Lincoln's plan to attack Lee - November 1862

To Henry W. Halleck

Steamer Baltimore
Major General Halleck Off Acquia Creek, Va
Sir: Nov. 27. 1862

I have just had a long conference with Gen. Burnside. He believes that Gen. Lees whole army, or nearly the whole of it is in front of him, at and near Fredericksburg. Gen. B. says he could take into battle now any day, about, one hundred and ten thousand men, that his army is in good spirit, good condition, good moral, and that in all respects he is satisfied with officers and men; that he does not want more men with him, because he could not handle them to advantage; that he thinks he can cross the river in face of the enemy and drive him away, but that, to use his own expression, it is somewhat risky. I wish the case to stand more favorable than this in two respects. First, I wish his crossing of the river to be nearly free from risk; and secondly, I wish the enemy to be prevented from falling back, accumulating strength as he goes, into his entrenchments at Richmond.

I therefore propose that Gen. B. shall not move immediately; that we accumulate a force on the South bank of the Rappahanock---at, say, Port-Royal, under protection of one or two gun-boats, as nearly up to twenty-five thousand strong as we can. At the same time another force of about the same strength as high up the Pamunkey, as can be protected by gunboats. These being ready, let all three forces move simultaneously, Gen. B.'s force in it's attempt to cross the river, the Rappahanock force moving directly up the South side of the river to his assistance, and ready, if found admissible, to deflect off to the turnpike bridge over the Mattapony in the direction of Richmond. The Pamunkey force to move as rapidly as possible up the North side of the Pamunkey, holding all the bridges, and especially the turnpike bridge immediately North of Hanover C.H; hurry North, and seize and hold the Mattapony bridge before mentioned, and also, if possible, press higher up the streams and destroy the railroad bridges. Then, if Gen. B. succeeds in driving the enemy from Fredericksburg, he the enemy no longer has the road to Richmond, but we have it and can march into the city. Or, possibly, having forced the enemy from his line, we could move upon, and destroy his army. Gen. B.'s main army would have the same line of supply and retreat as he has now provided; the Rappahanock force would have that river for supply, and gun-boats to fall back upon; and the Pamunkey force would have that river for supply, and a line between the two rivers---Pamunkey & Mattapony---along which to fall back upon it's gun-boats. I think the plan promises the best results, with the least hazzard, of any now conceivable.

Note By Abraham Lincoln --- The above plan, proposed by me, was rejected by Gen. Halleck & Gen. Burnside, on the ground that we could not raise and put in position, the Pamunkey force without too much waste of time

Burnside and Lincoln - A Chronology

Lincoln and Burnside:

01) July 8th 1862 AM
Lincoln meets with Burnside at Ft Monroe on the way to Harrison Landing & McClellan.
02) July 9th 1862 PM
After reviewing the AoP at Harrison Landings Lincoln returns to Ft. Monroe on way to Washington DC - offers Burnside command of the Army of the Potomac - he refuses
03) July 23rd 1862
Burnside meets with Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and Pope at the WH to discuss strategy.
04) July 28th 1862
Lincoln meets with Burnside and Halleck at WH & reaches decision to withdraw AoP from the Peninsula.
05) Sept 5th, 1862
Burnside in Washington DC. meets with Halleck, Lincoln and McClellan - offered field command of AoP - he refuses.
06) Nov 5th 1862
Lincoln orders Burnside to Replace McCllellan in Command of AoP - Burnside at first refuses, then accepts when told the alternative is Hooker.
07) Nov 26th 1862
Lincoln travels alone to Aquia Creek and meets with Burnside to discuss the campaign.
08) Dec 20th 1862
Burnside meets with Lincoln at the WH
8) Dec 22nd 1862
Burnside meets again with Lincoln, Stanton attends.
09) Dec 29th 1862
Lincoln meets with AoP Generals who state Burnside is incompetent & must go.
10) Dec 30th 1862
Lincoln telegraphs Burnside not to move the army without his knowledge.
11) Dec 31st & Jan 1st 1863
Burnside meets with Lincoln at WH - offers to resign
12) Jan 8th 1863
Lincoln disapproves Burnside offer to resign
13) Jan 24th 1863
Burnside meets with Lincoln at WH - requests Hooker and other officers be relieved of command & if not, that he be allowed to resign his commission.
14) Jan 25th 1863
Halleck meets with Burnside relieves him of Command of the AoP - Burnside transferred to Department of Ohio. Hooker given command of AoP.

Burnside letter to Lincoln - Jan 1st 1863 - Offers to Resign

Lincoln's endorsement, incorrectly dated ``Jan. 1. 1862'' is written on the back of the letter. On January 1, Major General Burnside wrote Lincoln as follows:

``Since leaving you this morning, I have determined that it is my duty to place on paper the remarks which I made to you, in order that you may use them or not, as you see proper.

``I am in command . . . of nearly 200,000 men, 120,000 of whom are in the immediate presence of the enemy, and I cannot conscientiously retain the command without making an unreserved statement of my views.

``The Secretary of War has not the confidence of the officers and soldiers, and I feel sure that he has not the confidence of the country. In regard to the latter statement, you are probably better informed than I am. The same opinion applies with equal force in regard to General Halleck. It seems to be the universal opinion that the movements of the army have not been planned with a view to co-operation and mutual assistance.

``I have attempted a movement upon the enemy, in which I have been repulsed, and I am convinced, after mature deliberation, that the army ought to make another movement in the same direction, not necessarily at the same points on the river; but I am not sustained in this by a single grand division commander in my command. My reasons for having issued the order for making this second movement I have already given you in full, and I can see no reasons for changing my views. Doubtless this difference of opinion between my general officers and myself results from a lack of confidence in me. In this case it is highly necessary that this army should be commanded by some other officer, to whom I will most cheerfully give way.

``Will you allow me, Mr. President, to say that it is of the utmost importance that you be surrounded and supported by men who have the confidence of the people and of the army, and who will at all times give you definite and honest opinions in relation to their separate departments, and at the same time give you positive and unswerving support in your public policy, taking at all times their full share of the responsibility for that policy? In no positions held by gentlemen near you are these conditions more requisite than those of the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief and the commanders of your armies. In the struggle now going on, in which the very existence of our Government is at stake, the interests of no one man are worth the value of a grain of sand, and no one should be allowed to stand in the way of accomplishing the greatest amount of public good.

``It is my belief that I ought to retire to private life. I hope you will not understand this to savor of anything like dictation. My only desire is to promote the public good. No man is an accurate judge of the confidence in which he is held by the public and the people around him, and the confidence in my management may be entirely destroyed, in which case it would be a great wrong for me to retain this command for a single day; and, as I before said, I will most cheerfully give place to any other officer.'' (OR, I, XXI, 941-42. This letter does not appear in the Lincoln Papers, and a footnote to the text in the source specifies ``This letter is printed from General Burnside's copy.'')