World War II - Book Reviews

Terrible Terry Allen - Gerald Astor
Awful Biography of one the US Army's best Divisional Commanders.  Allen commanded the  "Big Red One" in North Africa and Sicily. He was relieved of command by Bradley in August 1943, and sent back to the USA.  Later, he commanded the 104th Division in Northwest Europe. The whole book reads like a first draft, and shows no evidence of original research. Superficial and without footnotes. Example of how bad the book is:  Astor quotes a guy, who knew a guy, who knew Allen who states Allen "later in life" attributed his August 1943 relief to "anti-Catholic" bias. The rest of the "Relief" story is based on secondary sources. This great American soldier deserves a better biography.  Rating *

A General's Life: Autobiography of Omar Bradley - Clay Blair
Published after Bradley had died, this is a jazzed-up "update" of  Bradley's 1951 Autobiography "A Soldier's Story".  How much of it is Bradley and how is Clay Blair is unknown. In any case, it says nothing new at great length.  Also, Bradley was personally dull, so that drags the book down.  Too bad, because Bradley was one of the most important Generals in WW II, commanding 43 Divisions at one point.  Unfortunately, no one seems interested in writing a critical analysis of him. Disappointing.  Rating **

Calculated Risk -  Mark Clark
This one surprised me. Published in 1950, this is a dense, informative, 450 page autobiography which focuses on the Italian Campaign. As you'd expect, Clark defends his controversial Generalship, and gives us HIS side of the story. He admits to the occasional mistake, but anyone looking for apologies over the Rapido River or Anzio disasters will be disappointed.  He also records his contempt for General Devers and his disagreements with Alexander.  However, in the name of post-war Allied unanimity,  his more tart opinions - recorded in his Diary - about other British Generals and 8th Army are excluded from the book.  Superior to most right-after-the-war biographies.  Rating ***

Combat Commander - Earnie Harmon
 Harmon was commander of 1st Armored Division at Anzio and Tunisia, and later served as Division and Corps Commander in the ETO, including the battle of Bulge. Because it was published in 1970, Harmon is much more honest and critical of other Generals.  He's especially down on Fredendall and Hodges. His favorite General? William Simpson. Harmon also explains why - despite his battlefield successes - it took him so long to become a Corps commander. It seems he recommended someone George Marshall didn't like for promotion, and got on Marshall's "don't promote" list.  A  good WW II autobiography Rating ***

Command Decisions - Lucian Truscott 
An excellent post-war autobiography by one the best American Generals in World War 2. Fighting in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, Truscott rose from Divisional commander to 5th Army Commander. Aggressive and dynamic.  it seems everyone: Alexander, Churchill, Patton, Bradley, Ike, and Clark, liked him. Well-written, the book is jammed packed with details and goes over every battle Truscott was involved in.  The only minus? Like most post-war books, Truscott refuses to criticize other Generals (especially Clark).  The only exception is Patton.  But than Patton had been dead for over 8 years when Truscott published the book.  Rating ***

Hiroshima - Should we have dropped the Bomb?

Chronicles says No. Amazing that this is still being discussed and people still bringing up myths that have been debunked years ago.

1) In August 1945, the Japanese were NOT on verge of surrendering. They were looking for a way to end the war but key player, The Army C-in-C, whose consent was required, would only consider a modified surrender.  This would entail Japan withdrawing the troops from foreign soil,  no occupation of Japan, any Japanese war criminals being tried by the Japanese. Its unclear whether they considered Korea, Formosa, or Okinawa "Foreign Soil".

2) Even after the Emperor intervened, the A-bombs, and the USSR declaration of war, the Army still attempted to kidnap the Emperor and continue the war.  This attempted coup only failed because (1) quick thinking by the Emperor's aide (2) Luck (3) the Loyalty of a key low level Japanese officer (4) the unwillingness of the Army C-in-C to explicitly support it.  Still it was damn close thing.

3)  The planned invasion of  Kyushu Island would have cost at least 30,000 American lives, not mention 400,000 Japanese soldiers and and equal number of civilians.

4) The USSBS states Japan probably would've surrendered by November 1945 even without an invasion, due to blockade and conventional air attacks. Maybe, and this may have been less costly than an invasion in AMERICAN lives, but it would've been much more costlier in Japanese and other lives. Why?

(a) there was a large land war going on between the USSR and Japan in Manchuria and Korea.  In three weeks in August the Japanese had lost almost 100,000 army dead and the Soviets 10,000 - had the fighting continued through September this death toll would've at least doubled. Tens of thousands of Japanese civilians were also killed in the fighting.
(b) Large numbers of Japanese soldiers were "withering on vine" in the Philippines, New Guinea and the pacific islands.  Tens of thousands would have starved to death if the war had gone on another 3 months.
(c) Large numbers of Allied POWs and Dutch internees were also starving to death.
(d) Millions of Chinese and Japanese were still fighting in China. Tens of thousand of soldiers and civilians were dying ever month from disease, starvation, and battle.
(e) Indochina, Indonesia and Malaysia were still under Japanese occupation and civilians were dying of starvation.
(f)  In September 1945, the British had planned to invade Malaysia, the Australians Java, and the Soviets Hokkaido - result tens of thousands of deaths.

5) Even without an invasion, hundreds of Americans were dying at Sea and in Air battles over Japan.  During the last six weeks of the war, we lost 300 men a week in B-29 air raids, Kamikaze and Submarine attacks. We were also still mopping up over 100,000 Japanese troops in the Philippines.
6) A Japanese famine was narrowly avoided in the Spring and Summer 1946, had Japan delayed its surrender till November 1945, the famine would've been much worse and hundreds of thousands would've died.
7) The USN while opposing an invasion, wanted to seize ports in China and also several small islands in the Ryukyu's and Cheju.

So, the A-Bomb hastened the surrender and ultimately saved lives.

Marshall to MacArthur - March 29 1945

#5-076

To General of the Army Douglas MacArthur1

March 29, 1945 Radio No. WAR-60363. Washington, D.C.

Top Secret

TOPSEC personal for MacArthur for his Eyes Only from Marshall.

Command in Pacific is under consideration but complete solution with respect to command and future operations has not as yet been resolved.2

For your information the following portions of the future directive seem in general to be agreed upon although JCS formal approval has not yet been given, the delaying being due to failure so far to reach agreement as to certain details referred to below.

I. The over-all objective in the war against Japan, to be brought about at the earliest practicable date, is:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments, and destroying Japanese Air and Naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

It is expected that the JCS will assign you the responsibility to:

(1) Complete the occupation of Luzon and conduct such additional operations in the Philippines as required for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan. Further to the foregoing, conduct such additional operations toward completing the liberation of the Philippines as can be mounted without prejudice to the accomplishment of the overall objective.

(2) Make plans for occupying North Borneo, including Brunei Bay, using Australian combat and service troops and make preparations at such time as resources can be made available without detriment to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Units of the British Pacific Fleet may be allocated for this operation.

(3) Provide forces and support to Nimitz to assist him in completion of the seizure and development of positions in the Ryukyus as required in his current directive under provisions of Part II below.

(4) Establish bases in the Philippines to support further advances for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan.

II. It appears that agreement will be reached by the JCS placing Army resources in Pacific under you. The point at issue which has so long delayed a final agreement is the degree and manner of control that you as Army Commander will exercise as to Army troops throughout the Pacific which are of necessity closely integrated in Naval Base and other operations and in the Naval Logistical problem.

You will be given responsibility for planning, preparation and conduct of actual invasion of Japan. Nimitz would be given responsibility for amphibious phase of the operation.3

US Divisions and Losses in Philippines

LUZON:

• 1 Cav - KIA 650 - Engaged in Battle of Manila
• 6th Infantry - KIA 795 - Shimbu Line
• 11 Airborne - KIA 427 -Engaged in Battle of Manila
• 24th Infantry (Part) - Bataan.
• 25th Infantry - KIA 1,124 - Northern Luzon
• 32nd Infantry - KIA 924 - Northern Luzon
• 33rd Infantry - KIA 452- Northern Luzon
• 37th Infantry - KIA 830 - Engaged in Battle of Manila
• 38th Infantry - KIA 564 - Shimbu Line
• 43rd Infantry - KIA 996 - Shimbu Line
• 40th Infantry -KIA 466 - Advance on Manila
• Corps/Army - KIA 500
• 158 RCT KIA 226
• 503rd Parachute - KIA 183
• 34th RCT - 103 KIA

Total 8,390 KIA

Leyte to Dec 25th 1944 -

From POA:

• 7th Infantry - 550 KIA -Later sent Okinawa
• 77th Infantry- 600 KIA -Later sent Okinawa
• 96th Infantry - 500 -Later sent Okinawa

SWPA

• 32nd Infantry- 450 KIA -Later sent to Luzon
• 24th Infantry -544 KIA-Later sent to Luzon
• 1st Calvary - 200 KIA-Later sent to Luzon
• 11th Airborne - 158 KIA - Later sent to Luzon

Total 3,000 KIA

Southern Philippines:

• 24th Division - Mindanao
• 40th Division - Panay and Los Negros
• 41st Division- Mindanao
• Americal Division
• 31st Division - Mindanao

Total 2,000 KIA

Max Hastings - Liberal

Just because he wrote for the Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail doesn't mean he's conservative, even in the English sense. Here are some quotes:

Quotes from Max Hastings:

'1 I'm a wet liberal really, and always have been. But I'm sort of an aggressive wet liberal. Perhaps where some people have made a mistake - possibly even including Conrad Black - because I shoot every weekend and write about the military and so on, they think I'm frightfully right-wing. In some respects I'm more left-wing than Tony Blair.'

"2. To put it bluntly, the Republicans have become the party of America's stupid people. That is not abusive, but a statement of fact. Most of the whites who will vote for McCain next week are demographically among the nation's least-educated: rednecks; drivers of big, tough pick-up trucks with flags on the hoods; Johnny Cash fans; and deer hunters. Sure, in upmarket city suburbs there are still some McCain/Palin boards up, among people who simply vote with their wallets. In the Bush years, the Republicans have justified their reputation as the party which looks after rich people.

The blunt, happy truth is that today there are not enough dumb people in the United States to elect John McCain and his hockey mom Veep." Max Hastings Daily Mail November 2008

3. "A note of hysteria has crept into American politics. It has made the supremely foolish Sarah Palin a Right-wing heroine; spawned the anti-Obama Tea Party movement; made the rhetoric of hate respectable among rednecks, hillbillies and Right-wing TV station - From Daily Mail column on Obama's Health Care Victory."

His Endorsement of Tony Blair
Hastings then resigned and accepted an offer to edit Lord Rothermere's Evening Standard, a post of lesser standing but more to his taste. When the General Election came two years later he wrote the Standard's full page editorial himself, declaring the paper's support for Tony Blair. From a BNET Book review of Editor By Max Hastings

Black on Hastings Book "Editor"
I rarely disputed editorial policy with Max and was as opposed to the death penalty, to apartheid and to the mistreatment of Palestinians and Ulster's Catholics as he was - but I didn't share his simplistic solutions ... He was a better journalist than an editor but he rendered invaluable service to the Daily Telegraph at a critical time. I always liked him and remember him amicably. His book is as refreshing and uneven as its author'

92nd Division - Black Infantry Regiments

The combat record of the Infantry regiments in the 92nd Division finally showed even the most ardent racist that segregated units with White officers were not effective. One reason the Army high command supported integration in 1948. From The Marshall papers:

To General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

February 14, 1945 Radio No. F-26834. Rome(?), Italy

Top Secret, Eyes Only

The 92nd Division, holding 22 miles on the left of the Fifth Army front in ITALY, has been given a final tryout in a 3 day local offensive, heavily supported by air, plentiful ammunition and tanks. It met little opposition in most parts of the front but the Infantry literally dissolved each night abandoning equipment and even clothing in some cases. The Artillery appears excellent, also the Engineers, and other divisional troops. The command and staff are superior. But as matters now stand, the division is not only of little value but weakens the front by necessitating the putting of other divisions in rear to provide the necessary security against a local German thrust through to LEGHORN and supply lines, divisions that should be otherwise disposed in the center of the Army.

We cannot afford this wastage of effort and jeopardy of the front, therefore, I am proposing the reorganization of one negro Infantry regiment from the pick of the three; the assignment to the division of a converted (White) anti-aircraft regiment here with additional selected personnel. A third Infantry regiment of dependable quality is urgently required. Could you possibly spare the Japanese regiment to be transferred without equipment, utilizing transportation otherwise returning from MARSEILLES empty after movement of Canadians. This would give us a useful divisional weapon capable of strong thrusts. Address reply to reach my EYES ONLY in WASHINGTON Friday night.

As a result the 92nd Division went back into action with 1 Japanese-American Infantry Regiment, 1 white Infantry Regiment, and 1 Black Regiment (made up of the best from the original 3). The other two Black regiments were used as "security" and "engineers".

Meanwhile, 2,500 black volunteers were doing an excellent job in integrated infantry platoons in the ETO.

Blacks In WW II

US. Navy - June 1945
Total Blacks - 165,000 (Stewards/Cooks 75,000)
Total Navy - 3,315,000

US Marine Corps - June 1945
Total Blacks - 19,000
Total Marine Corps - 485,000

Of the approximately 19,000 blacks, 13,000 served overseas. 2,500 served in two Marine Defense Battalions, the remainder in Combat Support companies and as Cooks/Stewards.

US Army & Air Corps - June 1945
Total Blacks - 694,000
Total Army and Air Corps - 8,266,373

Total men in Combat units 2.8 million of whom 150,000 were black. There numbers are approximate but blacks were in the following units that saw combat:

Total 89 Divisions - 2 Black (92nd and 93rd)
Total 73 Tank Destroyer Battalions - 3 Black (827th, 679th,614th)
Total 65 Separate Tank Battalions - 3 Black (758th, 761st, 784th)
Total 326 Separate Artillery Battalions - 9 Black
Total 40 Separate Infantry Regiments - 3 Black

Ike almost fires Patton - May 1944

From The Marshall Papers - Volume four:

"Eisenhower informed General Marshall on April 30 that he had sent for Lieutenant General Patton to report and explain his actions, but based "on all of the evidence now available I will relieve him from command.” Eisenhower indicated his faith in the ability of Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges to replace Patton as Third Army commander, but recognized that "the big difference is that Patton has proved his ability to conduct a ruthless drive whereas Hodges has not.” He also expressed his regret that Major General Lucian K. Truscott was unavailable to OVERLORD as a result of his position in the Mediterranean theater. Eisenhower asked Marshall whether Patton should be returned to the United States in his permanent rank or sent home in some higher grade to serve in a training command. "His relief from an active theater will certainly be interpreted by everyone as definite and severe disciplinary action," wrote Eisenhower, "but you would have the immediate problem of absorbing him as a lieutenant general.” Eisenhower added, "After a year and a half of working with him it appears hopeless to expect that he will ever completely overcome his lifelong habit of posing and of self-dramatization which causes him to break out in these extraordinary ways." (Papers of DDE, 3: 1840-41.) "

Marshall Responded to Ike on May 1, 1944:

My view, and it is merely that, is that you should not weaken your hand for OVERLORD. If you think that Patton's removal does weaken your prospect, you should continue him in command. In any event, I do not want you at this time to be burdened with the responsibility of reducing him in rank. Send him home if you see fit, and in grade, or hold him there as surplus if you so desire, or as I have indicated above, continue him in command if that promises best for OVERLORD. I fear my quotation from one editorial may have resulted in over emphasis in your mind of the necessity for drastic action to meet difficult resulting situation here at home. Incidentally, the numerous editorials, while caustic regarding his indiscretion, lack of poise or dignity, suitable to his position have not demanded his release from command. Do not consider War Department position in the matter. Consider only OVERLORD and your own heavy burden of responsibility for its success. Everything else is of minor importance."

Ike reconsidered and after reprimanding Patton, informed Marshall he had decided to keep him in command of 3rd Army.

Marine Corps - WWII source of personnel

Enlisted to December 31, 1942 - 220,000

1943-1945

• Draftees - 70,000
• SS Enlistees - 150,000
• 17 year old enlistees - 60,000

Total - 500,000

After December 1942, men of draft age (18-37) could no longer enlist directly into the armed forces. Once drafted however, they could choose their branch of service (their request was not always granted). SS Enlistees were Marines who chose the Marine Corps after being drafted. Some 70,000 were true draftees. In 1944-1945, demand exceeded supply & men were sent directly to the Marine Corps regardless of their wishes.

FDR Knox and the Navy

Per the Official Navy History - Administration of the Navy Department In WW II:

FDR Ignores Knox except in PR and Dealing with Congress

"During the short-of-war period before Pearl Harbor the President usually consulted the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, directly on such matters as the building program, the employment and disposition of the fleet, naval personnel, and similar matters. However, in things involving the reaction of Congress and the public to new measures he dealt directly with Secretary Edison and later Secretary Knox. Knox was, for example, very helpful in getting Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941."

"Often the President used Knox to ascertain public reaction to proposed measures by having him make trial-balloon speeches on the subjects. Knox, a forceful and persuasive speaker, was well suited to bringing out press comment on matters that were new to the public."

FDR Supports Motorboats over DE's against Navy Objections

"Franklin Roosevelt was more given than his cousin to making technical decisions himself, particularly when it came to questions of the characteristics of naval ships. For one thing, he had a strong predilection for waging antisubmarine warfare with small craft. This partiality went back to World War I when, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he advocated building large numbers of 50-foot motorboats to meet the U-boat menace of that war. It took all the arguments of the technical Bureaus and the General Board, supported by the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels,to build the 110-foot subchasers instead. The professional Navy took the position that for antisubmarine work vessels must be at least large enough to go to sea and to stay at sea in bad weather, and that one element of sea keeping was sufficient size to provide accommodations for a crew large enough to permit watch-standing. Such accommodations could not be provided in 50-foot motorboats. In World War II Franklin Roosevelt again favored small craft of the motorboat type for coastal protection against U-boats. It was only gradually that programs for the construction of more seaworthy vessels such as the PCs, SCs, and DEs received his unqualified support."

FDR Responsible for the Alaska Battlecruisers

"Again, the Alaska class of ships, consisting of three 27,000-ton cruisers mounting 12" guns, was built largely because of the President's insistence on such a design, although there was no enthusiasm in the professional Navy for the type. The ships never had an opportunity to demonstrate their usefulness, for they were completed too late to get into action during the war. Franklin Roosevelt's interest in technical naval matters extended beyond ships. For example, he took an active part in planning the overall features of the new naval hospital to be built at Bethesda, Maryland, later known as the National Naval Medical Center."

FDR Selects Naval Officers

"President Roosevelt himself took an active part in selecting naval officers for key positions. He felt himself qualified to do this because of his wide acquaintance with naval officers, stemming from his eight years of service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Woodrow Wilson administration. He know personally a good many officers in his own age group. These officers reached flag rank during the 30's and became eligible for filling the more important positions in the Navy at the outbreak of World War II."

Retribution: Max Hastings hates MacArthur

Max Hastings' book on the last year of the Pacific War is a perfect example of MacArthur Derangement Syndrome (MDS). I've never read a respected military historian who hates an Allied general as much as Max hates Mac. Here are some Hastings' comments from Retribution:

• MacArthur by contrast seemed to reject accountability to any earthly power.(P19)

• MacArthur displayed a a taste for fantasy quite unsuited to a field commander. together with an ambition close to megalomania and a consistently poor judgment as a picker of subordinates.(p20)
• Army insiders held MacA personally responsible for the Philippines debacle, by failures of commission and omission, This was unjust, although his generalship was poor...(p20)
• He shamelessly manipulated communiques about his forces achievements, deprived subordinates of credit for successes, shrugged off his own responsibility for failures.
• He made no jokes, and possessed no small talk, though he would occasionally talk baseball to enlisted men in an effort to deceive them that he was human (p22)
• His belief that his critics were not merely wrong, but evil verged on derangement.
• Most distasteful of all his wartime actions was a flirtation with a 1944 run against FDR, whose liberalism affronted his own rabidly conservative convictions Only when he realized he could not defeat Dewey for the Republican nomination did he finally exclude himself. (P23).

And this is just the first 25 pages of a 560 page book! So far it seems that Hastings is the "deranged" one - not MacArthur.

MacArthur on the Yamashita Case

"In reviewing this case I have carefully considered the minority views presented by distinguished Justices of the United States Supreme Court in negation not only as to jurisdiction but as to method and meritorious action as well..

"No trial could have been fairer than this one, no accused was ever given a more complete opportunity of defense, no judicial process was ever freer from prejudice. Insofar as was humanly possible the actual facts were fully presented to the commission. There were no artifices of technicality which might have precluded the introduction of full truth in favor of half truth, or caused the slanting of half truth to produce the effect of non truth, thereby warping and confusing the tribunal into an insecure verdict."

On the contrary, the trial was conducted in the unshaded light of truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Those who would oppose such honest method, can only be a minority, who either advocate arbitrariness of process above factual realism, or who inherently shrink from the stern rigidity of capital punishment. Strange jurisprudence it would be, which for whatever reason defeated the fundamental purpose of justice --to rectify wrong, to protect right and to produce order, safety and well being. No sophistry can confine justice to a form. It is a quality. Its purity lies in its purpose, not in its detail. The rules of war and the military law resulting as an essential corollary therefrom have always proven sufficiently flexible to accomplish justice within the strict limitations of morality."

"It is not easy for me to pass penal judgment upon a defeated adversary in a major military campaign. I have reviewed the proceedings in vain search for some mitigating circumstance on Yamashita's behalf. I can find none. Rarely has so cruel and wanton a record been spread to public gaze... The transgressions resulting therefrom as revealed by the trial are a blot upon the military profession, a stain upon civilization and constitute a memory of shame and dishonor that can never be forgotten. Peculiarly callous and purposeless was the sack of the ancient city of Manila, with its Christian population and its countless historical shrines and monuments of culture and civilization, which with campaign conditions reversed had previously been spared.

"It is appropriate here to recall that Yamashita was fully forewarned as to the personal consequences of such atrocities. On October 24--four days following the landing of our forces on Leyte--it was publicly proclaimed that I would 'hold the Japanese military authorities in the Philippines immediately liable for any harm which may result from failure to accord prisoners of war, civilian internees or civilian non-combatants the proper treatment and the protection to which they of right are entitled."

"No new or retroactive principles of law, either national or international, are involved. The case is founded upon basic fundamentals and practice as immutable and ae standardized as the most matured and irrefutable of social codes. The proceedings were guided by that primary rationale of all judicial purposes--to ascertain the fill truth unshackled by any artificiality or narrow method or technical arbitrariness. The results are beyond challenge."

"I approve the findings and sentence of the Commission".

US Aircraft Carriers -Magazine Load & AvGas - WW II

USS Enterprise
Torpedoes - 36
500 Lbs. Bombs - 600
1,000 lbs Bombs 1,100
1,600 lbs Bombs - 18
2,000 lbs Bombs - 18
Depth Charges -300
100 lbs Bombs - 500

AvGas - 230,000 Gallons.

CVL
Torpedoes - 24
500 Lbs. Bombs - 72
1,000 lbs Bombs -120
Depth Charges -36
100 lbs Bombs - 160

AvGas - 122,000 Gallons.

Montgomery on Bradley's November offensive

Per Monty:
"I met with Bradley at MAASTRICH yesterday, November 16, 1944. He explained the American strategy in Western Europe. They intend to line up on the Rhine from the Swiss Border to to Dusseldorf... he said he expected to achieve this by January 1, 1945. After a a pause to bring up the Air Force and supplies they will cross the Rhine on a broad front in the direction of MUNICH and BERLIN."

"I stated that if we went on pursuing this policy of 'stretch' we would nowhere be strong enough to bring such pressure to bear on the enemy, that we could smash through to the selected objectives. These tactics give the Germans exactly what they want, i.e. time. The Germans are bound to bring divisions from the Russian front and elsewhere... but all arguments were useless.

At present there are 17 American divisions south of the Ardennes, and 18 north of the Ardennes. I failed to discover from Bradley any system of switching strength across to the area where initial success offered promising prospects."

Per Bradley:
Montgomery wanted to know our estimate as to when we would reach the Rhine. I would hazard a guess that we can reach the Rhine at Cologne by December 15th, and in vicinity of Frankfurt at the same time.

Montgomery on Eisenhower 1943-1945

Monty's First Impressions of Eisenhower - March 1943

General Eisenhower stayed the night with me. I liked Eisenhower. But I could not stand him around the place for long; his high-pitched accent, and loud talking, would drive me mad... He knows practically nothing about how to make war, and definitely nothing about how to fight battles. He is probably good at the political stuff.

Monty To Alanbrooke November 19th 1944,

I do not believe Ike is a happy man these days. Whitely says he is certain Ike is worried about something, but cannot find out what it is. I think in his own heart he knows the show is not going well. and the future does not look bright with regards to an early end to the German war, and he does not know how to put the matter right.

He never commanded anything before in his whole career; now, for the first time, he has elected to take direct command of very large scale operations, and he does not know how to do it. Do you think I should approach Eisenhower?"

Monty to General Simpson November 27, 1944:

1. As commander in Charge of Land operations, General Eisenhower is quite useless. There must be no mistake on this point; he is completely and utterly useless.
2. The American conception of War if allowed to continue will mean the war will go on all through 1945.
3. Eisenhower should revert to being Supreme Allied Commander, Bradley to be Land Commander, Monty to command north of the Ardennes (with Patton's 3rd Army transferred north) Devers to command south of the Ardennes.

Montgomery War Diary V-E Day 1945

And so the campaign in NW Europe is over. I am glad; its been a tough business. When I review the campaign as a whole I am amazed at all the mistakes we made. The organization was always faulty.
Eisenhower had no firm ideas as to how to conduct the war, and "blown about by the wind" all over the place; at that business ( Land C-in-C) he was quite useless. Tedder was completely ineffective... The staff at SHAEF were completely out of their depth all the time.

Corregidor Personnel - April 1942

Per Wainwrights Report:

Navy - 2,100
Army - 5,000
Marine Corps - 1,600
Civilian - 2,500
PS/FA - 3,500

Total 14, 700

Bataan - Personnel and Losses April 1942

Per Wainwright's Report (G-1)

Total
US Enlisted and Officers - 12,500
Philippine Scouts - 8,000
Philippine Army - 56,000

Total Military 76,500

Filipino civilians employed by Army and Refugees drawing rations - 22,000

Breakdown of Personnel:

9 Divisions of Philippine Army - 43,000
Philippine Scouts - 8,000

Various HQ's - 2,800
Artillery/Engineers - 6500
Provisional Air Corp Regiment - 1, 300
US 31st Regiment - 1,700
Misc. Air Corps -2, 300
Hospital Patients 8,500
Service Personal - 3,000

Breakdown by Sick/Wounded:
General Hospital - 8,500
Field Hospital -9,000
Aid stations -5,000
Total 22,500

Losses

Reported to Japanese POW Camp May 10, 1042:

US - 9,300
Filipino - 44, 000
In General Hospital (US only) 2,300

Estimated Killed in Battle/Death March (US only) - 950

Bataan - Supporting Artillery Jan 1942

From Wainwrights Reports:

Filipino Army
1st PA Division -0
2nd PA Division -0
11th FA - 10
21st FA -24
31st FA - 08
41st FA -24
51st FA -08
71st FA -06
91st FA -08
Total - 88 75MM

301st FA - 16 155 mm

US and Philippine Scouts
24th PS - 24 75mm
23rd PS - 20 75 mm
86th PS - 12 155mm
92nd CAC - 6 155 mm

Self Propelled - 27 75mm

Total Artillery on Bataan January 1942, 132 - 75 mm; 34 155mm; 27 75mm direct fire mounted on halftracks.

US Army By Mission - March 31 1945

Army Air Corps - 2.3 million
Army Ground Forces - 3.2 million
Service Forces - 1.6 million
Training - .2 million
Overhead - .2 million
Misc. -.3 million

Total 7.8 million

Of the 3.2 million men in AGF, 2.1 million were in combat units, 500 thousand were in training and overhead, and 600 thousand were in service support.

Eisenhower Rates his Generals - June 1943

From his Diary dated June 11, 1943.

I (Eisenhower) am recording here my impressions and opinions of certain senior officers for reference if I may need them at a later date:

LT General Omar Bradley: This officer is about the best rounded, well balanced senior officer we have in the service... He is respected by British and Americans alike. I have not a word of criticism of his actions to date, and do not expect to have any in the future. I feel there is no position in the army he could not fill with success.

LT. General George Patton: A shrew soldier who believes in showmanship to such an extent that he is almost flamboyant. He talks too much and too quickly and sometimes leaves a bad impression. Moreover, I fear he is a bad example to his subordinates who may be guided only by his surface actions without understanding the deep sense of duty, courage, and service that make up his real personality. He has done well with a combat corps command, and I expect him to do so in all future operations.

LT General Mark Clark - He is the best organizer, planner, and trainer of troops I have yet met in the American Army.... he is certainly one of the best we have. His only drawback now is a lack of combat experience in a high command position. This I tried to give him in the early day of organizing an American task force in the central Tunisian front. He rather resented taking any title other than Army commander, and since I could not establish an American Army in Tunisia, I gave the command to someone else. This was a bad mistake on Clark' s part, but I think he could successfully command an army in operations.

Patton in *his* diary states in July 1943 he thought Eisenhower was looking for an excuse to relieve him during the Sicily Campaign - which shows how perceptive he was. Given Ike's private opinion of him vs. Clark or Bradley- he was right. The implication from this entry is (1) Clark was Ike's first choice as I Corps Commander NOT Patton and (2) Ike considered Bradley and Clark better fit to command an Army.