peace into determined relentless war.

To the last the South was mistaken. They believed the Northern people would not fight. They expected easy victories. Washington, as they boasted, would soon be their capitol. One enthusiastic orator—a senator in the Confederate congress—boasted that they would soon quaff wine from golden goblets in the palaces of New York. Another gentlemen boasted that he would call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument. The boast was universal, and perhaps the belief also, that one Southern man could whip five Yankees. An Alabama gentleman reached the climax when he declared in a public speech that they could whip the North with pop-guns made out of elder stalks.1

It really appears as if Providence intended that the Southern people should be the instruments of the destruction of their own favorite institution. At a period when there was, for the first time in twenty years, peace between the two sections, they broke that peace by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and thus turned loose the angry winds of sectionalism. This in the end, through successive steps, led to secession. And when war came, the conviction gradually grew on the minds of men that that was the opportunity offered by Heaven for destroying slavery. It had caused one war, said they ; it should not cause another. Let it perish—by the war. And thus the folly of men was made to do the will of God.


Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Abe Lincoln Visits to the Army of the Potomac


Apr. 1st 1862
Lincoln goes to Alexandria, Va. - meets with General McClellan,

May 5th - 12th 1862
Lincoln goes to Fortress Monroe, Va. meets with Wool, Burnside and Navy. Does not meet with McClellan

May 22nd - 23rd 1862
Lincoln visits McDowell at Fredericksburg

July 7th - 10th 1862
Lincoln takes boat to Fortress Monroe & Harrison's Landing - visits McClellan and Burnside.

Oct. 1st - 4th .1862
Lincoln visits Gen. McClellan and battlefields in vicinity of Antietam.

Nov. 26th - 27th 1862
Lincoln goes to Aquia Creek - confers with Burnside on steamer Baltimore.

April. 4th - 10th 1863
Visits Hooker and AoP at Falmouth

May 6th - 7th. 1863
Lincoln visits Gen. Hooker and the AoP after defeat at Chancellorsville.

June 20th - 23rd 1864
Lincoln visits Gen. Grant at City Point

July 30th - 31st 1864
Lincoln visits Gen. Grant at Fortress Monroe

March. 23rd - Apr. 6th. 1865

Lincoln visits Gen. Grant at City Point

Apr. 4th - 5th 1865

Lincoln visits the evacuated city of Richmond, Va.

Abe Lincoln - Living Inside the Beltway Bubble

Reading Lincoln's daily chronology (The Lincoln Log Website), I was amazed at Lincoln's reluctance to travel. Basically, Lincoln spent the whole war in Washington D.C. except for trips to the Army of the Potomac.

Lincoln never visited the Armies of West or conferred with Halleck, Grant, Rosecrans or Sherman in Kentucky, Tennessee or Cairo/St Louis. Further, Lincoln only made 4 visits to the "Home-front" during the war:

  • June 23-25 1862 Lincoln took a nine hour train trip to West Point to visit General Scott. Arrives 3 AM June 24th 1862 at West Point. Spends the day with Scott and visiting West Point. Returns to DC, stopping at Jersey City to make an impromptu 10 minute speech;
  • November 18-19 1863 - took 5 hour train trip to Gettysburg, spent the night there, and next morning dedicated the cemetery & made the famous Speech. By Midnight he was back in DC;
  • April 18-19 1864 - Goes to Baltimore to attend Sanitary Fair and gives speech.
  • June 16-17 1864 Goes to Philadelphia for 1 day to attend the "Great Central Fair" for the US Sanitary Commission. Leaving DC at 7 AM - he got to Phlly at 11 AM, went the fair, attended the banquet and made a speech. The next day, he left Philly at 8 AM and was back in DC by Noon.
That's all his wartime travel - except trips to visit the AoP and Richmond in April 1865.

By Comparison Jeff Davis made many trips to visit the rest of the Confederacy and the armies of the West.

Saturday, June 06, 2009

Lincoln's plan to attack Lee - November 1862

To Henry W. Halleck
Steamer Baltimore
Major General Halleck Off Acquia Creek, Va
Sir: Nov. 27. 1862

I have just had a long conference with Gen. Burnside. He believes that Gen. Lees whole army, or nearly the whole of it is in front of him, at and near Fredericksburg. Gen. B. says he could take into battle now any day, about, one hundred and ten thousand men, that his army is in good spirit, good condition, good moral, and that in all respects he is satisfied with officers and men; that he does not want more men with him, because he could not handle them to advantage; that he thinks he can cross the river in face of the enemy and drive him away, but that, to use his own expression, it is somewhat risky. I wish the case to stand more favorable than this in two respects. First, I wish his crossing of the river to be nearly free from risk; and secondly, I wish the enemy to be prevented from falling back, accumulating strength as he goes, into his entrenchments at Richmond.

I therefore propose that Gen. B. shall not move immediately; that we accumulate a force on the South bank of the Rappahanock---at, say, Port-Royal, under protection of one or two gun-boats, as nearly up to twenty-five thousand strong as we can. At the same time another force of about the same strength as high up the Pamunkey, as can be protected by gunboats. These being ready, let all three forces move simultaneously, Gen. B.'s force in it's attempt to cross the river, the Rappahanock force moving directly up the South side of the river to his assistance, and ready, if found admissible, to deflect off to the turnpike bridge over the Mattapony in the direction of Richmond. The Pamunkey force to move as rapidly as possible up the North side of the Pamunkey, holding all the bridges, and especially the turnpike bridge immediately North of Hanover C.H; hurry North, and seize and hold the Mattapony bridge before mentioned, and also, if possible, press higher up the streams and destroy the railroad bridges. Then, if Gen. B. succeeds in driving the enemy from Fredericksburg, he the enemy no longer has the road to Richmond, but we have it and can march into the city. Or, possibly, having forced the enemy from his line, we could move upon, and destroy his army. Gen. B.'s main army would have the same line of supply and retreat as he has now provided; the Rappahanock force would have that river for supply, and gun-boats to fall back upon; and the Pamunkey force would have that river for supply, and a line between the two rivers---Pamunkey & Mattapony---along which to fall back upon it's gun-boats. I think the plan promises the best results, with the least hazzard, of any now conceivable.

Note By Abraham Lincoln --- The above plan, proposed by me, was rejected by Gen. Halleck & Gen. Burnside, on the ground that we could not raise and put in position, the Pamunkey force without too much waste of time

Saturday, May 16, 2009

Burnside and Lincoln - A Chronology

Lincoln and Burnside:

01) July 8th 1862 AM
Lincoln meets with Burnside at Ft Monroe on the way to Harrison Landing & McClellan.
02) July 9th 1862 PM
After reviewing the AoP at Harrison Landings Lincoln returns to Ft. Monroe on way to Washington DC - offers Burnside command of the Army of the Potomac - he refuses
03) July 23rd 1862
Burnside meets with Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and Pope at the WH to discuss strategy.
04) July 28th 1862
Lincoln meets with Burnside and Halleck at WH & reaches decision to withdraw AoP from the Peninsula.
05) Sept 5th, 1862
Burnside in Washington DC. meets with Halleck, Lincoln and McClellan - offered field command of AoP - he refuses.
06) Nov 5th 1862
Lincoln orders Burnside to Replace McCllellan in Command of AoP - Burnside at first refuses, then accepts when told the alternative is Hooker.
07) Nov 26th 1862
Lincoln travels alone to Aquia Creek and meets with Burnside to discuss the campaign.
08) Dec 20th 1862
Burnside meets with Lincoln at the WH
8) Dec 22nd 1862
Burnside meets again with Lincoln, Stanton attends.
09) Dec 29th 1862
Lincoln meets with AoP Generals who state Burnside is incompetent & must go.
10) Dec 30th 1862
Lincoln telegraphs Burnside not to move the army without his knowledge.
11) Dec 31st & Jan 1st 1863
Burnside meets with Lincoln at WH - offers to resign
12) Jan 8th 1863
Lincoln disapproves Burnside offer to resign
13) Jan 24th 1863
Burnside meets with Lincoln at WH - requests Hooker and other officers be relieved of command & if not, that he be allowed to resign his commission.
14) Jan 25th 1863
Halleck meets with Burnside relieves him of Command of the AoP - Burnside transferred to Department of Ohio. Hooker given command of AoP.

Burnside letter to Lincoln - Jan 1st 1863 - Offers to Resign

Lincoln's endorsement, incorrectly dated ``Jan. 1. 1862'' is written on the back of the letter. On January 1, Major General Burnside wrote Lincoln as follows:

``Since leaving you this morning, I have determined that it is my duty to place on paper the remarks which I made to you, in order that you may use them or not, as you see proper.

``I am in command . . . of nearly 200,000 men, 120,000 of whom are in the immediate presence of the enemy, and I cannot conscientiously retain the command without making an unreserved statement of my views.

``The Secretary of War has not the confidence of the officers and soldiers, and I feel sure that he has not the confidence of the country. In regard to the latter statement, you are probably better informed than I am. The same opinion applies with equal force in regard to General Halleck. It seems to be the universal opinion that the movements of the army have not been planned with a view to co-operation and mutual assistance.

``I have attempted a movement upon the enemy, in which I have been repulsed, and I am convinced, after mature deliberation, that the army ought to make another movement in the same direction, not necessarily at the same points on the river; but I am not sustained in this by a single grand division commander in my command. My reasons for having issued the order for making this second movement I have already given you in full, and I can see no reasons for changing my views. Doubtless this difference of opinion between my general officers and myself results from a lack of confidence in me. In this case it is highly necessary that this army should be commanded by some other officer, to whom I will most cheerfully give way.

``Will you allow me, Mr. President, to say that it is of the utmost importance that you be surrounded and supported by men who have the confidence of the people and of the army, and who will at all times give you definite and honest opinions in relation to their separate departments, and at the same time give you positive and unswerving support in your public policy, taking at all times their full share of the responsibility for that policy? In no positions held by gentlemen near you are these conditions more requisite than those of the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief and the commanders of your armies. In the struggle now going on, in which the very existence of our Government is at stake, the interests of no one man are worth the value of a grain of sand, and no one should be allowed to stand in the way of accomplishing the greatest amount of public good.

``It is my belief that I ought to retire to private life. I hope you will not understand this to savor of anything like dictation. My only desire is to promote the public good. No man is an accurate judge of the confidence in which he is held by the public and the people around him, and the confidence in my management may be entirely destroyed, in which case it would be a great wrong for me to retain this command for a single day; and, as I before said, I will most cheerfully give place to any other officer.'' (OR, I, XXI, 941-42. This letter does not appear in the Lincoln Papers, and a footnote to the text in the source specifies ``This letter is printed from General Burnside's copy.'')

Sunday, September 07, 2008

Lincoln was a Military Genius - NOT

One myth of the civil war is that Lincoln was some kind of Military genius. This view is probably best expressed in T.Harry Williams Book "Lincoln Finds a General" Where in Wise old Abe keeps promoting Generals, telling them what to do, and the stupid Generals keep letting him down. He keeps telling McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Meade to get out and fight. And that Lee's Army is their true objective and that if they'd just try hard enough, they'd destroy Lee and win the war. Well, one of the reasons this never happened is that the Army of Potomac never had enough men. They never had enough men, because Lincoln kept scattering the Union Army all over the Map - and attacking in different directions. Here is the distribution of the Union Army in July 1863:

  1. Western Theater
  • Missouri (Schofield) -25,000 men
  • New Orleans (Banks) - 25,000
  • Kentucky (Burnside) -40,000
  • Nashville (Rosencrans) -85,000
  • West Tennessee Garrisons -40,000
  • Vicksburg (Grant) -60000
  • Total Western 275,000 men
Eastern Theater
  • NC Coast -14,000
  • SC Coast -16,000
  • Norfolk/Ft Monroe -30,000
  • DC Garrison -35,000
  • WV/Maryland -35,000
  • AOP -115,000
  • Total Eastern 245,000 men

Total Union Army 520,000 men

Meade's 115,000 men are simply the men present. After deduction for sick, in confinement, non-combatents, etc. leave about 90,000 men vs. Lee's 75,000. This despite the fact that the Union Army outnumbered the Confederate Army by 520,000 vs. 250,000. The 250,000 confederates were distributed as follows:

Eastern Theater
  • Lee Army - 75,000
  • Richmond and NC 20,000
  • WV 5,000
  • SC Coast 15,000
  • Total Eastern 115,000

Western Theater
  • Nashville (Bragg) 45,000
  • E. Tenn 15,000
  • Arkansas 15,000
  • Jackson Miss 25,000
  • Vicksburg 30,000
  • LA 10,000
  • Total West 140,000

Friday, September 05, 2008

McClellan and Pope

One of the myths of the Civil War is that McClellan dragged his retreat from the Peninsula and refused to help Pope During the 2nd Battle of Bull Run. There is no evidence to support this claim which is found in almost every popular book on the campaign. The usual quote is that McClellan "told Lincoln that Pope would have to get out the scrape himself". Here is the actual full quote from the ORR:


WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862—2.30 p. m.
What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?
A. LINCOLN.
Major-General MCCLELLAN.

McClellan replied as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—2.45 p. m.

The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable.

I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.

No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.
Lincoln Replied:

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862—4.10 p. m.
Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, “to concen-
trate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,” is the right one, but
I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.
A. LINCOLN.
Major-General MCCLELLAN.