Americans and the past - Robert E. Lee: Reading the Man

I was going to write a book review of "Reading the Man: A Portrait of Lee" by Elizabeth Pryor - but found that 'William Vallante' at Amazon.com had said everything I wanted to say:

"There is indeed a certain childish willfulness in the American mind that insists on chastising the people of the past for not being like them, or else pretending that they were. Which is a certain way NOT to learn anything from history." ---Dr. Clyde Wilson

"Put it this way - if you are the type of person Dr. Wilson is describing, you're going to love this book! If not, you'll be wishing you had paid for it in Confederate bills instead of U.S. dollars.

The book itself contains roughly 175 pages of footnotes, bibliography and index. There are 50 pages of actual letters, some of which have already been published and others of which are not even by Lee, but by other people. If you're planning on seeing 500 pages of newly discovered letters, forget it. The fewer than 50 pages of new letters by Lee himself will leave you grossly disappointed. Finally, we have 425 pages of Ms. Pryor's perseverative and monotonous interpretations of those letters, which I suppose is the "meat" of the book.

According to Ms. Pryor, Lee did not release the Custis slaves immediately. The terms of the will specified "within 5 years" of the elder Custis' death (in 1857). Lee fulfilled that mandate by manumitting them in 1862. This apparently wasn't satisfactory enough for Ms. Pryor as she repeatedly drones on about Lee's failure to understand how the slaves felt.

Ms. Pryor is also critical of Lee for expecting the slaves to actually work!? Oh horror! Oh horror!

Of course, there is the matter of several slaves being whipped by Lee, something which has never been conclusively proven. Like a second rate shyster, Ms. Brown does her best to drum up the case against him.

According to Ms. Pryor, Lee had no appreciation of other cultures and saw nothing worthwhile in the Mexican culture when he was there during the Mexican war. I'm wondering what Pryor expected Lee, an educated, well-to-do man from one of Virginia's first families, to say when he was in Mexico? "Gee! What lovely mud huts!?" I'm pretty sure that Mexico didn't have Grand Melia and Paradisus or any other resorts at that time, so I can't figure out what Ms. Pryor expected him to see in the place? I suppose to understand her reasoning, or her expectations, one would have to refer back to Dr. Wilson's quote above.

Also, according to Ms. Pryor, Lee had "poor cross cultural communications skills", a term apparently taken from today's lexicon of multicultural drivel. In this case she was referring to his "communication", or lack of it, with the Comanches. I ran this past a native American friend of mine and he almost fell over laughing. I'm not sure there were too many folks at the time who had good cross cultural communication skills with the Comanches of that era, as this particular group wasn't usually given to such things themselves. Would that it were possible to transport Ms. Pryor back in time to the 1850s and observe how her "skills" with the Comanches would fare? I would be taking bets on how long she kept her pretty blond hair.

In sum, this book, touted though it is by most "contemporary" historians, is one more example of the sham that has become what we used to call, "the field of history".

Exports Unimportant in US growth 1929-1970

How often I've read some "economist" say something like this:

Our 40's and 50's economic hay-day was never going to last, the whole of the industrialized world was leveled EXCEPT America and we were the only place the rest of the world had to go both for the products they needed and the capital goods to rebuild their own industries. Definitely a good position to be in, but not one likely to be replicated or even maintained unless we want to start a new world war and level all the productive capacity Germany, Eastern Europe, India, S.E. Asia, Mexico, etc. (I don't think that would work out so well for us) We had a remarkable run of good luck...

The problem is - this is completely wrong. If you look at the historical statistics, you'll see that US Exports to the rest of the world (excluding Canada) were a minor factor in our economic growth. Here are the numbers:

1929:
US GNP -$100 billion
Merchandise Exports** - $4 Billion
Exports To Canada - $1 billion
US Budget - $4 Billion

1940
GNP - $100 Billion
Merchandise Exports ** - $4 Billion
Exports To Canada - $700 Million
US Budget - $10 Billion

1950
GNP - $285 Billion
Merchandise Exports ** - $7 Billion
Exports To Canada - $2 Billion
US Defense Budget - $24 Billion

1960
GNP - $564 Billion
Merchandise Exports** - $15 Billion
Exports To Canada - $4 Billion
US Defense Budget - $53 Billion

1970
GNP - $1,000 Billion
Merchandise Exports** - $35 Billion
Exports To Canada - $9 Billion

US Defense Budget - $95 Billion

** = excludes crude raw materials and food.

As shown above, from 1929 to 1970 our GNP increased from by almost $900 Billion dollars from approximately $100 Billion to $1,000 Billion. Our Merchandise exports increased from $4 billion to $35 Billion. Our Merchandise exports to the rest of the world (excluding Canada) increased from $3 Billion to $24 Billion.

So to recap. from 1929 to 1970 - US GNP increases $900 Billion, US Manufacturing exports (less Canada) increase by $21 Billion. That's 2 Percent of the increase. Even in 1970 our Merchandise Exports amounts to only $200 per person. Meanwhile, we were spending almost $1,000 a person just on the US Defense Budget.

Civil War Executions

Total Union executions during the war 267. For the following:

• Murder - 64
• Desertion - 159
• Rape -22
• Mutiny - 18
• Spying & Other - 13

Executions for desertion only occurred in the last two years of the war. Accordingly to Alotta only 3 Union soldiers were executed for Desertion from April 1861-April 1863. Further, execution *merely* for desertion from May 1863-April 1865, seem to have been fairly rare. Usually those executed had deserted before, committed a crime while AWOL, resisted arrest, were bounty jumpers, substitutes, or were caught deserting to the enemy. The Bounty jumpers executed in the last year of the war seemed to have been almost all foreign, with a large number of Canadians involved.

Since only 159 of the estimated 80,000 deserters were executed it seems that Union officials were using it as a deterrent.

There's also an interesting geographical disparity in the executions. Soldiers from the Middle-west were much more likely NOT to be executed. While the Midwest (Wisconsin (1), Iowa (o), Minnesota (0), Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio) furnished approximately 1/3 of the men for the union army, only 10 percent (25 of the 267 executed) were from those states. OTOH, Vermont & New Hampshire, with a large number of Canadians Bounty jumpers and foreign substitutes furnished only 2 percent of the Union troops but had 21 men executed.

Scott Adams - internet debates

Adams also offers these helpful internet debate tactics (see also his Reading Comprehension Test to show that someone is stupid:

Results Of Why I'm Stupid

If you are new to the Internet, allow me to explain how to
debate in this medium. When one person makes any kind of
statement, all you need to do is apply one of these methods to
make it sound stupid. Then go on the offensive.

1. Turn someone's generality into an absolute. For example, if
someone makes a general statement that Americans celebrate
Christmas, point out that some people are Jewish and so anyone
who thinks that ALL Americans celebrate Christmas is stupid.
(Bonus points for accusing the person of being anti-Semitic.)

2. Turn someone's factual statements into implied preferences.
For example, if someone mentions that not all Catholic priests
are pedophiles, accuse the person who said it of siding with
pedophiles.

3. Turn factual statements into implied equivalents. For
example, if someone says that Ghandi didn't eat cows, accuse the
person of stupidly implying that cows deserve equal billing with
Gandhi.

4. Omit key words. For example, if someone says that people
can't eat rocks, accuse the person of being stupid for
suggesting that people can't eat. Bonus points for arguing that
some people CAN eat pebbles if they try hard enough.

5. Assume the dumbest interpretation. For example, if someone
says that he can run a mile in 12 minutes, assume he means it
happens underwater and argue that no one can hold his breath
that long.

6. Hallucinate entirely different points. For example, if
someone says apples grow on trees, accuse him of saying snakes
have arms and then point out how stupid that is.

7. Use the intellectual laziness card. For example, if someone
says that ice is cold, recommend that he take graduate courses
in chemistry and meteorology before jumping to stupid
conclusions that display a complete ignorance of the complexity
of ice.

McClellan - The best commander of the Army of the Potomac?

From Edmund Palfry's, "Antietam and Fredericksburg":

These pages contain many outspoken criticisms of his [McClellan] military career. They are the expression of conclusions arrived at with deliberation by one who began as a passionate enthusiast for him, who has made his campaigns the subject of much study and thought, and who has sought only to compare the facts of those campaigns with the established principles of the military art. There is no occasion to repeat those criticisms here, but it may be well to add to them what the writer has said in another place in print, that there was in McClellan a sort of incapacity of doing anything till an ideal completeness of preparation was reached, and that the prevalence of the commander-in-chief idea was always pernicious to him, so that, from first to last, he never made his personal presence felt on a battle-field. With the further remark that he seems to have been totally devoid of ability to form a just estimate of the numerical strength of his opponent, our adverse criticisms come to an end, and it is a relief to keep silence no longer from good words.

It is little to say that his character was reputable, but it is true. He was a courteous gentleman. Not a word was ever said against his way of life nor his personal integrity. No orgies disgraced headquarters while he was in command. His capacity and energy as an organizer are universally recognized. He was an excellent strategist and in many respects an excellent soldier. He did not use his own troops with sufficient promptness, thoroughness and vigor, to achieve great and decisive results, but he was oftener successful than unsuccessful with them, and he so conducted affairs that they never suffered heavily without inflicting heavy loss upon their adversaries

It may appear a strange statement to follow the other matter which this volume contains, but it is none the less true, that there are strong grounds for believing that he was the best commander the Army of the Potomac ever had. No one would think for a moment of comparing Pope or Burnside or Hooker with him. The great service which Meade rendered his country at Gettysburg, and the elevated character of the man, are adverse to too close a scrutiny of his military ability. As for Grant, with his grim tenacity, his hard sense, and his absolute insensibility to wounds and death, it may well be admitted that he was a good general for a rich and populous country in a contest with a poor and thinly peopled land, but let any educated soldier ask himself what the result would have been if Grant had had only Southern resources and Southern numbers to rely on and use, and what will the answer be? While the Confederacy was young and fresh and rich, and its armies were numerous, McClellan fought a good, wary, damaging, respectable fight against it. He was not so quick in learning to attack as Joe Johnston and Lee and Jackson were, but South Mountain and the Antietam showed that he had learned the lesson, and with longer possession of command, greater things might fairly have been expected of him. Not to mention such lamentable failures as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, it is easy to believe that with him in command, the Army of the Potomac would never have seen such dark days as those of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor.

At the same time it must be admitted that, in such a war as the War of Secession, it would probably have been impossible to retain in command of the Army of the Potomac a man who was not only a Democrat, but the probable Democratic candidate for the Presidency at the next election, and that his removal was therefore only a question of time. A growing familiarity with his history as a soldier increases the disposition to regard him with respect and gratitude, and to believe, while recognizing the limitations of his nature, that his failure to accomplish more was partly his misfortune and not altogether his fault.

Dr. Fleming on General Sherman

From a response to a comment in "Chronicles Magazine" in 2008:

" I wrote as I did in the belief that you are a decent man who has been victimized by modern education.

Yes, I am saying Sherman was no better than Bomber Harris, indeed, far worse, because his criminal campaign of mass looting, burning, and raping was not aimed at a national enemy against whom his country had fought a few decades earlier in a terrible war but against people whom he had known, his fellow Americans. How many civilians died as a result of the Union’s decision to make war on civilians? No one knows but most estimates I have read are in excess of the roughly 600,000 military deaths. The majority were black, some of them killed in cold blood because they became an annoyance as they followed the troops, but most from the starvation that followed the destruction of an agrarian economy. I am not at all an expert in these matters and have only done casual reading except in certain regions, such as South Carolina and Missouri. Some jackass keeps on writing in to complain about Quantrill, an Ohioan whose deeds were not known to the Confederate commanders. But the deliberate murders, lootings, and ethnic cleansing committed by, for example, General Thomas Ewing, whose General Order #11 is so tragically portrayed by George Caleb Bingham, a unionist (if memory serves.) Read up on why Cole Younger joined up with Quantrill, after the Yankees tortured his father to death simply because he would not tell them where he had hidden his money or read WG Simms’ meticulous account of how Sherman burned Columbia, SC and the outrages committed by the troops and by vicious scoundrels like Black Jack Logan of Illinois, or look up the sack of Athens Alabama (in which women of both races were raped), the perpetrator of which, a lunatic Cossack colonel, although condemned by a court martial was reinstated and promoted by Lincoln. But why go on? The Union attitude is summed up by Phil Sheridan, later as an observer of the Franco-Prussian War. Though most Europeans had condemned France for starting the conflict, opinion shifted when the Prussians brutally besieged Paris. This was not enough for Sheridan, who shocked the Prussians by telling them how he and his boys used to manage these things. They should be left with nothing but their eyes, to weep with, he told the astonished Prussians.

What was the South guilty of? The decision to leave a union that had become odious to them after 3 generations, a union for which southerners had fought and died for disproportionately. Say, if you like, that they had reached the wrong conclusion or a conclusion you do not like, but Lincoln refused all negotiation and deliberately provoked a war, as he said he did, in attempting to reinforce Ft. Sumter. The result was the most terrible war of the 19th century.

Lee’s father was a hero of the revolution; his wife was the descendant of Martha Custis Washington, their 17th century plantation Arlington an almost sacred memorial of our nation’s first first lady was confiscated by the vile union government out of pure meanness. They locked up poor President Davis in a cold damp cell and would not permit his wife to provide warm clothing–they hoped he would die because they knew they could not put him on trial without incurring the censure of the civilized world. Or, read sometime about what the union did in the siege of Charleston, the most beautiful and civilized city in North America. (Milby Burton’s book, by the way, is excellent). But every part of the South has tales to tell, not legends, but documented cases of looting, arson, rape, and murder.

That most Southerners no longer care much about the systematic atrocities ordered by the union government and carried out by its armies is not so much a sign that they have forgiven the north as that they have been victimized by a Northern system of government education that has made them as ignorant as anyone in Illinois. But I hope you will understand why Southerners–all too few–who do remember find the platitudes of the History Channel or Ken Burns just a little offensive. To defend Lincoln and condemn the South is a little like telling the Ukrainians that Hitler was right. There was a time when good men in the South made common cause with their counterparts in the North and preferred not to speak too plainly about the late unpleasantness, but with the Civil Rights Revolution that once again subjected southern states to Reconstruction and with the growing smugness and hypocrisy of northerners who praise Lincoln and condemn slavery–the mote in their Southern neighbors’ eyes–and refuse to take note of the beam in their own–a pointless and criminal war– some young men feel they have had enough.

Not all northerners were evil; many were indifferent to the War or opposed it, and of those who supported it, some thought it should have been fought honorably. There is no point in demonizing all “Yankees.” But the new style of national history is giving the South much the same message as a sheriff is said to have given to women facing rape: Don’t fight it; just roll over and enjoy it."

General Hooker on Sherman - Part III

December 8th 1864

Dear Senator Wilson;

Generals Sherman and Sheridan, I am informed, have been nominated to the Senate for commissions of major-general in the regular army, while I am their senior as a brigadier. This is an outrage to me, and would be so pronounced by nine-tenths of the army were they allowed a free expression of their opinion.

No matter what the newspapers may say to the contrary, no officer high in command has been more unfortunate than Sherman, and this moment he is engaged in a raid which will tend to prolong the war, when he had it in his power to have, utterly destroyed Hood's army. At the time he cut loose from Atlanta, Hood was on the north side of the Tennessee River, but instead of marching for him, he chose to march from him. Blows, not marches, are to kill the rebellion. It is our duty to look after the rebel armies, and not territory, for that will come when the military power of the rebels is broken. Sherman's present raid will be likely to resemble in its results that of last winter to Meridian, in which he suffered much more than his adversary. We will, however, hope for the best. Whatever was gained by the campaign of Atlanta, all will admit was abandoned when he quit Atlanta, undoing at the close of the year what he had gained at the beginning. As regards the campaign of Atlanta, considering the relative strength of the forces and the means of each, taken in connection with the field of operations, the rebellion has presented no such opportunity for the display of generalship, and yet how badly improved. We merely crowded back an enemy inferior to us as one to three, instead of annihilating him, as we bad many opportunities to do. No campaign of ours is open to more severe criticism, and if it has hitherto escaped, it has been for the reason that the political condition of the country did not justify it; it was barren of fruit, but prolific in deeds of the noblest heroism on the part of the troops. Sherman is active and intelligent, but so devoid of judgment that it is actually unsafe to trust an army to his command. 1 know of what I am writing. If he is not flighty, I never saw a flighty man

Sheridan has just been made a brigadier, and now I hear he is named for a major-generalcy for Cedar Run. I have no disposition to disparage his conduct on this field, but how many times would I have been advanced had my conduct been regarded with equal favor? I have no objection to his being rewarded, but not at my expense, when I have had ten fields to his one, and acknowledged by my companions to have been a fighting general on all of them. What does it mean, then, Senator, that these indignities are crowded upon me? I am informed that Grant will never forgive me for taking Lookout Mountain, although assaulted in obedience to his orders; but the trouble was, I was too successful. But can it be possible that the President of the United States will adopt the opinions of the lieutenant-general in regard to men and war as his standard, by which he shall award the rewards and punishments of service? Is it possible that he should not be fully understood after the operations of this summer? If not, be assured, Senator, after four years of war all the high places of the army will be filled with men of medium ability, unless the Senate should interpose to prevent it. Every day one is made to blush at the ignorance which prevails in regard to the war, and this will continue to be the case until we can have a national organ, controlled by the highest intelligence of the land, to enunciate the truth in regard to passing events. Our people read newspapers to avoid thinking, and hence it is not surprising that they should often appear to great disadvantage. But I am wandering from my subject.

General Hooker on Sherman - Part II

From a Letter to Senator Wade

December 13th 1864:

"As for Sherman, no man occupying his position has been more unfortunate. His attack on Vicksburg in 1801 [1862] was a failure; his attack on Mission Ridge was a terrible repulse; Ids campaign to Meridian early this year was worse than a failure; and in his campaign of Atlanta, (considering his men, means, and field of operations, the most splendid opportunity for the display of generalship the rebellion has presented) he succeeded in pushing back the enemy, inferior to him as one to three, and even that advantage he abandoned in cutting.loose from Atlanta to run away from his adversary, instead of toward him. Now Hood is investing Nashville, occupying a position he held two years ago, after two years of campaigning to drive him into the interior. You and I know that the rebellion is dead when its military power is destroyed, and not until then; it is to be killed by blows, not marches; and, after an experience of four years, it does seem as if we ought to know this fact. Had Sherman marched against Hood, there was no earthly reason why he should escape; I hope that he will not now. Sherman is crazy; be has no more judgment than a child; and yet it is with such men that the high places of the army are being filled. Grant is determined to have no officer of ability near him in rank. Unless the Senate should interpose, our armies will be more and more feebly commanded as the war progresses. The absolute want of a just standard by which to award the rewards and punishments of service has tended more than any other one fact to prevent the army from arriving at that excellence in discipline and that success in battle we had the right and reason to expect. With a proper appreciation of merit on the part of the civil and military authorities in rebeldom, they have made an army inferior in number and inferior in character equal to if not superior to our own."

"Of my campaigns in the West last fall and the present year but little is known, except by those actually present, for the reason that a studied effort has been made by Generals Grant and Sherman to keep me in the background. I understand that I incurred the displeasure of the lieutenant-general in my assault of Lookout Mountain, and although it was made with strict conformity to his orders, that I cannot have his forgiveness. It was too successful; I carried away the honors, when he intended that 1 should be a spectator to Sherman's operations. In the campaign of this summer under Sherman it was the fortune of the Twentieth Corps, which 1 commanded, to do the heavy work, and it was accomplished in a manner that extorted the applause of all the armies. They became so partial to me that Sherman offered me a professional and personal indignity, which he knew would drive me from the army, and it was permitted to be done by the President of the United States. When McPherson fell, Sherman took Howard, my junior, an officer who cannot make himself felt on the field of battle, and assigned him to the command of that army, when the rumor that I was to have, it was received with expressions of great joy from one end of the line to the other. The dissatisfaction of the troops at this continues to this day."

"For the private part of the indignity, it would have given me. the greatest satisfaction to have broken my saber over the head of Sherman; for the professional part, I could but make application to be removed from that army. Every one understood the cause, and every one appreciated and approved of my withdrawal. During that entire campaign, Schofield, an officer unknown to the war, was in command of the Army of the Ohio, and McPherson, another of my juniors, exercised the command of the Army of the Tennessee. Such was my feeling of degradation, or humiliation, that I saw no day on that campaign that I would not have withdrawn from the service in disgust, could I have done so with justice to myself and the cause in which I was engaged. I could die, but I could not commit suicide. On coming East a new command was just about to be sent up the Potomac River, and it was given to Sheridan, a new man; but it was thought better to experiment with him, than give it to one who had won and sustained the character of "Fighting Joe" in all the armies. Sheridan was first made a brigadier-general for comparatively nothing, and now for his fight at Cedar Creek they are attempting to push him forward in an unprecedented "manner, over my head, to a major-generalcy. Understand me, I do not wish to underestimate his conduct in his last battle; but who will say, as a feat of arms, that it was to be compared with Lookout Mountain, or Peach Tree Creek, the 20th of July last? In this last fight my adversary outnumbered me two to one: in his the disparity of forces was the same, but in his favor.Every word I write you is true. Then let me ask again, why is all this? To avoid the trouble and responsibilities of the wart does the President surrender everything to General Grant? Is be willing, in his desire to have an easy time, that injustice of the most monstrous character should be visited upon subordinates? My blood curdles to think of it. You probably have taken the measure of General Grant before this; if you have not, you will soon have an opportunity."

General hooker on Meade

From his December 1863 letter to Secretary Chase:

"It appears to me that our people have it in their hands to make it of longer or shorter duration. I am glad to see that an effort is being made to merge the volunteers and regulars. This should have been done at the beginning of the war. In fact, there is no difference now; it only exists in theory. I know that I accepted my commission of brigadier-general in the army reluctantly, and only for the reason that it was tendered me in compliment for services. I have since had occasion to regret it many times, for it has only been an instrument of self-degradation to me ever since. Officers who had no commissions in the regular service have jumped me, while in the assignment of commands it has never been considered. If my services in this rebellion do not merit reward, they certainly have been such as should shield me from punishment. Many of my juniors are in £he exercise of independent commands, while I am here with more rank piled on top of me than a well man can stand up under, with a corporal's guard, comparatively, for a command. You cannot wonder, then, at the sincerity of my desire for the war to be brought to an end irrespective of the country and the cause. I see that they are pitching into Meade on all sides. I lost my confidence in him when he allowed Lee to escape. I thought well of him as a corps commander, and never doubted but that he would do as well with the responsibilities of an army upon him. He is a small craft, and carries no ballast. "

General Hooker on Sherman

From a letter to Secretary Chase on the Battle of Chattanooga:

Headquarters Eleventh And Twelfth Corps, Lookout Valley, Tenn., December 28, 1863.

"That day I crossed Lookout, and the night of that day and the following morning Sherman crossed the Tennessee with his command. Those that crossed first took possession of high ground, and commenced throwing up defenses, the enemy doing the same thing on a continuation of the same ridge, a broad ravine or depression dividing them. The morning found the former with one line and the latter with two lines of hastily thrown-up defenses, not so long, however, but that they could readily be turned either to the right or the left. Sherman attacked them in front and was repulsed, and only abandoned it after the fourth trial; not, however, until he had carried the advanced line, but with losses more severe than those experienced by that officer in his attacks on Vicksburg, the 28th and 29th of December, 1862. The enemy's supports were placed behind his second line, and on that was placed his main reliance. All of Sherman's attacks were made long after I had carried Lookout, which had enabled me to command the enemy's defenses across Chattanooga Valley, and which my success had compelled him to abandon. This placed me on the direct line to cut off his retreat, while Sherman, had he been successful, could only have pushed him back over the only line he had to retreat on. This attack on the left, after I had taken Lookout, which was well known to all the army, can only be considered in the light of a disaster.

Sherman is an active, energetic officer, but in judgment is as infirm as Burnside. He will never be successful. Please remember what I tell you. It was natural for Grant to feel partial to his old companions, and do all in his power to enhance their renown. Nevertheless, you will appreciate my nervousness in being placed in the situation in which this partiality was manifested, almost wholly at my expense. I will do Grant the justice to believe that he was honestly of the opinion that the plan he adopted was the most likely to insure success to our arms. He aimed for the battle- to commence and end on the left, while it commenced and ended on the right. I am informed that he has since said, "Damn the battle; I had nothing to do with it."

General Hooker on General Lee

From John Hay's Journals:

September 1863

— I dined to-night at Willard's. ... Speaking of Lee [Hooker] expressed himself slightingly of Lee's abilities. He says he was never muchrespected in the army. In Mexico he was surpassed by all his lieutenants. In the cavalry he was held in no esteem. He was regarded very highly by General Scott. He was a courtier, and readily recommended himself by his insinuating manner to the General [Scott], whose petulant and arrogant temper had driven of late years all officers of spirit and self-respect away from him.

"The strength of the Rebel army rests on the broad shoulders of Longstreet. He is the brain of Lee, as Stonewall Jackson was his right arm. Before every battle he had been advised with. After every battle Lee may be found in his tent. He is a weak man and little of a soldier. He naturally rests on Longstreet, who is a soldier born."

When we recall that only four months earlier Hooker, having been beaten at Chancellorsville, boasted of successfully withdrawing his army across the river from Lee's army, which was not pursuing, we shall find more humor in his depreciation of Lee than he intended. From the frankness with which Hooker and the others talked to Hay we may be justified in suspecting that they thought they might through him reach the President. Lincoln, who never failed to give a man credit for his good qualities, remarked to Hay, "Whenever trouble arises I can always rely on Hooker's magnanimity."

The West Point Class of 1846

This is the West Point class that the stars fell upon, much like the WP Class of 1915 (Ike, Bradley, etc.). Out of the 59 Graduates, 8 become Confederate Generals, and 10 became Union ones. The three most famous were Stonewall Jackson, McClellan (2nd in his class), Pickett (The Class Goat ranked 59th). The graduates of the class '46 were the perfect age for Civil war Generals, most were in their mid 30s when the war began. Still young enough for combat - but old enough to handle high command.

Some other facts:

• Of the 59 Graduates, 18 were dead by 1861. Six had died in the Mexican War, three were killed by Indians and astounding (by 21st century standards) 9 out 59 had died of disease or injury.
• Of the 41 alive in 1861 - 10 joined the Confederacy, 26 the Union, and 5 sat out the war. Two of these five spent the war as Vermont farmers, 2 had left the country (England and Cuba) and didn't bother to return, and 1 is simply listed as "whereabouts unknown".
• 8 of the 10 Confederate Graduates became Generals. Davis, a West Point grad himself, gave preferential treatment to West Pointers.
• 10 of the 26 Union grads became Generals. After McClellan, the most important were probably Reno, Couch, Stoneman, and Sturgis.
• Of the 36 who fought; 4 Confederates died along with 3 of the 26 Unionists.
• AP Hill is sometimes listed as "Class of '46" but didn't graduate until 1847.

The Old South - Described

From Temple's "East Tennessee in the Civil War":

But, while the North was capturing and organizing new states in the North-west, and extending its empire of thought to the Pacific, the South was slowly moving on as it had done fifty years before. The negro and the mule were the two great factors in its growth, and they leisurely moved on in the old way. They tilled the fields and raised the cotton, the sugar, the rice and the tobacco on which all prosperity depended. Kentucky, Tennessee and the West furnished the mule, the corn, the hay and the bacon. Southern harbors were filled, for the most part, only with coasting vessels. The harbors and the great natural highways to a large extent remained unimproved, because of the supersensitive scruples of Southern statesmen on constitutional questions.

Free, universal education was unknown. The great body of the people were poorly educated, many not at all. The result was, that they were generally thriftless, nerveless and non-progressive. As a rule, only the sons of wealthy men were thoroughly educated. The most promising sons of the rich planters were sent to the University of Virginia, or to Princeton, or Yale, or West Point, to be educated for the bar or the army, with the hope of their ultimately going to congress or becoming governors or great generals, while some were educated for the ministry or for the profession of medicine. The army or a political life was thought to be the highway to honor. Many of the young men on the great plantations grew up with no definite aim, no high purpose. They frolicked, and played cards, and followed the yelping hounds; they "sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play."

Manufacturing received but little encouragement; It served to develop a spirit of independent thought among the operatives, inconsistent with the safety of slavery. Skilled laborers, especially of the higher grade, would read and think and talk. Slavery was naturally repugnant to them, because it degraded them and their own labor. It tended to lower all laborers to the level of slaves. Trading was only tolerated as a necessity. Mining was almost unknown. The mechanic arts were only practiced in a small way. Planting and war were the only honorable callings aside from the learned professions. Even the learned professions were considered inferior in dignity to the other two. The little land owners who cultivated their fields with their own hands did not rise into the honorable dignity of planters. They were farmers, laborers, "poor whites."Only the man with his broad acres, his drove of Negroes, and his overseer was styled a planter. Without the appendage of an overseer—the most cruel and despicable of men—the position of no planter was high.

The great planter was a man of power. He was courted and honored. The doors of society opened wide at his approach. No wonder he became arrogant and haughty. Yet he possessed many noble qualities. He was brave, generous, magnanimous, sincere and honorable. Certainly in his day he had his good things—"was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day."From the serene heights of his fancied exaltation, the great planter looked down with cold contempt on the large body of Northern men. He regarded them as little tillers of the soil, petty traders, low shop-keepers, enslaved mechanics, howling fanatics and lovers of money. They were mean in spirit, cowardly, narrow, selfish and abased. Mammon was their God. If they gave to objects of charity, it was on a cold calculation that they would get back in some way two dollars for every one given. The operatives in factories were the slaves of the lordly manufacturers, with fewer comforts than the bondsmen of the South.

African-American Troops in the Civil War

After watching "Glory" (and reading some of the comments) I just wanted to write some facts about African-American troops in the Civil war. It seems that after being neglected for over 120 years the pendulum has swung the other way, and many people are completely overestimating the impact and importance of African-American Soldiers in the Civil War. Some facts:

• Of the estimated 2, 000,000 men who served in the Union Army about 186,000 were "Colored" (the 19th century term for Black Americans). Mostly former slaves, they were a nice addition to the Union's manpower pool, but not essential. Only 50 percent of Northerners ages 18-35 served in the Union army, so having blacks enlist allowed some whites to stay home, but thats it.
• Of the 110,000 Union soldiers killed in battle about 3,000 were African-American. That's about 3 percent. Almost 99 percent of the 30,000 union soldiers who died in Confederate prisons were white.
• Very few African-American units saw action prior to 1864. Those that did were like the famous "54th Massachusetts" used in "side-show" operations. So, no African American units at Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Shiloh, Antietam, Stones River, Bull Run, 2nd Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, or Seven Days.
• Even after January 1864 African American units were used for Garrison duty, guarding lines of communications, "side show" operations, and guarding supply wagons. For example, Sherman's Army in the Atlanta campaign (May-September 1864) and the March-to-the-Sea and the Carolina's (November 1864-March 1865) had no African-American Combat units. The Army of the Potomac during the "Overland Campaign" (May to June 1864) had no black artillery or Calvary regiments. And only 2 of its 44 infantry brigades were African-Americans. Even the famed Battle of Franklin (November 1864) was an "all-white" affair.
• African American troops did fight in some significant battles, the Battle of Crater in July 1864, the Battle of Nashville in December 1864, and the Siege of Petersburg from June 1864 to March 1865. Some 280 "Colored" soldiers were killed by Forest's Calvary at Fort Pillow, Tennessee. Some call it a massacre since only 70 were taken prisoner.
• Black troops should have led the attack during the Battle of the crater in July 1864, but Grant and Meade were afraid they would be called 'racists' if the attack failed, so white troops led the attack. As Grant explained later:

General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front, and I believe if he had done so it would have been a success. Still I agreed with General Meade as to his objections to that plan. General Meade said that if we put the colored troops in front (we had only one division) and it should prove a failure, it would then be said and very properly, that we were shoving these people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about them. But that could not be said if we put white troops in front."

The Folly of Fort Sumter

From Temple's "The Civil War In East Tennessee":

With this avowed purpose on the part of Mr. Lincoln, which he carefully pursued, it may afford a curious theme for speculation as to what would have been the fate of the Southern Confederacy if Sumter had not been assaulted, or if some similar act of open war had not been resorted to. Would it have gone on exercising the powers of government over the states which had seceded until its authority had become securely cemented and established? Would Virginia, Tennesseeand North Carolina have joined the seceded states? Sooner or later this is most probable. Would the people of the North have acquiesced in this dismemberment of the government? Yes, at that time, in preference to civil war. In this very contingency such men as Greeley, Seward, Thurlow Weed and Crittenden, and thousands of others, if they did not all say, as Mr. Greeley did, let the cotton states "go in peace," they did all insist in spirit that there should be no coercion to restrain them from going. Previous to this time, Expresident Pierce had written to Jefferson Davis, assuring him that if there was to be fighting "it will not be along Mason's and Dixon's line merely. It will be within our own borders, in our own streets, between the two classes of citizens to whom I have referred." "The Albany Argus," a Democratic paper said: "The first gun fired in the way of forcing a seceding state back into the Union would probably prove the knell of its final dismemberment."

So high was the tide of public opinion running, at the time of the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, against the party that had elevated him to power, especially against the Abolition part of it, that it is almost certain that any attempt at coercion against the people of the seceding states, would have been followed in the North by mobs, riots and civil war. Mr. Lincoln saw and knew the hazardous condition of affairs around him. He knew that a blow prematurely struck at secession was more likely to produce a revolution in the North than to end the existing one. In addition to his earnest desire to avoid the shedding of blood, there was necessary on his part the most cautious statesmanship. A single false step would prove fatal to the Union. He must so act as to put the South clearly in the wrong before the world in the event of a conflict of arms. There must be no divided North. He delayed, apparently hesitated, and seemingly negotiated with the enemy. He refused to reenforce Sumter, and only attempted to send provisions to the starving garrison. No troops were mustered for the national defense, not one; no force was used; no threats were made. Never did Mr. Lincoln exhibit a more masterly wisdom, or pro founder sagacity than in this crisis. By his discretion, secession came to a standstill. The North was petrified with fear. A majority had turned with rage against the triumphant party. In the South there was danger, as Mr. Gilchrist said, that some of the states would return to the old Union.

And now came the stupendous folly of firing on Sumter. That single act, in "one hour by Shrewsbury's clock" united the divided North. Without that, or some equally foolish deed, the North could never have been brought to the point of resisting the South, and secession would have triumphed. But when the nation's honor was assailed, and the national flag brought low, sympathy was in a moment turned to wrath, and men everywhere rushed to arms. That first shot, as it went sounding round the world, announcing the commencement of the conflict, was also sounding the death knell of the Southern Confederacy, But for that shot, it might be in existence to-day as a government. But it accomplished its purpose in the direction intended. By it, Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina were induced, most unwisely but most naturally, to rush to the help, not of the aggrieved party, but of the aggressor. But it did more than this—something not anticipated. It lost to the South, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, East Tennessee, Kentucky and Missouri. And still more; by this needless act, the North was brought together in one hour as one man in the determination to avenge the nation's insult, and to lift up and restore the fallen and dishonored flag. Thus Mr. Davis by that shot did what no other power on earth could have done—united the divided North.

The Southern people were sadly mistaken. They expected a divided North. Such would have been the case if the leaders had waited in patience for the fruit to ripen. There can scarcely exist a doubt that a large majority of the Northern people would have voted, in the spring of 1861, to let the seceding states go in preference to the alternative of Civil War. So shocking, so dreadful was the idea of such a war that men were ready to give up everything rather than have such an affliction. But when the nation's honor was insulted, the feeling of brotherhood was turned into rage, that of peace into determined relentless war.

To the last the South was mistaken. They believed the Northern people would not fight. They expected easy victories. Washington, as they boasted, would soon be their capitol. One enthusiastic orator—a senator in the Confederate congress—boasted that they would soon quaff wine from golden goblets in the palaces of New York. Another gentlemen boasted that he would call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument. The boast was universal, and perhaps the belief also, that one Southern man could whip five Yankees. An Alabama gentleman reached the climax when he declared in a public speech that they could whip the North with pop-guns made out of elder stalks.1

It really appears as if Providence intended that the Southern people should be the instruments of the destruction of their own favorite institution. At a period when there was, for the first time in twenty years, peace between the two sections, they broke that peace by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and thus turned loose the angry winds of sectionalism. This in the end, through successive steps, led to secession. And when war came, the conviction gradually grew on the minds of men that that was the opportunity offered by Heaven for destroying slavery. It had caused one war, said they ; it should not cause another. Let it perish—by the war. And thus the folly of men was made to do the will of God.

The Real Reason for the Civil War

From "East Tennessee in the Civil War" By Oliver Temple:

Diplomacy and negotiation, however, to say nothing of conciliation, were still open to the Southern States when war was inaugurated by them. At this very time, as is shown in detail elsewhere, the people of the North were ready to concede to the slave states nearly everything they might demand, if they would forego their determination to leave the Union. They could have had whatever they demanded. But no concessions, no guaranties, it is believed, would have satisfied the ambitious leaders. They asked for none; they would have accepted none, They wanted independence and that only.

The controversy—at least the essential part of it—could have been adjusted. It ought to have been. A terrible responsibility lies at the door of one section or the other in that it was not settled. There was no necessity for war. It could and should have been avoided if the North had stood out defiantly in the winter of 1860-1861—if Mr. Lincoln and congress had obstinately refused any concessions, or had manifested no spirit of conciliation, no return of brotherly love—they would have stood forever before the world as haughty and implacable in their overwhelming strength. But they exhibited, in this hour, no implacable hatred, no haughty confidence born of conscious superiority of power.

"Put it in your book," said to the author, an intelligent and most worthy gentleman from Alabama, an ex-Confederate surgeon, who served in the army during the whole war, part of the time under Forrest—" put it in your book, that there should have been no war, that the differences should have been adjusted; that the people of the North and of the South were of substantially the same blood and did not hate each other, and that the war was the work of ambitious politicians and bad men on each side. The great body of the people on both sides were opposed to the war."

It would be surprising, if we could exactly ascertain, how small the number of men in the South is who are actually responsible for the inauguration of the war. Up to the close of the presidential election in 1860, it is doubtful whether as many as a thousand in all the Southern States were working for the distinct object of separation. Previous to the time of firing on Sumter, it is doubtful whether in a single state, aside from South Carolina and Mississippi, a majority of the people were in their hearts honestly for a separation from the Union. They professed to be, it is true. But every one familiar with the fearful despotism of public opinion, in the cotton states, on the subject of slavery, will readily realize how impossible it was to resist this public sentiment in the winter and spring of 1861. In most of the states but few men were found brave enough to do so, and in some of the states secession swept over them with the suddenness and fury of a tropical tornado.

The War of Secession is generally regarded as the "Slaveholders' War." It would be more correct to call it the "Politicians' War." In the beginning it was the work alone of ambitious politicians. Gradually the circle widened and other classes were drawn into it. Finally whole sections were seized with the idea. Thus, from a beginning started by a few men, the movement spread over eight states.

Slavery was the remote, but not the immediate, cause of the war. This institution was as secure in 1861 as it was in 1820, and if the South had waited and willed it, it could have been so hedged around by constitutional guaranties and safeguards as to place it forever beyond the power of government to molest. Slavery was made the excuse, the pretext for the war. It was the rallying cry of the daring leaders when they would inflame the minds of the Southern people with madness.

Jefferson Davis - Decides to Flee to Mexico & not die in the last ditch

Letter to Varina Davis April 23, 1865:

I think my judgement is undisturbed by any pride of opinion or of place, I have prayed to our heavenly Father to give me wisdom and fortitude equal to the demands of the position in which Providence has placed me. I have sacrificed so much for the cause of the Confederacy that I can measure my ability to make any further sacrifice required, and am assured there is but one to which I am not equal, my Wife and my Children. How are they to be saved from degradation or want is now my care. During the suspension of hostilities you may have the best opportunity to go to Missi. and thence either to sail from Mobile for a foreign port or to cross the river and proceed to Texas, as the one or the other may be more practicable. The little sterling you have will be a very scanty store and under other circumstances would not be counted, but if our land can be sold that will secure you from absolute want.

For myself it may be that our Enemy will prefer to banish me, it may be that a devoted band of Cavalry will cling to me and that I can force my way across the Missi. and if nothing can be done there which it will be proper to do, then I can go to Mexico and have the world from which to choose a location. Dear Wife this is not the fate to which I invited when the future was rose-colored to us both; but I know you will bear it even better than myself and that /of us two/ I alone will ever look back reproachfully on my past career.

Jefferson Davis - Delusional - Beauregard's View - April 1865

General Beauregard, in his conference with the President, also told him that, from Macon, General Cobb reported that the enemy's cavalry had penetrated North Alabama, from the Tennessee River, threatening Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery; while another force of cavalry, supported by infantry and artillery, was advancing, through North Georgia, on Atlanta, Columbus, and Macon, where he, General Cobb, had but few troops, principally local and State reserves, to oppose to them.

General Beauregard also said to Mr. Davis that the picture he presented to him was most gloomy, but that he thought it his duty to attempt no concealment of the truth, so that the President might have a clear knowledge of the situation, and be prepared for the inevitable. President Davis lent an attentive ear to the account thus given of the hopeless condition of the Confederacy, but appeared, nevertheless, undismayed. He said that the struggle could still be carried on to a successful issue, by bringing out all our latent resources; that if the worst came to the worst, we might, by crossing the Mississippi River, with such troops as we could retreat with, unite with Kirby Smith's army, which he estimated at some sixty thousand men, and prolong the war indefinitely. General Beauregard did not expect, and was amazed at, this evidence of visionary hope on the part of the President. He admired his confidence, but inwardly condemned what to him seemed to be a total want of judgment and a misconception of the military resources of the country.

The President on that day (11th April), after his interview with General Beauregard, sent telegrams to General Johnston, by way of Raleigh... and one to Governor Vance, also at Raleigh. They fully indicate the state of Mr. Davis's mind at the time, and need no commentary:

"Greensboro", N. C, April Uth, 1865. "Governor Z. B. Vance, Raleigh, N. C.:"I have no official report, but scouts, said to be reliable, and whose statements were circumstantial and corroborative, represent the disaster as extreme."I have not heard from General Lee since the 6th instant, and have little or no hope from his army as an organized body. I expected to visit you at Raleigh, but am accidentally prevented from executing that design, and would be very glad to see you here, if you can come at once, or to meet you elsewhere in North Carolina at a future time. We must redouble our efforts to meet present disaster. An army holding its position with determination to fight on, and manifest ability to maintain the struggle, will attract all the scattered soldiers and daily rapidly gather strength."Moral influence is wanting, and I am sure you can do much now to revive the spirit and hope of the people. Jeffn. Davis."

*From the Military Operations of P.T. Beauregard Volume II

Jefferson Davis - Delusional - Joe Johnston's View - April 1865

From General Joseph Johnston's "My Negotiations" (N.A. Review August 1886)

On April 10th, the Federal army commenced its march toward Raleigh. The Confederate troops moved in the same direction. Having the advantage of a day's march, they reached Raleigh the next afternoon, when I received, by telegraph, orders to report to the President at Greensboro' without delay.

[Johnston meets with Davis on April 12th, and Davis makes wild statements that the army will soon number in the hundreds of thousands]

I reached the station there early in the morning of the 12th, and was General Beauregard's guest in the box-car in which he lodged... We found Davis with three members of his Cabinet—Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Beagan... We had supposed that the President wished to obtain information from us of the military condition of that department, but it soon appeared that we were to receive, not to give information. For those present were told, with very little preface, that, in two or three weeks, the President would have in the field a larger army than the Confederacy ever had in its ranks at one time, by calling out the many thousands who had abandoned the service, and all those enrolled by the conscript bureau, who could not be brought into it by the military force used for the purpose by that bureau. It was suggested that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who under similar circumstances could not be forced into it, would scarcely return to it, or enter it, in its present hopeless condition, upon a mere invitation. The fact that we had not arms enough for the soldiers who stood by their colors made this scheme inexpressibly wild. But no opinions were asked and we were dismissed.

Before leaving the room, General Breckenridge came as expected, .and reported that General Lee had capitulated on the 9th. After this intelligence, General Beauregard and I carefully considered the state of our affairs. We found ourselves compelled to admit that the military resources of the South were exhausted, and that the Confederacy was overthrown.

General Beauregard and I were summoned to the President's quarters next morning (the 13th); I supposed at General Breckenridge's suggestion. We were desired to compare the military condition of the Confederacy with that of the United States. As spokesman, I said that we had an army of 20,000 * infantry and artillery, and 5,000f mounted troops; against which the United States could bring three: that in Virginia of 180,000, as we were informed ; that in North Carolina of 110,000, and that in Alabama of 60,000, making odds against us of at least fifteen to one. Then we had neither money nor credit, and no arms except those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition excepting that in their cartridge-boxes, nor shops to repair arms or fix ammunition; and that therefore the only effect of our keeping the field would be the devastation of our country and the ruin of the people, and this, too, without inflicting harm on the enemy. I asserted further that it would be the highest of human crimes to continue the war. General Beauregard assented decidedly to this view.

The members of the Cabinet were then desired by the President to express their opinions as to the possibility of our continuing the war. GeneralBreckenridge and Messrs. Mallory and Reagan concurred with the military officers—that we had been overcome in arms, and that it was necessary to make peace. But Mr. Benjamin entertained the opposite opinion, which he asserted in a speech enthusiastically warlike.

[Johnston then met with Sherman and signed a convention for peace that was repudiated by President Johnson. ]

In the afternoon of the 24th I received from the President, who was then in Charlotte, notice by telegraph that he had ratified the terms of pacification agreed upon by General Sherman and me on the 18th. Within an hour thereafter a courier brought me from General Hampton two communications from General Sherman—one giving notice of the rejection of the terms above mentioned by the President of the United States, and the other announcing the termination of the armistice forty-eight hours after noon of that day. These facts were communicated to the administration without delay; and I proposed that, to prevent further devastation of our country by the marching of armies, our army should be disbanded.

[Davis orders Johnston to disband the infantry and keep on fighting]

A reply dated 11 P.m., April 24th, was received early next morning. It suggested that the infantry might be disbanded then, to re-assemble at a place named. I was directed to bring with me all the cavalry, a few light field-pieces, and all other men who could be mounted on serviceable beasts. I declined to obey this order; giving as my reason, that it provided for the performance of but one of the three important duties I had to perform—securing the safety of the President and Cabinet, but not that of the people and of the army, and I suggested the immediate escape of the high civil officers under a proper escort.

The confident belief that it would be a high crime to continue the war governed me in this instance, as it had prompted me to urge the civil authorities of the South to end the war. The arrangement ordered would have put the great bodies of Union troops in motion, everywhere spreading suffering and ruin among our people, without serving the object of the President's escape as well as an escort of a few picked men would have done.

[Having rejected Davis' crazy plan, Johnston met with Sherman and made peace in N.C., S.C, Ga. and Florida]

I determined, therefore, to make another effort to bring about a pacification—within the extent of my command, at least—in the confidence that it would spread fast to the West and South. In that hope I proposed another armistice to General Sherman, and another arrangement, on the basis of the military clause in the agreement of the 18th. General Sherman sent a favorable reply very promptly; so that I was able to set out early on the 26th to meet him at Bennett's, as before, after reporting to the Administration that I was about to do so. We met at Mr. Bennett's about noon ; and, as General Sherman was anxious to restore tranquillity to the country, we soon agreed upon terms, and established peace within the limits of our commands, which were the same.

Marshall to MacArthur - March 29 1945

#5-076

To General of the Army Douglas MacArthur1

March 29, 1945 Radio No. WAR-60363. Washington, D.C.

Top Secret

TOPSEC personal for MacArthur for his Eyes Only from Marshall.

Command in Pacific is under consideration but complete solution with respect to command and future operations has not as yet been resolved.2

For your information the following portions of the future directive seem in general to be agreed upon although JCS formal approval has not yet been given, the delaying being due to failure so far to reach agreement as to certain details referred to below.

I. The over-all objective in the war against Japan, to be brought about at the earliest practicable date, is:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments, and destroying Japanese Air and Naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

It is expected that the JCS will assign you the responsibility to:

(1) Complete the occupation of Luzon and conduct such additional operations in the Philippines as required for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan. Further to the foregoing, conduct such additional operations toward completing the liberation of the Philippines as can be mounted without prejudice to the accomplishment of the overall objective.

(2) Make plans for occupying North Borneo, including Brunei Bay, using Australian combat and service troops and make preparations at such time as resources can be made available without detriment to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Units of the British Pacific Fleet may be allocated for this operation.

(3) Provide forces and support to Nimitz to assist him in completion of the seizure and development of positions in the Ryukyus as required in his current directive under provisions of Part II below.

(4) Establish bases in the Philippines to support further advances for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan.

II. It appears that agreement will be reached by the JCS placing Army resources in Pacific under you. The point at issue which has so long delayed a final agreement is the degree and manner of control that you as Army Commander will exercise as to Army troops throughout the Pacific which are of necessity closely integrated in Naval Base and other operations and in the Naval Logistical problem.

You will be given responsibility for planning, preparation and conduct of actual invasion of Japan. Nimitz would be given responsibility for amphibious phase of the operation.3