Philippine American War 1899-1902 - US Losses by year

Time Period	US Army Killed and Died of Wounds
February 1899- June 1899	349
July 1899 – June 1900	282
July 1900 –June 1901	239
July 1901 – June 1902	134
Total KIA and DOW	1,004
Total Died of Disease	2,572
Total Died Other Causes	589
Total Deaths	4,165

Source: US Department of War Reports 1899-1902, Statistical Abstract of USA (1953) Page 284

Funston - Memoirs of Two Wars (Cuba and the Philippines)

From the Preface:

In writing reminiscences it is difficult to avoid overworking the personal pronoun in the first person singular, without making the style so stilted that the account might be taken for an official report; but in this case an attempt has been made not to offend too deeply against the canons of good taste in that particular respect. Acknowledgment is hereby made of the fact that in the times described the writer was by no means the only person present in either Cuba or Luzon.

The author would scarcely advise a young man to follow in his own footsteps, and go into foreign lands looking for trouble merely because his own country did not furnish enough; as the chances are that he would finally rest in a forgotten grave, as was the case with not a few of our countrymen who assisted the Cubans in their struggle for independence, but whose very names are not now known by the people for whom they gave their lives.

After we have passed middle age the tendency of most of us is to live in the days that have gone by, and to give but little thought to the future. Whatever may happen to one later, if on many more than a hundred days of his life he has heard the popping of the bullets of the Mausers, he can congratulate himself on the fact that he is still alive; and can sit back in an easy chair and spend many pleasant hours thinking of the things that were. It is worthwhile if you win, but not if you lose. It is good to have lived through it all.

Manila, August, 1911. 

More crazy quotes from "The Imperial Cruise" by James Bradley

Quotes from Chairman James "Mau-mau" Bradley on the Philippine-American War (1899-1902):

Factual Errors and outright lies: 

1. Error: The Philippines first Independence day was celebrated on June 12, 1898. The Filipinos would not celebrate another Independence day for another sixty-four years (!) - Page 91

Fact:  The Philippians became Independent in 1946.  48 years after their 1st Independence day.

Lie:  On the Battle of Manila 1899 -  US forces killed more than 3,000 Filipino freedom-fighters in the first twenty-four hours.  Photos of Filipino dead heaped in American dug ditches,  recalled the US Army burial scene at Wounded knee... few remember that more Filipinos defending their country than Americans died on D-Day. - Page 102

Fact: The Filipinos lost 238 men killed - not 3,000. 

Lie: Most US history books claim they killed 20,000 to 30,000 freedom-fighters and 200,000-300,000 civilians; other sources estimate the US Military sent one million to three million to early graves. - Page 127

Fact:  No reputable historian believes we killed "one million Filipinos" The total population of Philippines was only 8 million and increased substantially from 1900 to 1910.  Comparison of the Census records shows no decrease in any age group. 

Lie: US Military action reduced the Carabaos population by 90 percent, result in mass hunger throughout the Philippines. -Page 120

Lie: The  US army had systematically executed 1,300 Filipino Prisoners in just one camp. Americans brought in a priest to hear the condemned men's confessions.  The US forces marched the Filipino prisoners to the killing grounds, made them dig their own graves, then shot them.  The body of the priest swung from a noose overhead. - page 129

Lie: On September 14, 1900, just two weeks after he assumed office, TR responded to the worst military crisis since the Battle of Little Big Horn.  51 American soldiers had died in Balangiga massacre. - Page 122

The US Army-Nazi Killing machine exposed or More Bradley Lies:

1. "Inside the fetid and poorly supplied camps, many uprooted civilians died. US soldiers shot captured freedom-fighters as common criminals..."
2. On Election day, November 4, 1900, the public gave the Republicans their biggest victory since Grant's re-election in 1872.  Robert Austill,  a soldier in the Philippines wrote: "The people of the United States want us to kill all the men, F- all the women, and produce a new race for these islands."
3. [While Taft enjoyed life in his Manila mansion...]Outside Manila, the US Military were still forcing civilians into Concentration camps, vultures grew too fat to fly as they feasted upon the corpses of dead Filipinos, torture was routine,  and the smoke of burned towns filled the air. - Page 120
4. In one letter that surfaced, one soldier stated he had water-boarded 160 Filipinos, of whom 134 died. Other evidence made it undeniably clear that atrocity warfare had been condoned and encouraged from the top.
5. US fought WW II for 56 months and lost about 400,000 dead.  So Hitler and Tojo killed about as many about the same per month - 7,200 - as the US did in the Philippines.
6. Ingenious Yankees employed a variety of other gruesome tortures, including flogging, scorching bound prisoners over open fires, and the rope cure.  A private from Utah summed things up in a letter home to his parents "No cruelty is too severe for these brainless monkeys..."
7. Captain Fred Macdonald ordered every native in the Hamlet of LaNong killed, save a beautiful mestizo woman, whom the officers repeatedly raped, prior to giving her over to the enlisted men. - page 106
8. General Smith gave residents of Samar 10 days to abandon their homes and enter US Concentration camps or be shot on site.  In field reports, Major Waller enumerated many civilian deaths, but no US casualties.

A random slam against Booker T Washington

1. He (Taft) held elections but allowed only three percent of the population to vote... he modeled Filipino education after the Tuskegee institute where Blacks learned to work with their hands and say "Yes, sir" at every opportunity.

Teddy Roosevelt - Racist Zoo-keeper

1. Roosevelt called his zoo-like freak show [1904 St. Louis World's Fair Exhibition], the "Philippine reservation".  Roosevelt had his minions search the wilds of the Philippines and ship 1,200 Filipinos to St. Louis,  where he presented them as closer to monkey's than humans.  Fair-goers viewed more than 1,000 photographs showing the Filipinos as robbers, murderers and rapists.  The Philippine exhibit had 18 million visitors.
2. But the future of the Philippines would be decided in the American Aryan Capital. The very idea of that a Pacific Negro [Aguinaldo] was capable of ruling eight million people was unthinkable.

The Imperial Cruise by James Bradley = Shoddy, Leftwing Lunacy

Suggested subtitle:  Teddy Roosevelt was a Racist - a dirty, rotten, AmeriKKKan, White- Christian racist.

One the stupidest, and shoddiest 'history' books I've ever read.  The book covers the 1905 cruise from San Francisco to Japan via China and the Philippines by William Howard Taft and TR's daughter Alice.  The book claims Taft negotiated "secret" treaties with Japan that "sold-out" Korea and eventually lead to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a Maoist China, and the Korean war. At every stop, Bradley gives us a little story of how "White Christians" had destroyed/oppressed/exterminated everyone.

Here are a few samples of the prose:

On the American West:

1. "The Indian survivors of the American race cleansing were locked up as noncitizens, nonvoting prisoners in squalid reservations. And while Lincoln had technically freed the slaves, ...restrictive Jim Crow laws had invisibly re-shackled the American black man, and the lynching tree had plenty of branches left"  (page 34).
2. "Buffalo Bill was the embodiment of the blond Aryan who sowed civilization as he race-cleaned his way west"
3. General Sherman - who commanded the Indian wars from 1866-1884 ordered his troops "During an assault soldiers cannot determine between male and female..." They did not, and through the decade the Indian dead included thousands of mothers, children, elderly, some killed merely for sport, their private parts sliced off and used to make wallets or decorative hats, their scalps and genitals displayed as trophies  Page 67 
4. With his own Indians, the American Aryan had been quick to make treaties that Congress would later disregard.
5. The US Army had waged a race war in the American West, shooting civilians, killing women and children, executing prisoners, raping women, torturing captives,  looting and burning village, and herding the defeated into concentration camps. Now, they would chew through the agricultural, pre-industrialized Philippines. - page 118

On the US-Mexican War 

1. Polk ordered Taylor into Mexican territory between the two rivers [Rio Grande and Nueces]... Mexican historians refer to the US actions as "the American Invasion".  Taylor's incursion was brutal, with massacres of Mexican civilians and rapes of local women.  (page 63).

On the Spanish-American War and Cuba

1. Not one shred of evidence ever existed to suggest that the Spanish blew up the Maine.  Page 77 
2. McKinley conjured up the fantasy that when an American soldier pointed a gun at a Foreign other he was there to help.  Page 79
3. In contrast to the American Revolution, the Cuban freedom fighters would've won their independence without foreign help.  Page 80
4. Instead Americans  informed shocked Cuban freedom fighters that the old Spanish Civil authorities - white men - would remain in charge.  No Cubans would be allowed to confer on the surrender or sign it.

US Army Losses during the Philippine-USA war 1899-1902

It always amazes me that people (not just Gore Vidal) can't get numbers and history straight.  Usually this is for propaganda purposes. For example, because the Philippine-American war of 1899-1902 is often labeled as a 'bad war" and a "war of conquest" both Filipino and US losses are exaggerated to make it seem more bloody and awful then it really was.  So here are the actual US losses from the US army records:

US Army
Killed in battle (includes died of Wounds) - 1,004
Died of Disease - 2,572
Other Deaths -589
Total - 4,165.

Total Served:  100,000 (often quoted as 124,000 or so, but that includes men who went twice or more from the US to the Philippines).

Total Filipino Losses:

Killed in Battle - 12,000-16,000 (even the 12,000 is probably an exaggeration).
Civilian Deaths due to Disease, Famine, Battle - 200,000

How many of the 200,000 were due to the war and how many to due to the Cholera epidemic of 1902 is unknown.

Time Frame
The usual end time for the war is stated as June 1902. But there was very little fighting from June 1901 to June 1902.  The US army lists 100 men killed in battle from July 1901 to June 1902.  Of those 50 killed in one massacre on Samar in August 1901.

General J.M. Bell and the Killing of 600,000 Filipinos in 1901

From the May 1st, 1901 New York Times Interview:

"One-sixth of the natives of Luzon have either been killed or have died of Dengue fever in the last two years" was the remarkable statement of Brig. General Bell, who arrived in Washington to-day direct from the Philippines, where he was in command of four departments of Southern Luzon.

'The loss of life by killing alone has been very great," continued the General, "but I think not one man has been slain except where his death served a legitimate purpose of war.  It has been necessary to adopt what in other countries would be considered harsh measures, of the Filipino is tricky and crafty and has to be fought in his own way."

"One of my sentinels was beheaded within 150 yards of my HQ.  His executioner was a Bolo-man, who came into camp disguised as a fruit vendor.  He had his Bolo hidden in the fruit basket and with one blow cut off the sentinel's head."

The problems with General Bell's statement are:

(1) J.M. Bell wasn't on Luzon for two years.  He arrived in October 1899 and left in March 1901, and returned to the US in the Summer of 1900 for several months on sick leave.
(2) J.M. Bell was a Brig General stationed in southern Luzon.  There's no evidence he visited the rest of Luzon, or knew anything about Luzon except what went on in HIS department.
(3) J.M. Bell had no way of knowing the total population in Luzon in April 1899 or April 1901.
(4) The Census records disclose no drop in Luzon's native population from April 1899-April 1901.
(5) There was no epidemic of "Dengue Fever" in the US Army or among the Luzon Filipinos in 1899-1901.
(6)  Bell was 63 when he gave the interview and retired in October 1901.  There's no evidence he ever testified before Congress to support his "remarkable statement" or was ever questioned further on it, by anyone.
(7) Given that Bell was in charge of 1/6 the natives on Luzon, my suspicion is that the reporter simply mis-quoted him.

General J. Franklin Bell vs. General James M Bell - A tale of two bells

These two General Bells were both on Luzon from Feb 1900-March 1901 and are often mistaken for each other.  No wonder, since both were Brigadier Generals on Luzon and both were named "James Bell".  They were two entirely different people as shown by their mini-bios:

General James Franklin Bell - (1856-1919)  - Medal of honor winner.  West Point Graduate.  July 1899 Colonel of the 36th Volunteer Infantry on Luzon.  September 1899 -wins MOH in fight against Filipinos.  December 1899 - Promoted Brigadier General.  Later, Commander of District in Northern Luzon, where he created the policy of "concentration" to defeat Guerrilla Activity.  June 1903 Returns to USA and made Commander of Fort Leavenworth.  Major General - June 1907.   Various training commands during WWI. Buried Arlington National Cemetery.

General James M. Bell - (1837-1919) - Joined Union army in 1862 (86th Ohio Infantry)  - decorated for bravery in Battle of the Wilderness.  1876 - Seventh Calvary and Battle of Little Big Horn. March 1896 - Major; US 8th Calvary.  April 1898 - Fought battle of Santiago. Battle injury - singled out by General Joseph Wheeler for bravery.  1899 -Promoted Lt Colonel  (Vol).  February  1900 - Promoted Brigadier General (Vol) and transferred to Philippines.  Made head of 2,500 man "Bell Expeditionary Force".  March 1900 - made head of 3rd District - Southern Luzon.  June 30, 1900 - Per General MacArthur's Annual Report - on sick leave in Japan.  August 1900 - In San Francisco.  September 1900 - Back in Philippines.  March 8, 1901 - leaves command of 3rd District and Returns to USA.  May 1st 1901 - Gives interview to New York Times, quoted in "Conquest of the Philippines".  September 20, 1901 promoted Brigadier General (Regular).  October 1, 1901 - Retires after reaching mandatory retirement age  of 64.  1910 - Gives interview to Walter Camp regarding Custer and the Little Big Horn Campaign.  Buried San Francisco National Cemetery.

Did the USA kill 600,000 Filipinos in Luzon from 1899-1901?

According to Gore Vidal they did:

"General J. Franklin Bell, a propos our seizure of the Philippines. “In order to combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such conditions will soon become intolerable.”

"General Bell himself, the old sweetheart, estimated that we killed one-sixth of the population of the main island of Luzon—some 600,000 people."

The Source for Vidal's statement:

"West Point: America’s Power Fraternity (1973)  and Moorfield Storey’s Conquest of the Philippines. (1926).  Storey’s source - the New York Times of May 3, 1901."

"West Point" simply quotes "Conquest" and can be ignored. Here is the quote from "Conquest of the Philippines" (page 121):

"No official estimate of the number of people killed by such measures throughout the islands
since the beginning of the war has ever been made. General J. M. Bell, however, made the 
estimate that in Luzon alone one-sixth of the native population had been wiped out as a con- 
sequence of the war (18). Luzon then had a population of over three and a half million, and
one-sixth of that number meant 600,000 men, women and children. "

The Facts:

1) Gore Vidal mixes up  his General Bells.  There were TWO general Bells on Luzon in 1900.  First, Major General J. Franklin Bell quoted in the first paragraph and second, Brig. General  James M. Bell - who was supposedly interviewed on May 3, 1901. They were two very different people.  James M. Bell was the 60 year old  Military governor of 3 provinces on Luzon - total population 600,000.  He returned to the USA in April 1901; and retired in October 1901.  General J. Franklin Bell stayed in the Philippines from 1899-1902 and was later criticized for harshness.

2) There is no record of John M. Bell in the May 3rd, 1901 New York Times. There IS one for May 1, 1901 (will be discussed later).

3) Moorfield Storey wasn't a historian but a political partisan and President of the "Anti-Imperialist League" from 1905-1921. He ran for Congress in 1900 as an Independent "anti-imperialist".  His book 'Conquest of the Philippines' is an attack on American Philippine policy not an objective history.

Did the USA kill 3 million Filipinos?

During the Philippine-American war. 1899-1902  Gore Vidal thought so:

"The comparison of this highly successful operation with our less successful adventure in Vietnam was made by, among others, Bernard Fall, who referred to our conquest of the Philippines as "the bloodiest colonial war (in proportion to population) ever fought by a white power in Asia; it cost the lives of 3,000,000 Filipinos." (cf. E. Ahmed's "The Theory and Fallacies of Counter-Insurgency," The Nation, August 2, 1971.) General Bell himself, the old sweetheart, estimated that we killed one-sixth of the population of the main island of Luzon—some 600,000 people."

Others reduce the Philippine "Genocide" to 1.4 million:

"EXCEPT during the sixties when the Filipino-American War of 1899-1902 was referred to as “the first Vietnam,” the death of 1.4 million Filipinos has been usually accounted for as either collateral damage or victims of insurrection against the imperial authority of the United States. The first Filipino scholar to make a thorough documentation of the carnage is the late Luzviminda Francisco in her contribution to The Philippines: The End of An Illusion (London, 1973)."

The facts:

Population of the Philippines*
 1887:    6,584,727  (est. 500,000 non-Christians)
 1899:    7,303,311  (est. 600,000 non-Christians)
 1903:    7,635,426  (647,000 Non-Christians)

*   = Sources:  Philippine Statistics board; 1903 and 1918 Philippine census.

Plus 1903 census shows a overall ratio of males/females of  50/50.  War and "Genocide" in response to Guerrilla warfare usually kills many more men than women, so you'd expect the ratio of young men/young women to be highly unbalanced *after* the war.  And also see a large number of widows.  Instead you see the following:

1903 Census - Widows - 330 thousand
1918 Census    Widows - 340 thousand

1903 Census - Men 18-29      -  675 thousand
1903 Census  - Female  18-29 - 800 thousand

1903 Census Males    30-39 -  490 thousand
1903 Census Females 30-39 - 450 thousand

Marshall to MacArthur - March 29 1945

#5-076

To General of the Army Douglas MacArthur1

March 29, 1945 Radio No. WAR-60363. Washington, D.C.

Top Secret

TOPSEC personal for MacArthur for his Eyes Only from Marshall.

Command in Pacific is under consideration but complete solution with respect to command and future operations has not as yet been resolved.2

For your information the following portions of the future directive seem in general to be agreed upon although JCS formal approval has not yet been given, the delaying being due to failure so far to reach agreement as to certain details referred to below.

I. The over-all objective in the war against Japan, to be brought about at the earliest practicable date, is:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments, and destroying Japanese Air and Naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

It is expected that the JCS will assign you the responsibility to:

(1) Complete the occupation of Luzon and conduct such additional operations in the Philippines as required for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan. Further to the foregoing, conduct such additional operations toward completing the liberation of the Philippines as can be mounted without prejudice to the accomplishment of the overall objective.

(2) Make plans for occupying North Borneo, including Brunei Bay, using Australian combat and service troops and make preparations at such time as resources can be made available without detriment to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Units of the British Pacific Fleet may be allocated for this operation.

(3) Provide forces and support to Nimitz to assist him in completion of the seizure and development of positions in the Ryukyus as required in his current directive under provisions of Part II below.

(4) Establish bases in the Philippines to support further advances for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan.

II. It appears that agreement will be reached by the JCS placing Army resources in Pacific under you. The point at issue which has so long delayed a final agreement is the degree and manner of control that you as Army Commander will exercise as to Army troops throughout the Pacific which are of necessity closely integrated in Naval Base and other operations and in the Naval Logistical problem.

You will be given responsibility for planning, preparation and conduct of actual invasion of Japan. Nimitz would be given responsibility for amphibious phase of the operation.3

FDR Terminates MacArthur's Position in the Philippines - Aug 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The President requests me to advise that General Douglas MacArthur be informed that his services in the Philippines shall terminate upon the conclusion of a two year tour of duty there; that the General is needed for service in the United States; that the General be acquainted with post commands ^to which he may be assigned at the time of his return to active duty in the United States; and that he be given his preference of such posts as may be available at that time. As a furthur consideration, in the event the General prefers some Corps Area or other command which may not be open, at that time, the President is willing that the War Department work out much transfer of officers as may be necessary to permit General MacArthur to take over the post he most desires.


The President has noted the contents of the confidential letter addressed by Brigadier General Conley to General Douglas MacArthur, under date of September 18, 1935. He directs that such portions of this letter or of existing War Department orders as conflict with the above request shall be nullified, i.e. "x x x limit of time of foreign service is waived in your case" etc.


STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

Later Memo from Craig on this in Miss LeHands Confidential Files.

US Divisions and Losses in Philippines

LUZON:

• 1 Cav - KIA 650 - Engaged in Battle of Manila
• 6th Infantry - KIA 795 - Shimbu Line
• 11 Airborne - KIA 427 -Engaged in Battle of Manila
• 24th Infantry (Part) - Bataan.
• 25th Infantry - KIA 1,124 - Northern Luzon
• 32nd Infantry - KIA 924 - Northern Luzon
• 33rd Infantry - KIA 452- Northern Luzon
• 37th Infantry - KIA 830 - Engaged in Battle of Manila
• 38th Infantry - KIA 564 - Shimbu Line
• 43rd Infantry - KIA 996 - Shimbu Line
• 40th Infantry -KIA 466 - Advance on Manila
• Corps/Army - KIA 500
• 158 RCT KIA 226
• 503rd Parachute - KIA 183
• 34th RCT - 103 KIA

Total 8,390 KIA

Leyte to Dec 25th 1944 -

From POA:

• 7th Infantry - 550 KIA -Later sent Okinawa
• 77th Infantry- 600 KIA -Later sent Okinawa
• 96th Infantry - 500 -Later sent Okinawa

SWPA

• 32nd Infantry- 450 KIA -Later sent to Luzon
• 24th Infantry -544 KIA-Later sent to Luzon
• 1st Calvary - 200 KIA-Later sent to Luzon
• 11th Airborne - 158 KIA - Later sent to Luzon

Total 3,000 KIA

Southern Philippines:

• 24th Division - Mindanao
• 40th Division - Panay and Los Negros
• 41st Division- Mindanao
• Americal Division
• 31st Division - Mindanao

Total 2,000 KIA

Corregidor Personnel - April 1942

Per Wainwrights Report:

Navy - 2,100
Army - 5,000
Marine Corps - 1,600
Civilian - 2,500
PS/FA - 3,500

Total 14, 700

Bataan - Personnel and Losses April 1942

Per Wainwright's Report (G-1)

Total
US Enlisted and Officers - 12,500
Philippine Scouts - 8,000
Philippine Army - 56,000

Total Military 76,500

Filipino civilians employed by Army and Refugees drawing rations - 22,000

Breakdown of Personnel:

9 Divisions of Philippine Army - 43,000
Philippine Scouts - 8,000

Various HQ's - 2,800
Artillery/Engineers - 6500
Provisional Air Corp Regiment - 1, 300
US 31st Regiment - 1,700
Misc. Air Corps -2, 300
Hospital Patients 8,500
Service Personal - 3,000

Breakdown by Sick/Wounded:
General Hospital - 8,500
Field Hospital -9,000
Aid stations -5,000
Total 22,500

Losses

Reported to Japanese POW Camp May 10, 1042:

US - 9,300
Filipino - 44, 000
In General Hospital (US only) 2,300

Estimated Killed in Battle/Death March (US only) - 950

USAFFE Strength - December 7, 1941

December 7th 1941 US Army Strength
Increase over July 31

Air Corps
July 31st -2,500
Dec 8th -5,500
increase - 3,000

Coastal Artillery and Support Troops
July 31st -5,000
Dec 8th -9,000
increase -4,000

Mobile AAA
July 31st -0
Dec 8th -1,800
increase -1,800

US Infantry
July 31st -2,000
Dec 8th -2,000
Increase -0

US Tank
July 31st -0
Dec 8th -1,200
Increase -1,200

Filipino Scouts
July 31st -12,000
Dec 8th -12,000
Increase -0

Total US Army
July 31st -22,000
Dec 8th -32,000
Increase -10,000

Artillery December 7, 1941:

Philippine Army - 52 British 2..95 inch, 96 British 75mm = 148 75mm & 16 155 mm
Note: This is the total artillery in stock all over the Luzon. Of the 148, 8 were sent to the south leaving 140 for the 8 Filipino Divisions on Luzon. Many of the artillery had wooden wheels or were not fit to towed by Truck - all were British WWI surplus. The Japanese captured almost 40 in their advance to Bataan leaving about 100 for the defense to Bataan in January 1942.

US Army
- 16 155mm
-36 75mm
- 12 2.95 inch
- 48 M3 75mm Self propelled artillery

Of the 48
75mm and 2.95inch pieces - 36 were with the Philippine Division. 24th Regiment (PS) had 24 75mm and the 23rd (PS) 12 2.95 inch The other 12 75 mm were with the 86th Regiment (PS). The 16 155mm were with the 88th Regiment (PS).

Total
- 64 2.95 inch
- 132 75mm
- 32 155mm
- 48 75mm self propelled

MacArthur and the PreWar Phillipines

October 1935 - MacArthur Appointed Military Adviser to the Commonwealth. The Philippine government is poor and reluctant to spend money. The Philippine Army budget is frozen at $8 million per year from 1937 to 1941.

September 1937 - FDR informs MacArthur he will be rotated back to the USA after the end of his 2 year tour (October 1937).

December 1937 - MacArthur Retires from US Army. His only position is head of the Philippine army. However, Eisenhower and several other US army officers remain to lend him assistance.

Oct 1935- July 1941 - MacArthur constantly requests FDR for increased military aid to build up the Philippine army but is refused. Under current US war plans the Philippines are considered "indefensible".

July19, 1941 Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of the newly created Army Air Forces, submits to Marshall, Stimson, and FDR a proposal to transfer to the Philippines of four heavy bombardment groups, consisting of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit groups of 130 planes each.

July 26, 1941 - MacArthur is recalled to active duty and made head of the USAFFE (US Armed Forces Far East). The current head of the US Army Philippine Department Major General Gunter is made redundant and returns to the US.

July 26, 1941 - The Philippine Army with 10 Divisions (120,00 men) is mobilized.

July 31, 1941 - MacArthur has the following US Army forces:

Filipino Scouts - 12, 000
31st US Army Regiment - 2,500
American Harbor Defense & Support Services - 5,000
US Air Corps - 2, 500
Total US Army - 22, 000

Tanks - 0
M1 Rifles -0
75mm Guns - 36 ( plus 48 in the Philippine Army)
105 mm artillery -0
Anti-aircraft guns -0
Radar sets -0

P-40B - 31
P-35 -52
B-17 -0
B-25 -0
Obsolete light bombers - 39
Obsolete fighter -16
Other (cargo, liaison, etc.) - 68

August 1, 1941 - War Department informs MacArthur that existing War Strategy has changed. Reinforcements will be sent pending shipping availability. General Marshall informs MacArthur that US plans to base hundreds of B-17s in the Philippines to deter Japanese aggression has been approved.

August 10, 1941 - MacArthur states the Philippine army has only 48 75mm guns is short machine guns, anti-tank guns and AAA. He requests 84,500 Garand rifles (M1), 330 .30-caliber machine guns, 326 .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, 450 37-mm. guns, 217 81-mm. mortars, 288 75-mm. guns with high-speed adapters, and over 8,000 vehicles of all types.

August 16, 1941 - War informs MacArthur that that the following units would sail from San Francisco between 27 August and 5 September: the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) consisting of 76 officers and 1,681 enlisted men; the 194th Tank Battalion (less Company B), with 54 tanks, 34 officers, and 390 enlisted men; and one company (155 men) of the 17th Ordnance Battalion.

September 5, 1941 - MacArthur turns down Marshall's offer of a US national guard division since equipment, supplies and aircraft require priority. Marshall approves MacArthur's request for funds for airfield defense and promises to send additional AAA and radar sets.

September 6, 1941 - 9 B-17s arrive in Manila

October 2, 1941 - 50 P-40 fighter planes arrive in Manila.

November 4, 1941 - 26 B-17s arrive.

Late November 1941 - 26 P-40s arrive.

December 8th 1941 - Aircraft strength of FEAF:

P-40 - 107
B-17 - 35
P-35 - 52
Obsolete light bombers - 39
Obsolete fighter -16
Other (cargo, liaison, etc.) - 68

Radar sets in operation - 2
Clark Airfield for B-17s
Six other Airfields for fighters

Airfields bombproofed - 0
Airfields with AAA protection -1 (Clark AFB)
Total AAA in Philippines - 12 75mm & 24 37mm plus .50 Cal Machine guns
Del Monte Airfield established in Late November for B-17s.

Why it was better to invade Luzon than Formosa

The short answer is that an invasion of Formosa in January 1945, not only would have been unnecessary but would have been a bloodbath. We would have incurred many casualties for no real benefit. The only real advantage of invading Formosa over Luzon was Formosa's geographic position. We could have cut Japan's sea lanes to the south more effectively from Formosa than Luzon. Otherwise the advantage would have been with Luzon. We would incurred more casualties for the following reasons:

1) We had occupied Luzon since 1900 and knew the detailed maps of the area along with Military officers who knew Luzon very well. Formosa had been occupied by Japan for almost 40 years, and we had no detailed maps or information on the island.

2) The Filipinos were on our side and provided us with valuable military intelligence. Such as the strength and location of the Japanese troops, existence of fortifications and blown and unblown bridges. The Filipinos not only used as scouts, but were valuable in containing and mopping up Japanese troops. The Formosa population would have contained large pro-Japanese elements that would have provided them with intelligence against us, and well as supporting guerrilla action against us.

3) Occupation of a mountainous, heavily forested island 240 miles long and 90 miles wide, with bad roads, would have required massive amounts of troops and negated our superiority in artillery and tanks.

4) Japan had millions of troops in China, and could have easily shipped reinforcements from China to Formosa. Formosa is only 100 miles from the China coast and 240 miles from Okinawa. On Luzon, OTOH, had only 250,000 japanese troops and no reinforcements arrived after our invasion.

5) The Japanese had 40 years to fortify Formosa against attack, and we didn't know their location and strength. By contrast the Japanese had only 3 years to fortify Luzon and we knew their exact location and strength.

6) With airfields in Leyte and Mindoro we were able to cover the landings in Luzon and suffer few losses. We invaded Luzon on Jan 9th 1945 and by Jan 15th the Japanese had launched their last Kamikaze attack and moved their remaining planes to Formosa. Furthermore, with adequate air cover form Mindoro and Leyte the Fast Carriers were able to cut loose in Mid January and continue their destruction of Japanese shipping and naval vessels in Indochina, Japan, and Okinawa.

7) By contrast, the only air coverage for the Formosa landings would have come from the CVE and the fast carriers. The Japanese would have been able to strike the landings not only from the Formosa airfields but stage them from Luzon and China. Indeed, even after we had occupied all of the Formosa, the Japanese still have continued their Kamikaze attacks from Chinese airfields.

Myth - The invasion of the Philippines was unnecessary

“Philippine campaign was totally unnecessary campaign undertaken to assuage MacArthur's ego. the capture of Peliliu secured the flank of the real drive, the navy/marine campaign in the central pacific. so that reason usually set forth as an excuse doesn't fly, and it blew the hell out of manila and the rest of the Filipino towns, killed scores of Filipino civilians not to mention closeto 70,000 U.S. casualties. So it should be forgotten. it was wasteful in the extreme and criminally unnecessary.

I am not the world's greatest expert on this, but if I remember the situation, MacArthur and Nimitz briefed President Roosevelt, with MacArthur recommending his return to the Philippines, and Nimitz recommending the island-hopping campaign which would bypass and isolate the Philippines,to be eliminated of the Japanese later.”

This post is a perfect example of why being ill-informed is worse than being uninformed. This post is completely wrong. To whit;

Nimitz never recommended bypassing the PI. Nimitz and every other field commander in the Pacific thought we needed to invade Leyte and establish airfields to cover the Japanese airfields on Luzon before invading either Luzon or Formosa. Only King wanted to bypass the Philippines and go directly to Formosa.

FDR did not decide Pacific war military strategy based on a discussion with MacArthur. Actually strategy was set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In 1944 that included Arnold, Marshall, King, and Leahy. FDR, from what I’ve read never overruled his JCS after his decision to invade North Africa in July 1942.

In September 1944 the choice was not between invading the Philippines and invading Okinawa and Iwo Jima. No one at the time thought we could move directly from Saipan to Okinawa in the Fall of 1944. There were three options being considered two viable option and one unviable:

1) Viable; To invade Leyte and then invade either Luzon or Formosa; or
2) Viable: bypass the PI and invade Formosa and the China Coast.
3)) Unviable: bypass the PI and Formosa and invade Japan directly or Okinawa.

Option three was never considered viable by either the Army or Navy. Marshall considered it, but quickly dropped the idea when Army planners thought it impossible. The only one in favor of Option 2 was Admiral King.

Bypassing the PI and invading Formosa was supported by King for three reasons:

1) it would support our invasion of the China coast, allowing us to support the Nationalists.
2) occupation of Formosa would cut Japan sea lanes to the south
3) B-29s could use it as a base to Bomb Japan.

Eventually, the JCS (except for King) and Nimitz, MacArthur, and Halsey concluded that we had to invade Leyte and establish airfields to neutralize the airfields on Luzon before either Formosa or Luzon could be invaded.

After the JCS decided to invade Leyte in October 1944 they had to decide between Luzon or Formosa. Marshall and Arnold supported an invasion of Luzon. Also supporting Luzon were the other army field commanders and Admiral Halsey. King never wavered in believing Formosa should be invaded.

However the Key player in the decision was Nimitz. Initially he favored invading Formosa but he came to the conclusion that it would be cheaper in lives and quicker to first invade Luzon and then invade Okinawa; bypassing Formosa. Nimitz’s reasons were as follows;

• Formosa could not be invaded till March 1945 vs. an invasion of Luzon in January 1945. Thereby pushing the invasion of Okinawa until June 1945.
• Formosa was no longer needed as a B-29 airbase.
• A Chinese port was no longer needed to support the Chinese.

MacArthur's Pearl Habor December 8 th 1941 - More MDS

This book is a blow by blow account of the Japanese attack on Clark Field on December 8th 1941. Starting even before MacArthur was recalled to day in July 1941, the author tells the story of how the Japanese planned their attack, and how the FEAF was created and reinforced and eventually attacked on December 8th.

However, when it comes to analyzing the reason for the Japanese success, the author comes down with a case of MacArthur Derangement Syndrome. Per the author, Big Mac was to blame for the full disaster and even more absurdly, the loss of 18 B-17s is described as a significant event.

The truth is that the FEAF was "Doomed at the Start", (which BTW, is the title of much better book about the the P-40 fighter pilots in the FEAF from Dec 1941-to May 1942).

To summarize, FEAF has 35 B-17s and 100 P-40s, in the Philippines on December 8th, 1941. The FEAF lost approximately 17 B-17s and 40 P-40s in the attack. Clark AFB had inadequate AAA and was not properly bombproofed. No matter what Brenton or MacArthur did or didn't do, we simply didn't have enough planes (with no replacements from the USA) to do stop the hundreds of Japanese bombers and fighters. And of course, the Japanese had replacements and the FEAF did not. Note, the remaining US fighters were quickly disposed of during the remainder of Dec/Jan 1941.

To argue that 18 unescorted B-17s, on their first combat mission, could have inflicted significant damage on unknown Japanese airfields in Formosa is absurd. It is 520 miles from Clark AFB to Formosa, and it was covered with Fog through much of the day. In fact the reason the Japanese did not attack at dawn was due to fog covering the airfields.

It should be noted that Mac had ordered the Air Force to move all B-17s to Del Monte out of danger in early December. The Air Force only moved 16, leaving 19 at Clarke Field. One reason for delaying the attack was to wait for the other 16 B-17s to fly up to Clarke, be refueled and go in one big attack.

Finally, FEAF was warned of a Japanese air attack and had their planes airborne at dawn. However, they had to come down refuel. The attack on Clark AFB achieved surprise because the radar operators did not warn Clark AFB of the incoming Japanese planes.The author never makes clear how 18 B-17s on their first combat mission, flying unescorted to an unknown target could have accomplished anything significant. Had the B-17s taken off at dawn for Formosa, they would discovered it covered in fog. had the B-17s taken off after 7AM, they would have found the Formosa airfields empty. The fact is that 18 B-17s were simply too little to have accomplished anything.

Myth: FDR Decided to invade the Philippines - Honolulu 19944

This myth was started by Robert Sherwood in his book "Roosevelt and Hopkins". Per Sherwood, FDR traveled to Hawaii in July 1944 and met with MacArthur and Nimitz. After talking to both men, he was swayed by MacArthur's oratory and decided to invade the Philippines in October 1944.

This is false. FDR came to Hawaii on July 26, 1944 and left three days later. He spent the night of the 27th and the morning of the 28th talking with Mac and Nimitz about the future of the war in the Pacific. The rest of the time was spent inspecting the troops, making speeches, touring Hawaii and various entertainments. MacArthur had no staff with him and spoke off the cuff.

The decision to invade the Philippines in October 1944 was made by the JCS in September 1944. The final decision to invade Luzon and liberate Manila was made by the JCS on October 3, 1944.

So, FDR did NOT decide the strategy of Pacific war in July 1944. The decision to invade the Philippines was NOT a political decision. It was military one made by the JCS, Marshall, Arnold, King, and Leahy.

BTW, there were two reasons for FDR's trip. One was to shore up his popularity by showing him as a war leader. The second, was to provide FDR, a very sick man, with a 4 week vacation from DC.