McClellan Vs. Grant

Any Grant Vs. Mac comparison has to begin with the understanding that Grant had it much, much easier in April ’64 than McClellan in April ’62. Others have listed the advantages. Of course Grant was also much more willing to go along with Lincolns military “suggestions” then McClellan. (And if Grant got ticked off at Lincoln, he certainly never made the mistake of venting his anger in letters to his wife). Of course, they were too different kinds of men and were in different circumstances. The Civil War was Grants big chance to make it big and he doesn’t seem have been very political before the war. McClellan OTOH was a RR President and going back into the Army was a financial sacrifice for him. He was also opposed to the Radical Republican agenda. So when Stanton and Halleck started bad mouthing and treating with contempt after Seven Days he wasn’t the least bit inclined to pander to them; instead it was more of “I’ll tell you what I think and if you don’t like it – fire me”. Something Grant never would do.

How to quickly judge a Civil War Book

Simply apply the "Young Napoleon" test.  The more the author refers to McClellan as  "The Young Napoleon"  - the worse the book.

Stop Lying about George McClellan!

Aaarg! Rick Beard in the New York Times has a somewhat reasonable column about Antietam entitled the America's bloodiest Day. However, he persists in repeating Stanton slanders as if they were historical fact. So for the record:

1) There is no evidence McClellan "refused" to "reinforce Pope". McClellan was acting under Halleck's orders and was in Alexandria Va - 1 hour from the White House. Halleck and Lincoln were the "decision makers" - not McClellan. McClellan was in no position to "refuse" to do anything.

2) McClellan did not propose that "we leave Pope to get out of his scrape" - he told Lincoln that there should be no half-way measures. Either reinforce Pope with everything and have them "cut their way through" or "make the Capital perfectly safe". Two alternatives that Lincon and Halleck should decide on. McClellan ends his message by stating he would cheerfully and enthusiastically support EITHER course of action. But no half-measures.

3) There is no evidence that McClellan did anything to hinder Pope or do anything other than what he considered to be the correct military decision. There is no evidence McClellan was motivated by jealousy or was trying to sabotage Pope. Historians constantly quote these so-called "letters to his wife" completely disregarding that McClellan was "blowing off steam" or "venting" to his wife. I wonder what Abe was telling Mary Todd about McClellan, I wonder.

4) There is no evidence, other than Stanton's wish and Halleck's belief that McClellan was slow in evacuating the Peninsula, or dragged his feet, or delayed because he wished to hurt Pope.

George McClellan - Wannabee Dictator

From NPR review of Richard Slotkin author of "The Long Road To Antietam: How The Civil War Became A Revolution.":

Slotkin : (On the situation in late 1861) So it's a poisonous situation, and there is actually a serious proposal to make McClellan a dictator, and what they mean by that is that they would - not that there would be a military coup but that they would pass a law vesting the power to run the war effort in McClellan and formally take - in a sense taking it away from Lincoln.

NPR: And he wrote a lot of letters to his wife, many of which have endured for historians like yourself. What do they tell us about his (McClellan's) musings about taking control of the republic?

Slotkin: Well, they show a few things. He was really unrestrained, and it really is a window into the mind of a man who is a narcissist of world-class status. He really does see himself as the indispensible man, and he - his resentments of Lincoln are phenomenal. He (McClellan) refers to him (Lincoln) as the original gorilla, a traitor or the tool of traitors.He believed that he should be in charge of the government, that Lincoln should defer to him, and he was outraged by Lincoln's refusal.

Slotkin on McClellan's Harrison Landing Letter:

And he really - McClellan in effect makes three important demands of Lincoln. First, that the administration reject any move against slavery, and the letter says in a kind of threatening way that if anything radical is done about slavery, the army itself will dissolve - that is, the soldiers will refuse to fight.

And the second thing he says, and this is kind of a legalistic point, but it's an important one, he says that a war of subjugation would be against the Constitution - that is, it's not - Lincoln can't treat the Southerners as rebels, that as the Southern territory is liberated from the Confederates, Southerners have to be restored to their political rights, so that no sooner are they liberated than ex-Confederates can start voting for Democrats.

And the third thing he says is that Lincoln should appoint a commander-in-chief - that is, a soldier commander-in-chief - and give him power to act essentially without interference from the political - from the civilian government. And it's stunning. Basically a defeated general is asking the president to give up his political power and surrender his own party's interest and platform to the platform and interests of the opposition.

McClellan on the Civil war - June 1864 at West Point

Stripped of all sophistry and side issues, the direct cause of the war, as it presented itself to the honest and patriotic citizens of the North, was simply this: Certain States, or rather, a portion of the inhabitants of certain States, feared, or professed to fear, that injury would result to rights and property from the elevation of a particular party to power. Although the Constitution and the actual condition of the Government provided them with a peaceable and sure protection against the apprehended evil, they prepared to seek security in the destruction of the Government, which could protect them, and in the use of force against the national troops holding the national forts. To efface the insult offered to our flag; to secure ourselves from the fate of the divided republics of Italy and South America; to preserve our Government from destruction; to enforce its just power and laws; to maintain our very existence as a nation -- these were the causes which impelled us to draw the sword. 
Rebellion against a government like ours, which contains the means of self-adjustment, and a pacific remedy for evils, should never be confounded with a revolution against despotic power, which refuses redress of wrongs. Such a rebellion cannot be justified upon ethical grounds, and the only alternatives for our choice are its suppression, or the destruction of our nationality. At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partizanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. It was in this cause and with these motives that so many of our comrades have given their lives, and to this we are all personally pledged in all honor and fidelity.
Shall such devotion as that of our dead comrades be of no avail? Shall it be said in after ages that we lacked the vigor to complete the work thus begun? That after all these noble lives freely given we hesitated, and failed to keep straight on until our land was saved? Forbid it heaven, and give us firmer, truer hearts than that...It must be the intention of the overruling Deity that his land, so long the asylum of the oppressed, the refuge of civil and religious liberty, shall again stand forth in bright relief, united, purified and chastened by our trials as an example and encouragement for those who desire the progress of the human race. It is not given to our weak intellects to understand the steps of Providence as they occur; we comprehend them only as we look back upon them in the far-distant Past. 
So is it now. We cannot unravel the seemingly tangled skein of the purposes of the Creator -- they are too high and far-reaching for our limited minds. But all history and His own revealed word teach us that his ways, although inscrutable, are ever righteous. Let us then honestly and manfully play our part; seek to understand and perform our whole duty; and trust unwaveringly in the beneficent God who led our ancestors across the sea, and sustained them afterward, amid dangers more appalling even than those encountered by His own chosen people in their great exodus. He did not bring us here in vain, nor has he supported us thus far for naught. If we do our duty and trust in Him, He will not desert us in our need; firm in our faith that God will save our country, we now dedicate this site to the memory of brave men, to loyalty, patriotism and honor.

McClellan - The best commander of the Army of the Potomac?

From Edmund Palfry's, "Antietam and Fredericksburg":

These pages contain many outspoken criticisms of his [McClellan] military career. They are the expression of conclusions arrived at with deliberation by one who began as a passionate enthusiast for him, who has made his campaigns the subject of much study and thought, and who has sought only to compare the facts of those campaigns with the established principles of the military art. There is no occasion to repeat those criticisms here, but it may be well to add to them what the writer has said in another place in print, that there was in McClellan a sort of incapacity of doing anything till an ideal completeness of preparation was reached, and that the prevalence of the commander-in-chief idea was always pernicious to him, so that, from first to last, he never made his personal presence felt on a battle-field. With the further remark that he seems to have been totally devoid of ability to form a just estimate of the numerical strength of his opponent, our adverse criticisms come to an end, and it is a relief to keep silence no longer from good words.

It is little to say that his character was reputable, but it is true. He was a courteous gentleman. Not a word was ever said against his way of life nor his personal integrity. No orgies disgraced headquarters while he was in command. His capacity and energy as an organizer are universally recognized. He was an excellent strategist and in many respects an excellent soldier. He did not use his own troops with sufficient promptness, thoroughness and vigor, to achieve great and decisive results, but he was oftener successful than unsuccessful with them, and he so conducted affairs that they never suffered heavily without inflicting heavy loss upon their adversaries

It may appear a strange statement to follow the other matter which this volume contains, but it is none the less true, that there are strong grounds for believing that he was the best commander the Army of the Potomac ever had. No one would think for a moment of comparing Pope or Burnside or Hooker with him. The great service which Meade rendered his country at Gettysburg, and the elevated character of the man, are adverse to too close a scrutiny of his military ability. As for Grant, with his grim tenacity, his hard sense, and his absolute insensibility to wounds and death, it may well be admitted that he was a good general for a rich and populous country in a contest with a poor and thinly peopled land, but let any educated soldier ask himself what the result would have been if Grant had had only Southern resources and Southern numbers to rely on and use, and what will the answer be? While the Confederacy was young and fresh and rich, and its armies were numerous, McClellan fought a good, wary, damaging, respectable fight against it. He was not so quick in learning to attack as Joe Johnston and Lee and Jackson were, but South Mountain and the Antietam showed that he had learned the lesson, and with longer possession of command, greater things might fairly have been expected of him. Not to mention such lamentable failures as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, it is easy to believe that with him in command, the Army of the Potomac would never have seen such dark days as those of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor.

At the same time it must be admitted that, in such a war as the War of Secession, it would probably have been impossible to retain in command of the Army of the Potomac a man who was not only a Democrat, but the probable Democratic candidate for the Presidency at the next election, and that his removal was therefore only a question of time. A growing familiarity with his history as a soldier increases the disposition to regard him with respect and gratitude, and to believe, while recognizing the limitations of his nature, that his failure to accomplish more was partly his misfortune and not altogether his fault.

Goerge McClellan Gives advice to Sherman on Military Education

During the summer while at Lancaster, Sherman wrote to several officers of the army with whom he had been associated, asking for their views on certain problems of military school organization. The following letter from Captain George B. McClellan is the only one that has been preserved. It was taken from the Seminary in 1864 by an officer of Gen. Banks's army and was returned to Louisiana State University in 1909. It bears the following endorsement by Sherman: "Capt. McC. went to Sebastopol and reported to our government. He spent more than a year in Austrian, Russian, and English camps and is a gentleman of singular intelligence."


GEORGE B. McCLELLAN TO W. T. SHERMAN

Illinois Central Railroad Company, Vice President's Office, Chicago, Oct. 23, 1859.

My DEAR SIR: I regret exceedingly that I have so long delayed replying to yours of the 3oth, ult. I hope this will reach you at Baton Rouge in time to serve your purposes, and must beg you to consider my rather multifarious duties as my excuse for the delay; in truth I was desirous of taking some little pains with my reply, and it has been difficult for me to find the time.

I think with you that the blue frock coat, and felt hat with a feather, with perhaps the Austrian undress cap, will be the most appropriate uniform, the grey coatee is rather behind the age.

If the academy is in the Pine Barrens, it would seem that the period from September 1 to June 20, with the two examinations you speak of, would answer every purpose. It would be almost impossible to have an encampment, I should suppose, yet you might in a very few days teach them how to pitch tents, and the more important parts of camp duty, such as guard duty, construction of field kitchens and ovens, huts for pioneers, etc.

You will find in Captain Marcy's new book The Prairie Traveller a great deal of invaluable information in reference to camps, taking care of animals, etc., on the prairies. I think you would find it worth while, if not to make it a text book, to require or advise to students to procure copies. It is a book they will read with great interest and profit-it fills a vacuum of no little importance.

I think I have at home the plates belonging to the French "Instruction pour 1'enseignement de la Gymnas- tique." This will give you all the information you need as to the appliances required for a gymnasium. The title is Instruction pour 1'enseignement de la Gymnas- tique dans les corps de troupes et les etablissements mil- itaire (Paris, I. Dumaine).

If my copy is lost I would advise you to import it. There is also a very good little work published by Dumaine, called Extrait de I'Instruction pour 1'enseignement de la Gymnastique, etc., par le Capitaine C. d'Argy.

In addition to the regular instruction in the infantry and artillery manuals, I would by all means have daily practice in the gymnasium, or fencing with the foil and bayonet, and the same exercise at least half an hour a day ought to be devoted to this.

With regard to the course of instruction necessary to lay the foundation for a thorough knowledge of engineering, I do not think that the general course at West Point can be materially improved upon. We have all felt the want of practical instruction on certain points when we left West Point-e.g. in the actual use of instruments, both surveying and astronomical, topography
and field sketches, railway engineering, etc. - but it is impossible to do everything in a limited time, and I would suggest that you follow in the main the West Point course, retrenching a little from some of the higher branches and adding a little to the practical instruction.

I know of no complete work on the construction of railways, it is thus far essentially a practical business. Collum and Holley's work on European Railways contains some valuable information. Lardner on the Steam Engine, Parbouron the Locomotive and Steam Engine, Collum on the Locomotive are all useful. Borden's Formulae for the Location and Construction of Railroads, Haupt on Bridge construction, Moseley's Mechanical Engineering, Edwin Clarke on the Brittania and Conway Tubular Bridges, Arolis series of Rudimentary treatise on Engineering, etc., are all of value.

I regret that I am rather pushed for time tonight, as I would have liked to write more fully, but I start for St. Paul in the morning and must do the best I can in a limited time. If I can give you any further information it will afford me great pleasure to do so at any time. With my best wishes for your success in Louisiana, I am very truly yours,

Geo. B. McCLELLAN.

How many men does Lee have? Sept 1862

The Governor of Pennsylvania tells McClellan Lee has 120,000 -200,000:

HARRISBURG, PA.,
September 10, 1862—10 a. in.
General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Rockville:

Your message received. I have letter from clergyman, dated Taney-
town, Md., Sunday night, in which he says:

"One of my elders, a reliable man, traveled 7 miles through their camps on Sunday. Their force around Frederick is not less than 120,000 men, and the part under Lee had not joined that army.He conversed with many officers and men. They appeared to believe:

Their whole army in Maryland would exceed 200,000 men, and their intention was to march either upon Harrisburg or Baltimore, probably the latter. Men ragged and filthy, but full of fight. Our news from Hagerstown is gooG- eneral White, at Martinsburg, reports all well. No enemy near Hagerstown or approaching in that direction. Confidence is being rapidly restored there."

From all we can learn, the enemy has selected his ground and massed his force near Frederick, to give you battle, the result of which will probably decide the future of our country.

A.G. CUBTIN, -
Governor of Pennsylvanta.

Franklin's Corps at 2nd Bull Run

Per Franklin in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War:

August 16th 2-August 24th

THE Sixth Corps left Harrison's Landing on the James River on August 16th, 1862, and arrived at Newport News on August 21st. On the 22d and 23d it embarked on transports for Aquia Creek. My impression is that Burnside's corps started first, landing at Aquia Creek; Porter's disembarked at Aquia Creek; Heintzelman's followed, landing at Alexandria; and the Sixth Corps followed Heintzelman's. As soon as I saw the infantry of the corps embarked at Newport News, leaving the chiefs of the quartermaster and subsistence departments and the chief of artillery to superintend the embarkation of the property for which they were responsible, with orders to hasten their departure to the utmost, I preceded the transports, and on Sunday, August 24th, about 2 o'clock, arrived at Aquia Creek, at which point I had orders to disembark and report to General McClellan. The wharves here were so encumbered with the artillery and stores that were already landed for the corps of Burnside and Porter, that McClellan directed me to have my corps landed at Alexandria, and to report upon my arrival to General Halleck.

August 24th PM Meets with Halleck
Still preceding the corps, I reported to General Halleck at "Washington, arriving there about 4 o'clock p. M. The city was as quiet as though profound peace reigned; no one was at General Halleck's office to whom I could report, and I found him at his house. He 'told me that he felt under no apprehension about Pope's position, and that he doubted whether it would be necessary for me to go to the front at all; that in any event I could be of no use until my artillery and horses arrived—instancing the fact that Burnside had been much crippled, and had done little good so far, on account of the absence of his artillery. He directed me to go into camp in front of Alexandria, and reorganize the corps as the artillery and transportation reached the camp.

August 25th and 26th Infantry Arrives
The infantry arrived on Monday and Tuesday, the 25th and 26th, but no artillery horses, except sixteen, had arrived on Wednesday night.

Tries to get Horese for artillery and Transport
The two division commanders and myself were constantly at work during this time, endeavoring to get horses. But we had no success, the answer to our demands always being that the teams then present were absolutely necessary to feed the troops in the forts from day to day, and that this duty was more important under the circumstances than that of providing transportation for artillery. Without transportation the artillery could not be used.

August 27th
On Wednesday, the 27th, news having arrived that the enemy was at Centreville, Taylor's brigade of Slocum's division was sent there on the cars of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to reconnoiter. It was received at the railroad bridge over Bull Run by a force of the enemy's artillery and infantry, and lost its gallant commander and many men. The brigade was withdrawn in safety in the face of a large force, four brigades of A. P. Hill's division, Jackson's corps. The order for this movement came from General Halleck.

August 28th
Thursday, the 28th, was employed in organizing such batteries as had arrived, with the horses, which now began to arrive slowly, and in attempting to collect a train for carrying provisions to General Pope's army. Little was accomplished, however.

August 29th and August 30th AM
On Friday, the corps was started to the front with orders to communicate with General Pope, and at the same time to guard his communications with Alexandria. On the arrival of the leading division, commanded by General W. F. Smith, at Annandale, ten miles to the front, its commander reported to me that fugitives were constantly coming in, and reported a large force of the enemy near Fairfax Court House, six miles distant. As he had with him only ten rounds of ammunition for each gun, he considered it prudent to await further orders. General McClellan, upon learning this state of things, directed me to stop at Annandale for the night, and proceed the next morning at 6.

During the night more ammunition and provision wagons were collected, numbering about one hundred, and as I was starting in the morning at the designated time I received orders to delay my start until 8:30 A. M., to protect the train so formed. When I arrived at Fairfax Court House I detached a brigade of General Slocum's division and one battery to take position to guard the point where the Little River Turnpike joins the Warrenton pike between Centreville and Alexandria. The detachment of this brigade had an important effect upon the after events of the campaign, as will appear. Proceeding onwards toward Centreville I received, at 1:30 P. M., an order from General McClellan, directing me to join General Pope at once.

August 30th PM- Arrives on Battlefield
The corps marched forward through Centreville toward Bull Run about three miles in front of Centreville, without stopping. Going to the front I found General Slocum's division formed across the road, in front of Cub Run, stopping what seemed to be an indiscriminate mass of men, horses, guns and wagons, all going pell-mell to the rear. As General Slocum expressed it, it was as bad as the Bull Run retreat of 1861. Officers of all grades, from brigadier-general down, were in the throng, but none of them exercised any authority. We gathered about three thousand in a yard near by. Presently a force of cavalry appeared to the left and front, about one mile off, and the fugitives, imagining that they were the enemy, ran to the rear as one man;—nothing could stop them."

Burnside and Lincoln - A Chronology

Lincoln and Burnside:

01) July 8th 1862 AM
Lincoln meets with Burnside at Ft Monroe on the way to Harrison Landing & McClellan.
02) July 9th 1862 PM
After reviewing the AoP at Harrison Landings Lincoln returns to Ft. Monroe on way to Washington DC - offers Burnside command of the Army of the Potomac - he refuses
03) July 23rd 1862
Burnside meets with Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and Pope at the WH to discuss strategy.
04) July 28th 1862
Lincoln meets with Burnside and Halleck at WH & reaches decision to withdraw AoP from the Peninsula.
05) Sept 5th, 1862
Burnside in Washington DC. meets with Halleck, Lincoln and McClellan - offered field command of AoP - he refuses.
06) Nov 5th 1862
Lincoln orders Burnside to Replace McCllellan in Command of AoP - Burnside at first refuses, then accepts when told the alternative is Hooker.
07) Nov 26th 1862
Lincoln travels alone to Aquia Creek and meets with Burnside to discuss the campaign.
08) Dec 20th 1862
Burnside meets with Lincoln at the WH
8) Dec 22nd 1862
Burnside meets again with Lincoln, Stanton attends.
09) Dec 29th 1862
Lincoln meets with AoP Generals who state Burnside is incompetent & must go.
10) Dec 30th 1862
Lincoln telegraphs Burnside not to move the army without his knowledge.
11) Dec 31st & Jan 1st 1863
Burnside meets with Lincoln at WH - offers to resign
12) Jan 8th 1863
Lincoln disapproves Burnside offer to resign
13) Jan 24th 1863
Burnside meets with Lincoln at WH - requests Hooker and other officers be relieved of command & if not, that he be allowed to resign his commission.
14) Jan 25th 1863
Halleck meets with Burnside relieves him of Command of the AoP - Burnside transferred to Department of Ohio. Hooker given command of AoP.

Hitchcock offered command Army of the Potomac - March 15 1862

FROM FIFTY YEARS IN CAMP AND FIELD BY ETHAN ALLEN HITCHCOCK:

At New York I finally determined to say by note to the Secretary Stanton that if, with his knowledge of my broken health, he might announce my acceptance of the commission and order me to report to him. That was done and I reached here this morning—March 15 [1862]. On reporting to the Secretary, almost without a word of preface he asked me if I would take McClellan's place in command of the army

of the Potomac!l I was amazed, and told him at once that I could not. He spoke of the pressure on the President, and said that he and the President had had the greatest difficulty in standing out against the demand that McClellan be removed.

" He then asked me if I would allow him to put me at the head of the Ordnance Department, and remove General R. This surprised me almost as much as the other offer, and was entirely unlike anything I had anticipated, and I declined.

" He then took me to President Lincoln and introduced me. I was civilly received. Secretary Seward was present and some despatches were read—reports from the army, etc.

"The President took a letter out of his pocket and read it as a sample, he said, of what he was exposed to. It was anonymous, marked ' urgent,' and called on him to ' remove the traitor McClellan'—using the most extravagant language of condemnation. Judge Blair, Postmaster-General, came in and asked for a brigadier-general's commission for a relation of his wife.

" I offered to go, but Mr. Lincoln detained me till the others went. He then expressed the wish to have the benefit of my experience: said he was the depository of the power of the government and had no military knowledge. I knew his time was important and shortly left him.

"Now—what is to come of this? I want no command. I want no department. I came to be at hand for ' contingent service,' and must adhere to my purpose. General Scott, whom I saw in New York, told me I could be very useful here. He even said that I ought to be in command of the army, but that that was now impossible.

" I urged the Secretary to extend General Halleck's command over the whole valley of the Mississippi, and this has been done at once, putting Buell under his orders.

" On the whole, I am uncomfortable. I am almost afraid that Secretary Stanton hardly knows what he wants, himself.2

Timeline - McClellan and re-inforcing Pope

All dates 1862

August 23rd - McClellan Leaves Fort Monroe

August 24th 6 am- McClellan arrives Aquia Creek. McClellan requests Halleck for news of Pope and for orders.

August 24rd - McClellan meets with Porter and Burnside at 12:15 PM. He learns that Pope has retreated from Rappahannock and that Porters Corps in near Fredericksburg. Later, McClellan telegrams Halleck & asks who commands Porter. Halleck replies that night - Porter is under the command of Pope, states he doesn't know where Pope is.

August 26th 11 am - Halleck telegrams McClellan& orders him to Alexandria and to leave Burnside in charge of Aquia Creek. Tells McClellan that Heintzlemann has joined Pope and Kearny is on his way.

August 26th, PM - Sumner Corps starts to disembarks at Aquia Creek


August 27th 6 am - McClellan arrives Alexandria and telegrams Halleck for orders. He has no idea what his command is or where Pope is.

August 27th 10 am - Halleck telegrams the McClellan will "take entire direction of sending troops out of Alexandria - Determine questions of priority of transportation and the places they should occupy."

August 27 115 PM - Halleck sends the following:

Telegrams from General Porter to General Buruside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sign], and Ricketts near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centreville.

August 29, 1862—12 PM (Received 12.8 p. in.)
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLEOK. General-in-Chief:
Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin’s
corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without
transportation.
GEG. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major- General,.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
Aleiandria Va., August 29, 1862—(Received 12.50 p. in.)
Major-General HALLECK, General-in- Chief:
Have ordered most of Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry ho report to
General Barnard for scouting duty toward liockville, Poolesville, &c.
If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river I had better
send a brigade or two of Sumner’s to near Tennallytown, where, with
two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch
both Chain Bridge and Tennallytown. Would it meet your views to
post the rest of Sumner’s corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran
where they can either sul)port Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, an~
even Tennallytown. Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready
for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

WASHINGTON, D.C., August 29, 1862—3 p. m.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
Your proposed disposition of Sumner’s corps seems to me judicious.
Of course I have no time to examine into details. The present danger
is a raid upon Washington in the night-time. Dispose of all troops as
you deem best. I want Franklin’s corps to go far enough to find out
something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at
Annandale as to prevent his going farther; otherwise he will push on
toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Mannannas,
either by telegram or through Franklin’s scouts. Our people must move
more actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.


WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
I think you had better place Sumner’s corps as it arrives near the
fortifications, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The l)rincipal thing
to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially iii the night-
time. Use Cox’s and Tyler’s brigades and the new troops for the same
object if you need them.
Porter writes to Burnside from Bristoe, 9.30 a. in. yesterday, that
Pope’s forces were then moving on Manassas and that Burnside would
soon hear of them by way of Alexandria.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
August 29, 1862—5.25 p. m~ (Received 5.38 p. in.)
Maj. Gen. II. XV. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
Before receiving the President’s message I had put Sumner’s corps
in motion toward Arlington and the Chain Bridge, not having received
no reply from you. The movement is still under your control in either
direction, though now under progress, as stated. I think that one of
two alternatives should be fully carried out.
GEG. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major- General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862—7.50 p. m.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
You will immediately send constructing trains and guards to repair
railroad to Manassas; let there be no delay in this. I have just been
told that Franklin’s corps stopped at Annandale, and that he was this
evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders; investi-
gate and report the facts of this disobedience. That corps must push
forward, as I directed, protect the railroad, and open our communica-
tions with Manassas.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
August 30, 1862�9.40 a. m.
Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria, Va.:
I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march of yester-
day. Considering the circumstances of the case, he was very~wrong in
stopping at Annandale. Moreover, I learned last Night that the Quar-
termaster's Department could have given him plenty of transportation,
if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He
knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope's
army, and should have acted more promptly.
II. W. HALLECK
General-in- Chief

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
August 30, 1862.
Maj. Gen. II. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was
to march from Alexandria he has been using every effort to get trans-
portation for his extra ammunition, but he was uniformly told by the
quartermasters here that there was none disposable, and his command
marched without wagons.*
After the departure of his corps, at 6 a. in. yesterday, he procured 20
wagons, to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of
General Banks' supply train for that purpose.
General Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, l)y application
upon quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons
to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was
obliged to march without it.
I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed
to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin; but
they will not go far toward supplying the deficiency.

Return to Bull Run - John Hennessy

This is probably the best book on the Battle of Second bull Run.

The battle which occurred in late August 1862 is mostly forgotten, sandwiched in between the Seven Days battle and Antietam which occurred 2 weeks later. G.F.R Henderson's has written the definitive account from the Confederate side, but no one has told the entire story in one book. Hennessy corrects the deficiency and focuses on the Union side and John Pope.

The first part of the book ( 125 pages) begins on August 10, 1862 and ends August 27, 1862. Hennessy describes the retreat of Pope to the Rappahannock line, the maneuvering of the armies, and Jackson's march to, and capture of, Manassas Junction. The remaining 330 pages cover the battle itself, Pope's retreat to Washington,. and relief on September 4th. The Bull Run campaign is analyzed in a 17 page epilogue.

I think his analysis is sound, except for the excessive criticism of every one's favorite Civil War punching bag - George McClellan. Echoing the Radical Republicans who wished his destruction Hennessy states McClellan must share with Halleck and Pope primary responsibility for the defeat. Hennessy accuses McClellan of:

• A plodding retreat from Harrison Landing thereby allowing Lee extra days to operate against Pope;
• Using every pretext and excuse not to give Pope aid while at Alexandria;
• Writing Vile things (about Pope) that put him a poor light;
• using invective that not only doomed Porter but led politicians to mistrust the AOP; and
• creating in the AOP a culture of conservatism, risk avoidance, and plodding reliability that hobbled the AOP for years.

Finally, to top it off, he calls McClellan's performance "one of the sorriest chapter in the history of war" and quotes Lincoln's quote to Chase on Sept 2, 1862, that "McClellan has behaved badly in this affair but we must use the tools we have".

The problem is that neither the ORR nor the book narrative supports this. In fact, McClellan played only a tiny role in the 2nd Battle of Bull Run. Until August 23rd he was on the Peninsula arranging the AOP's evacuation. From August 24-26 he at Aquia Creek doing nothing per orders. From August 27th -August 30th he was under Halleck's command at Alexandria both arranging the defenses and sending out troops. Finally, from 1 PM August 30, 1862 to September 4th he was merely in command of the Washington defenses.

The primary responsibility for the defeat lies first with Pope and secondarily with Halleck. Pope and Halleck made the same basic error - they tried to fight a battle with part of the army in transit and without adequate calvary or supplies. Both men underestimated Lee and were determined to show they were bold fighters - unlike McClellan. Sadly, the only thing worse then a overly cautious general is an bold reckless one.

Pope on McClellan

Message Pope to Halleck, September 3, 1862.
[Pope has just returned to Alexandria and is upset at McClellan's "Treachery"]

.
I do not exactly understand my status here. Will you ask the general, so I may know. Does McClellan command on this side of the river or do his functions only extend to designating the positions to be occupied by the troops arriving from Centreville? Everybody in this army considers him responsible for the failure to send forward Sumner and Franklin and Cox or anybody else, and for the inefficient condition in which they did arrive, without artillery and with only 40 rounds of ammunition. There is, and can be, no good feeling here under these circumstances. Beg the general, if nothing else can be done, to command himself. It is easy to do so from Washington, as the telegraph lines are all.

Message Pope to Halleck ,September 5, 1862.
[Pope has been relieved and informed McClellan in Charge]

DEAR GENERAL: I must again ask your attention to the condition of things in this army. By the present arrangement you are doing me more injury than my worst enemy could do. It is understood, and acted on, that I am deprived of my command, and that it is assigned to McClellan. An order defining his exact status here as well as my own is Necessary at once. I send you an official protest against his action.

Letter Pope to Halleck ,September 30, 1862.
[Pope writes Halleck from St. Paul MN, where is he was sent to fight Indians]

I begin, then, by saying that in my judgment every sense of justice and fair dealing, as well as a sense of deep personal obligation should have impelled you to sustain me against the machinations of McClellan and his parasites, knowing well, as you did, that the result of the late campaign in Virginia was directly due to the neglect of duty (to call it by no worse name) of these very men.

It may be, and doubtless was, true that considering the relations between myself and McClellan and many of his followers who held high commands in that army, it was better to change the commander of the armies around Washington, but this fact did not necessitate nor justify, in view of the facts in your possession, that McClellan should be thus advanced nor that I should be banished to a remote and unimportant command.

A great and fatal mistake for the country as for yourself was committed when he was thus assigned. If you had sustained me as I had every reason to expect, and did expect you would do, you would have had a warm and earnest friend, as I had always been. By yielding to and advancing McClellan you have only put into the hands of an enemy a club to beat your own brains out with. You can never be forgiven for occupying the place you do. You of course do not imagine McClellan to be your friend in any sense. Every motive a man can have he has to displace you from your position, which is a constant reproach and humiliation to him. Neither he nor his clique will omit any means to destroy you. Having at your own urgent request and from a sense of duty laid before the Government the conduct of McClellan, Porter, and Griffin, and substantiated the facts stated by their own written documents,

Letter Pope To Halleck October 20, 1862
[Pope's response to Halleck's reply to the 9-30-62 letter]

...Why are McClellan,, and Griffin retained in high commands with such charges of treachery and baseness hanging over them? Do you not believe these charges true? Are they not substantiated to your satisfaction by the papers attached to the report containing them? Did not both you and the President know before the battles at Manassas, from Porter’s intercepted dispatches, that he was likely to do precisely what he did? The President himself told me so. I would not care to press these charges if the Government would only do me the barest justice

It is now too late to set matters right by a court, which has been long enough delayed to allow the full impression to be made against me. You assume that I confine my charges to Porter and Griffin. My report tells another story. The greatest criminal is McClellan, and my charge is direct and lain against him.

You say that I “complain” that McClellan was placed in command of the army in Maryland. I think the expression misplaced. I said that facts in your possession did not “justify” it. He is under grave charges of neglect and abandonment of the Army of Virginia. He should never have been placed in command of anything under such circumstances. You know that he failed to do his duty, and I am glad that you deny having had anything to do with his assignment to that command.

Letter Pope to Halleck November 7, 1862
[Pope won't let go of the Bone and continues the correspondence]

...One of the great points made against me and ill favor of McClellan’s that he took an army which had been defeated and demoralized under my command and immediately marched against the same enemy and defeated him at South Mountain and Antietam. I presume it is unnecessary to tell you that the only troops of the Potomac Army which ever drew triggers under my command were the army corps of Heintzelman and Porter, and the Reserves, under Reynolds, numbering, all told, about 21,000 men. Of these one-half was commanded by Porter, who did nothing. lleintzelman, Sigel, and Banks were left in the entrenchments’ at Washington. McDowell’s corps, numbering about11,000, and Porter’s corps, unhurt by any actions or operations under my command, were the only portions of the force ever engaged with me that McClellan took with him. They did not number over 21,000 all told, of whom Porter’s whole corps was kept carefully out of action inMaryland.• Of a piece with this falsehood is the one stating that I had lost numbers01 wagons, &c.; utterly and wholly false. My wagon trains were always out of the way and the enemy at no time pressed upon me. No wagons were reported lost to me except some 20 or 30, broken-down, between Centreville and Fairfax Court-House, which I sent back for on Tuesday morning whilst my whole force was at Fairfax Court-House. A report of the quartermaster- in charge will exhibit this, and ought to accompany the official reports of corps commanders.

I say to you, in all views, that unless the Government would have great embarrassment in the future, the whole of McClellan’s career should be laid bare. The overt act at Alexandria, during the engagements near Centreville, can be fully substantiated by letters from many officers since I have been here, it is quite certain that my defeat was predetermined, and I think you must now be conscious of it. You remember that I expressed to you before I entered Virginia my conviction that McClellan would not co-operate with me, nor in factwith any other man, under such circumstances.

Sherman on George McClellan

Letter To his wife (October 1864)
You ask my opinion of McClellan. I have been much amused at similar inquiries of John and others in answer to a news paragraph that I pledged ninety-nine of the hundred to McClellan. Of course this is the invention of some knave. I never said such thing.

I will vote for nobody, because I am not entitled to vote. Of the two, with the inferences to be drawn at home and abroad, I would prefer Lincoln, though I know that McClellan, Vallandigham or even Jeff Davis if President of the U. S. would prosecute the war, and no one with more vigor than the latter.

But at the time the howl was raised against McClellan I knew it was in a measure unjust, for he was charged with delinquencies that the American people are chargeable for. Thus, how unjust to blame me for any misfortune now when all the authorities and people are conspiring to break up the Army till the election is over. Our armies vanish before our eyes and it is useless to complain because the election is more important than the war. Our armies are merely paper armies. I have 40,000 Cavalry on paper but less than 5,000 in fact.

A like measure runs through the whole, and so it was with McClellan. He had to fight partly with figures. Still I admit he never manifested the simple courage and manliness of Grant, and he had too much staff, too many toadies, and looked too much to No. 1. When I was in Kentucky he would not heed my counsels, and never wrote me once, but since I have gained some notoriety at Atlanta and the papers announced, as usually falsely, that I was for him, he has written me twice and that has depreciated him more in my estimation than all else. He cannot be elected. Mr. Lincoln will be, but I hope it will be done quick, that voters may come to their regiments and not give the Rebels the advantage

Report of General Franklin on 2nd battle of Bull Run

Report of Gem William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth
Army Corps, of operations August 30.

CENTREVILLE, August 30 8.15 p. m.

GENERAL: I have opened your dispatch of 2 p. in. to General Pope.
1 arrived at the field this afternoon at 6 o'clock. Found that the road
was filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, all leaving the field
iii a panic. It was a scene of terrible confusion, and I immediately
formed line of battle across the road an(1 attempted to stop and form
the stragglers. It was impossible to succeed in this, the number be-
coining over 7,000 in less than half an hour. The number continued to
increase until I left the position, and I have now moved my corps to
this place. The panic, from the accounts I have had of it, appears un-
accountable. The men are from several divisions. Our left was broken
and turned. I shall make this place as defensible as possible, but my
march to-day has linen 20 miles.

I was unable to find General Pope on the field, but I understand that
he changed his position several times.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major- General, Commanding.
 General H. XV. HALLECK,
Commander-in- Chief.


No. 117.

Itinerary of the First Division, Sixth Army Corps, Brig. Gen. Henry W.
Slocum commanding, August 16 31. *

August 16, broke camp at Harrison's Landing and marched to Charles
City Court-House, 7 miles.
August 17, marched to and crossed the Chickahoininy at Barrett�s
Ford, 14 miles.
August 18, marched to Simpson's house, Williamsburg, 15 miles.
August 19, marched to Yorktown, 12 miles.
August 20, marched to Young's Mill,14 miles.
August 21, marched to Newport News, 9 miles.
August 22 and 23, embarked on transports for Aquia Creek.
August 24, arrived and debarked at Alexandria, Va.
August 27, the First Brigade moved from encampment near Alex-
Alexandria by rail to Bull Run Bridge. Marched across Bull Run Bridge,
and met a large force of the enemy, under General Jackson, 2 miles
beyond, and was soon forced by vastly superior numbers to retire under
a galling fire from the enemy's artillery. Marched back the same after-
noon to FairfaxCourt-House. The loss in killed, wounded, and missing
in the engagement was very severe. Among those wounded was Gen-
eral George W. Taylor, who subsequently died of wounds then received.
August 29, the division left camp near Alexandria, and marched to
Annandale, on the Little River pike, about 7 miles.
August 30, marched, via Fairfax Court-House and Centreville, to-
ward Bull Run, and just at evening formed line of battle across the
Warrenton pike, beyond Cub Run, to stop the stragglers that were
then coming from the battle-field. Remained in position there all
night, until the army had all retired. Marched this day about 18 miles.
August 31, fell back to Centreville and took position in the fortifica-
tions.

McClellan and Pope

One of the myths of the Civil War is that McClellan dragged his retreat from the Peninsula and refused to help Pope During the 2nd Battle of Bull Run. There is no evidence to support this claim which is found in almost every popular book on the campaign. The usual quote is that McClellan "told Lincoln that Pope would have to get out the scrape himself". Here is the actual full quote from the ORR:

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862—2.30 p. m.
What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?
A. LINCOLN.
Major-General MCCLELLAN.

McClellan replied as follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
August 29, 1862—2.45 p. m.

The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable.

I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.

No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President.

Lincoln Replied:

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862—4.10 p. m.
Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, “to concen-
trate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,” is the right one, but
I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.
A. LINCOLN.
Major-General MCCLELLAN.